HPS Simulations Blog

Replacements

Replacements is the strength recovery of a unit based on the individual unit's replacement rate that is applied in the Order of Battle. Replacements are in addition to the recovery rate (if any) which is specified in the parameters data. It important to familiarize yourself with replacements and how to get the maximum amount of replacements to your units. The most critical aspect of gaining replacements is the Local Supply Level. First World War Campaigns titles are meant to be played with the Virtual Supply Truck optional rule activated. By activating this rule, your supply levels can vary across the map depending on the location of the hex in relation to the nearest supply source that is providing supply to that hex. The replacement rate of the unit is directly influenced by the supply level, therefore if your units are located in an area with poor supply then you will receive a reduced rate of replacements. When the local supply is greater than 50%, you will receive 100% of the assigned replacement rate of that unit each turn, which is typically 3 or 4% strength for 1914. This might seem like a lot, but the supply levels decline a great deal by the end of 1914 and during the later periods of the campaign it is quite unrealistic to expect your units to have a > 50% local supply value level at all times. As your units advance and as the campaign progresses to the late period, the local supply level will drop and you will receive less replacements based on the local supply level. If a unit has a replacement rate of 3% and is drawing on a local supply of 40%, then that unit will receive only 2/3rds of its maximum replacement rate (which would be 2%).42 The replacement rate is reduced even further (halved) if the unit in question is out of range of its parent HQ (detached). With this in mind, when resting units it is advisable to position them in range of its parent HQ and to position the units in an area that is getting a "good" supply level that is greater than 50% (this might require you to move the units out of a forested or swampy area and move them closer to a road or rail network).

42 See the user manual for more information on Replacements.
Infantry movement speed

The regular infantry speed decided on was 3 hexes per turn, which turns about to be about 1.86 miles per two hour turn of cross country, tactical movement. Non-tactical road movement is about 3.72 miles per two hour turn.43 These movement rates might seem slow, and they are indeed regulated, but when factors are considered such as the general over burdening of the average infantry soldier during this period, a steady, regulated road march pace to manage fatigue, and the general cautiousness when moving in the face of the enemy, then it is indeed a realistic rate. Tactical movement during this period was practically done at a snail's pace when compared to the mechanized warfare of the 1940s. Tactical movement is always exponentially slower than a non-tactical road march movement since contact with enemy is either likely or possible, and the unit is advancing slowly and cautiously scanning its surroundings because of this. Typical training manuals of the period stated that divisions could be expected to obtain a 4 km/h road march speed, but it is arguable if this speed was sustainable for many days in a row, but most importantly, given the nature of a wargame, users are inclined to constantly keep their units on the march rather than stopping for any reason whatsoever. Rather than allow a constant 4 km/h road march speed, a more conservative 3 km/h movement rate is used. This makes it so that in order to obtain a forced march of 50 km distance, the user would have to march his units for every turn in the day and night (thus gaining fatigue at night and preventing this speed from being sustained indefinitely).44 The best infantry of the period had the ability to march 40-50 km a day in a forced march,45 and in First World War Campaigns and average line infantry unit can achieve 48 km a day on flat terrain if it force marches during the night turns. This approach works well since it causes the unit to get fatigue (when the Night Fatigue Optional Rule is used). There are of course "light infantry" units in the Order of Battle that have faster speeds (4 km/h)

43 This is .93 miles per hour and 1.86 miles per hour respectively.
44 A “normal” day.s march for infantry of the period was 22-25 km. Zuber, 29.
45 Zuber, 29.

because they had lighter packs, were generally in better physical condition, and were trained and conditioned to maintain higher paced movement (64 km forced march distance is possible for average light infantry units).

