More Brutal: World War 1 or World War II?

[Michael Dorosh]

I would say that the Western Front in WWI was more 'wasteful'. The idea of sacrificing so many men for so little gain for so long. The learning curve for the generals was far too flat.

Flat??!

In 1914, artillery was sited in the front lines and firing over open sights, officers were riding horses and carrying swords, infantry were wearing red pants, the basic unit of maneuver was the company, and by 1915 everyone was mired in trench warfare.

In 1917, out of whole cloth, they had invented tanks, combined arms, the use of wireless communications, the use of indirect artillery fire (the British had experimented with it in South Africa to little effect), sound ranging and flash spotting for counter-battery fire, trench raids, armoured cars, the infantry squad, the light machine gun, the sub machine gun, the steel helmet, body armour, the trench mortar, the hand grenade, and tactics to use all that stuff.

All these things were developed over the course of about two years, which is a pretty short time when you think about it.

There was really nothing so revolutionary during the Second World War in terms of tactical innovation, not that comes to mind immediately. Tactics certainly evolved, but more gradually. Certainly the development of artillery usage in the Second World War was a major step forward, and amphibious tactics was also a major development - but I still don't think it matches the enormous learning curve they had in the First World War - from trench warfare to - dare I say it - "blitzkrieg" - in two years.

That was anything but flat.

['Ol Fezziwig]

<belligerent sophistry snipped>.

Jim was talking about the higher-level operational handling of armies vice the tactical innovations you so glibly and incorrectly toss about. The tendency of the brass to stand in front of a map and vaguely wave their arms showing their anticipated 'breakthroughs' and where the 'exploiting cavalry' was to be deployed never changed throughout the war, despite myriad tactical devices.

Despite the innovations you mention-which would be felt on the battlefield, few were realistically incorporated into the battle plans of either side; they were more akin to a "Gambler's Risk". The problems of how to prosecute the battle after the initial FEBA was reached were never solved.
The desired penetration-breakthrough-exploitation effect was beyond the capabilities of either side in the West; in the East, only the collapse of the Russians allowed anything near that desired end.

Certainly, Haig never grasped his plans were beyond his means; he kept employing the same basic plan, only increasing the scope each time, hoping this time he really would break the German's back. It is in this vein that Jim speaks of a "flat learning curve" and it is in that vein he is correct.

[Michael Dorosh]

Jim was talking about the higher-level operational handling of armies vice the tactical innovations

You can't get to one without mastering first the other. My point is that the British did both, and by 1917 were doing quite well and by the late summer of 1918 were unbeatable. The learning curve was not especially flat if you take into consideration the time it took to overcome the technical hurdles first.

Haig was generally well thought of, incidentally, after the war. Especially by veterans who actually served. He also has many defenders in the historical community, particularly in recent years. Corrigan ("Mud, Blood and Poppycock"), certainly, but also Terraine and Carlyon.

It didn't take a lot of time if you stop looking at it in hindsight. Much of the midwar period was a stalemate situation. The Somme in July 1916 was forced on the British, who had to do something and had to do it with a citizen army with no training. Martin Middlebrook gave a lecture on his book First Day on the Somme at our local military museum and I spoke briefly with him on the subject; it was a fun evening. I asked him what choice the British had but to use the "same old tactics" in the same old way on 1 July. Kitcheners Army was not an army, it was miners and bank clerks in Pals Battalions. The company wave was about all they were capable of. Middlebrook conceded that there might possibly be something to that point...

Nothing happens overnight, even with all the good will in the world.

[Martin Mayers]

A much misunderstood and misrepresented man was Haig

[Michael Dorosh]

A much misunderstood and misrepresented man was Haig

Absolutely agree.

[Martin Mayers]

Absolutely agree.

My history teacher at college whom I admired more than any other teacher I have ever met for putting history on the map for me, bringing it to life etc. once asked us all what we thought of Haig.

Needless to say, generally speaking, we all had the impressions that he was an oaf. We'd read Owen and Sassoon, lions led by lambs and all that and of course this, the stark facts, and the tv programming around at the time had completely led our views.

Said teacher, Bob Hope he was called (!!) introduced us to a 'game' he had on the old BBC microcomputer. Turns out it was a World War One simulation of the Battle of the Somme and had been produced for education purposes.

So, we all dabbled at length with this game...the results basically being that we came up with very little which changed things dramatically. Casualty rates tended to be pretty much on a par. Limited successes. etc.

What this thing did was bring home the real dilemmas which the HQ were facing and the difficulties they had when lacking weapons capable of breaking the stalemate.

There's an interesting statistic for me. Which single weapon caused the overwhelming majority of casualties in World War One.....I suspect most of your historical experts know the answer....but if you don't...hazard a guess

[Michael Dorosh]

There's an interesting statistic for me. Which single weapon caused the overwhelming majority of casualties in World War One.....I suspect most of your historical experts know the answer....but if you don't...hazard a guess

Great story. The dilemma for Haig was indeed real. It's easy to forget that - a good way to approach it is to ask yourself - as your teacher made your class do - what would you have done instead, given the resources at hand? Doing nothing was not an option.

I am not an "expert" but I will attempt an answer to your question anyway. My understanding is it was artillery causing the majority of casualties, followed by machine guns, then small arms and Bayonets were less than 1% of the total, approaching 0.

And the casualties were suffered over the course of a year; major attacks were a rarity, but it was the constant drip, drip, drip that ran the numbers up. A relief in place, a week in the line, constant patrolling - there were always guys getting hit, in ones and twos.

Going back to the original question, my own regiment suffered 1,313 fatalities between February 1915 and November 1918, and about 430 from July 1944 to May 1945. Wounded was usually a factor of four, but I that's 29 KIA per month in the First World War and 43 KIA in the Second. Very rough numbers, but I think consistent with the experience of other units.

[Martin Mayers]

Artillery yes. Overwhelmingly so.

Most people who don't know instinctively say "the machine gun"....because that is what has been conditioned into people....masses of troops being mown down across no mans land by machine guns.

The sad truth of course was that most didn't even get far enough to be shot.

[Michael Dorosh]

Artillery yes. Overwhelmingly so.

Most people who don't know instinctively say "the machine gun"....because that is what has been conditioned into people....masses of troops being mown down across no mans land by machine guns.

The sad truth of course was that most didn't even get far enough to be shot.

And they were exposed to them far, far less than they were to artillery. Coming out to fight in broad daylight happened rarely. And they could expect to be out of the front-line trenches quite often, as the rotation system was generally quite good - though being in support trenches still left them exposed to artillery.

[Ken Hampel]

All these things were developed over the course of about two years, which is a pretty short time when you think about it.

Not when someone is shooting at you