Here are some findings from the Hearings of the General Board of the Navy conducted in oct. 1918 about the US gunnery in british services after practicing nine months at Scapa:
Complains about the poor accuracy of US BBīs are explained for with these points:
 poor crew quality following the rapid expansion of the USN and drafting of many green and unseasoned crews, particularely an issue for USS TEXAS
 there was no long range firing range in the US (to be constructed in 1918) and many of the ideas concerning long range firing couldnīt be tested for this reason
 poor dispersion. British ships regularely had about 200 yard dispersion in range with five gun (half-) salvos while US full gun half salvos in the best case (USS FLORIDA) had 400 yard range dispersion and in the worst case (USS WYOMING, USS TEXAS) exceeded 1000 yard dispersion in range. Typical dispersion was 500 to 750 yard in range. Possible causes include:
[a] guns from different manufacturer with different copper increasement in the bore
[b] magazines not air conditioned as in british practices, causing different charge temperatures
[c] more pointed, longer windscreens not adjusted for a higher spin rate and some in-flight-instabilities
[d] twin gun mountings to close together
[e] missing follow-the-pointer-gear for elevation
[f] erratic heel in some ships (USS DELAWARE)
 Insufficient integrated and complete firecontroll equipment. When the fleet arrived there was no follow-the-pointer-gear aviable and it was refitted for training early in 1918 but not for elevation. Additionally, there were problems to transmit the ranges, which took longer than in british practices. On the other hand, the Ford Mk I range predictor and the long baselength rangefinders gave a good account of themselves.
 Exposure:There was no splinterproof cover for either RF and spotting equipment or personal in US BBīs. Additionally, in weather conditions encountered typically in the North Sea, the only aviable turret-RF were mounted to low and became spray affected and awash in anything but calm Seas. While Readings could not be secured from RF positions, alternative aloft RF positions theoretically could have secured readings but the cage mast made this idea impractical."The present location of the rangefinders is a menace. We would loose them very early in a fight of any size."
The spotting tops in the cage masts also missed weatherproof housings.
 poorer Searchlight controlls in night conditions and fragile searchlight mountings
 poorer practice in division firing simulating battle conditions
The firing procedure called for the -by british practices abandoned- spot instead of ladder firing caused large time lags between each salvoīs and the larger dispersion made it impossible to determine whether or not the MPI was close to the target. The large dispersion meant that if the MPI wasnīt close to the target, there was still some likelyhood to straddle it but despite full gun salvoīs, the excessive dispersion meant that the probability to achive a hit from a straddle was lower, too.
The USN was able to sort out most of these problems following a rapid progression in the decade after 1920 but by 1918, it was unlikely that they could approach a long range engagement with an efficiency approaching that recorded for british forces and they would be much more suspect to degraded firecontroll for reasons of weather and splinterdamage.