As a former light infantryman myself, I have personally conducted a forced 30 mile (50 kilometers to the people in the rest of the world) road march in one day, with modern equipment and weapon, and I was unable to walk properly for several days thereafter.46 Sustaining this pace over several days would certainly not be possible or practical, unless the unit in question was of elite quality. Although modern infantry are increasingly being over burdened with equipment at weights that are becoming progressively similar to the weight of load that infantry of the First World War carried, infantry of the First World War typically carried up to 60 lb (30 kg) loads of equipment,47 which was quite heavy compared to the typical rifleman of the Second World War.48

46 This forced road march was conducted with a full ruck sack, an M16A2 with 120 rounds of ammo, Kevlar (helmet), LBE (belt and suspenders with canteens), protective mask and MOPP suit (carried, not worn). Given the distance covered and the time it took to complete, the road march rate was roughly 2.5 miles per hour, factoring in stops to change socks, drink water, and consume food.

47 Zuber, 29.
48 Depending on the source, while also keeping mind that Second World War infantry did not fight with their packs on, where as early First World War infantry did.

Panzer Campaigns users may notice that the movement cost parameters differ slightly in this series, and that is due to a slight difference in time scale. A typical Panzer Campaigns day has 10 turns in it while a typical First World War Campaigns day only has 8 turns in it. So, with that in mind, infantry in First World War Campaigns can actually achieve similar (almost identical) road movement speeds as they can in Panzer Campaigns. However, it must be considered that the infantry of both wars differed to the point that it can be considered that World War Two infantry were the direct descendent of the light / assault infantry hybrid that came into being at the end of World War One (Sturmtruppen / Stoßtruppen).
Unit frontages, attack formation

A successful attack comes from knowing where and how to concentrate your forces. Typical German “by the book” attack formations of the period shed light on how you should concentrate your forces.49 In the attack, a German infantry regiment.s frontage was only 1 km wide, with the regiment deployed in depth. Depending on the situation, usually only one battalion would be in the front and the other two battalions would be in reserve, ready to relieve the front battalion, or ready to move forward to administer an assault. The infantry regiment.s MG companies were usually in front with the lead battalion, ready to deploy to provide a base of fire, as was the division.s field guns. The “book” attack frontage for a brigade was therefore only 2 km wide, the division was 4 km wide, and a corps was 8 km wide.50 It is easy to see how the Germans intended to concentrate as much force on a small area to provide for a sustained attack. The deployment in depth was a direct result of observation experience of the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria. On the attack, the deployment in depth ensures that reserves can move forward to provide a fresh impetus to the momentum of the advance. The Japanese deployed on too broad of a front on the attack and did not have reserves in depth so their attacks frequently stalled. Of course, the situation did not always allow the book to be followed, but it does give the attacker a guideline to follow; attacking in depth should always be preferred to width in World War One. And if it can be spared, a defense in depth is almost an immovable force.

49 The “book” is referring to the 1909 Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie, the German infantry field manual.
50 Zuber, 53.

On the attack, if you follow this strict frontage guideline where possible, then you should be able to use the front battalion to absorb fire and whittle away the defenders to get disruptions, then commit the reserve to assault and get a breakthrough. The key here is knowing when to commit the reserve for the assault and when to simply relieve the forward battalion to continue the attack by fire. The “book.s” decision point on when to commit the assault is in the cold calculated moment that the attack begins to suffer from noticeably less retaliatory fire, when it is discovered that they are disrupted or low on ammo or suffering from some other combat related stresses like high fatigue.

Unit frontages, defense formation

In the defense, the “book” prescribed that wider frontages could be the norm given that a defending force could spread out and still effectively hold ground. The frontages were essentially doubled in the defense, with a regiment usually holding a 2 km front (two battalions on the line, one in reserve), a brigade holding a 4 km front, a division holding an 8-9 km front and a corps holding a 16-18 km front. As mentioned, if it can be spared, a defense in depth is obviously preferred over width. It is important, much more so than is true in the Panzer Campaigns and Modern Campaigns series, to keep track of enemy formation names on enemy units with Fog of War on. In other words, you should keep a careful eye on enemy unit.s organizational names in order to determine if the defender is spreading himself too thin. It cannot be stressed enough that this can be a revealing sign on where to strike. The same is true if the roles are reversed, if you can determine that an enemy division or other formation is spread out, then you will know where you do not need to concentrate your reserves. During this period of warfare, extensive records were kept on enemy formation locations to ascertain strength
and intentions; an effective commander in First World War Campaigns should do the same.

Forts

Forts come in two types: strong and weak, or in game terms, vacated and non-vacated. In the game rules, any vacated fortification is one half the normal defensive bonus applied to the fortification. The actual size of a particular fort in no way translates into the defense value of the fort, nor whether or not it is considered to be a “strong” or “weak” fort at start. Several factors are considered when determining if a fort should begin the game in a vacated status.

The primary factor beyond the actual study of each fortification was a research chart that was constructed showing the number of days a fort held out against bombardment of a particular caliber of siege gun. For example, seven of Liege's twelve forts held out for only one day, most being bombarded by 210mm howitzers. The other five held out from a period of two to four days again being bombarded by 210mm howitzers. A few of the forts were hit by 305mm Mortars and 420mm "Big Bertha" howitzers and these fell promptly afterwards. The same is true for Namur. The forts of Antwerp held out from five to thirty days of bombardment from 420mm Howitzers. This translates to Namur and Liege having weaker forts, however both were armed with a rather large amount of cannon as they had a wide range of artillery ranging in caliber from 57mm to 210mm guns that were, for the most part, obsolete.

So, what is the rationale behind the placing of fortification types? In most cases fort strengths, whether they are vacated or not, are determined mainly by how long they historically held out in bombardments, as mentioned above. In most cases the actual size of the fort is ignored in terms of defensive ability, with the size only determining how large the garrison and gun battery is. In some cases more capable forts will also have higher quality defenders. However, as a general rule, the following guidelines are applied:

FORT: The most capable of forts. These were modern constructions that usually were equipped with gun turrets and modern guns but this is not always true. The most capable forts were elaborate constructions that were quite impenetrable, before the world witnessed the power of Big Bertha and other massive siege guns of course.

Fort: Lesser forts, either of stone construction or because they had less capable defenses either through neglect, or obsolescence. Within the rules of the game, this also represents destroyed or damaged capable forts (vacated).

REDOUBT: Redoubts, ouverages, small forts or any lesser fortification made of concrete (above or below ground). This could be equipped with guns or gun turrets but most often only contained a garrison of infantry.

Redoubt: Citadels and obsolete forts (ancient fortresses) or destroyed (vacated) redoubts. These are usually scattered across the map and are no longer garrisoned or equipped with guns.

BUNKER: Earthen bunkers and trenches.
Bunker: Primitive or damaged or destroyed (vacated) bunkers.
In cases where a supply source is present on a fortification hex and there is no fortress gun unit (static), or fortress battalion unit present then a small, static, garrison unit of less than 100 men will be present. The more capable fortified zones will also have an HQ assigned to the garrison and the less capable zones will need to rely on the currently assigned Army HQ radius for command. The sole purpose for these small garrison units is to man the fortifications and keep an accidental move that would vacate the fortification from occurring, from a user moving a unit into and out of a FORT or REDOUBT hex, and to keep LOS to such fortification hexes and make them easy to find. The SHIFT key can also be used to locate fortifications as the positions of all forts are pinpointed with labels.51

51 The exact locations of fortresses of the period were well known to both sides. It is intentional that the enemy can note fortress locations that he does not have LOS to by using map labels.

It is important to note that fortresses in general are abstractions. Given the amount of forts located in France, not every single fort has been placed on the map. Only the most important ones are present and, in the case of obsolete forts, only the ones that were temporarily used for refuge or were used for landmarks are present.

Trenches and Improved Positions

The trenches that were dug in 1914 were extremely primitive. These early field works were simply nice straight and narrow ditches that were rarely continuous and barely capable of covering a standing man. There were no traverses, were severely overcrowded, and were extremely vulnerable to artillery fire. Many of these early trenches were the graves of many soldiers as nearby exploding artillery fire collapsed the walls and buried the men alive as they knelt for protection. For this reason, trenches in France '14 do not have the high defensive ratings as they in no way represent the more elaborate trenches constructed out of experience in the later years of the war.52 Improved hexes represent the piling of debris, man made or natural, to create a more defensible position. It also represents a hastily dug scrape in the ground or the simple act of creating a concealed position. An alternate term for these positions might be "breast works".

52 The elaborate trenches that most people characterize as standard World War I trenches did not come into existence until mid 1915 and early 1916, after both sides obtained substantial entrenching experience.

Given the low entrenching value, it is the designer's intent to mainly allow improved positions to be built, with it taking a lengthy amount of time to construct a primitive trench. Engineers will be vital in order to speed up the process and make it more likely to successfully construct fighting positions. This decision is primarily due to the lack of training, doctrine or entrenching equipment that resided in the line units of 1914. This would of course change drastically in the following years.

Heavy Machine Gun Units

Note: "Heavy machine gun" and "machine gun" is referenced interchangeably elsewhere in the notes document but all refer to the "heavy machine gun" units that are described in this section.

It was a tedious process to determine exactly what kind of combat factors heavy machine gun units of the period should have. But before this is discussed, it is important to understand that the term "heavy machine gun" differs from the modern terminology. The term today usually refers to a heavy barrel machine gun of 12.7mm53 or higher. However, in the early 1900's, it referred to a machine gun which was on a heavy mount to stabilize the weapon in which to provide it with a stable firing platform. Unlike World War II and later periods, the ratings for these heavy machine gun units had to be completely different and in a class of its own. The manner in which heavy machine guns were employed in an artillery type role, combined with the limited infantry tactics of the day, results in a period where the heavy machine gun reigned supreme and necessitates that they be completely separate units, not factored into infantry battalion combat ratings. The result is a unit with combat factors that greatly differ from anything in the Panzer Campaigns or Modern Campaigns series.
53.50 caliber.

The source of the formula that determined their combat ratings was based in professional military studies of the period. These historical studies calculated that one heavy machine gun was essentially worth the firepower of approximately 60-100 rifles, with the more consensual figure being around 80 rifles. This estimate was a cold harsh calculation of firepower versus the rigid early war infantry tactics and effectiveness of the day. Maxim and Maxim copy heavy machine gun soft attack and assault strengths are derived from calculations based on number of weapons per element in question, compared to the soft attack strength of an average infantry battalion in the order of battle by using a ratio of 80:1, which is determined at the maximum effective range to target. Specifically, the rating at two hexes is (A * E * R) / M, where A = average infantry Bn soft attack [2.5]54, E = per rifle estimate [80], R = range value denominator [3], M = number of men per heavy machine gun [15]. In other words, the heavy machine gun units have a standard attack strength directly based upon their 1914 firepower effectiveness estimate at 2,000m range. This base rating is then adjusted higher or lower to represent various different types of heavy machine guns, with the Maxim and Maxim copy being the median. The resulting high, almost artillery like, rating makes heavy machine gun units particularly deadly during this period in the history of warfare, but a cumbersome and slow to deploy unit that is only really useful in the defense.

54 The average infantry battalion soft attack rating is 2.5, which is an average of the Gewehr 98 [2] and SMLE [3] equipped infantry soft attack ratings.
55 This increased survivability is especially true for the smaller two gun section sized units. See the User Manual for more information on combat resolution.

Deciding on the number of men per weapon was a serious headache. The idea initially was to convert these units into gun type units and avoid the issue altogether but it was decided that is more accurate to have crew casualties than it would be to have losses jump in increments of guns. This makes heavy machine gun units more effective and increases their survivability.55 The strength in men of the heavy machine gun unit is derived from an average so as to maintain a consistency regardless of any small variance in crew strength between the different nationalities. The actual number of men assigned to physically operate the weapon was usually six, regardless of nationality. However, there were addition soldiers that were assigned to the crew that had nothing to do with its direct operation but were still vital to the function of the heavy machine gun such as range takers, ammunition carriers, gun captains, layers, loaders, assistant loaders, and so forth. When all of these operators are taken into account, the number of men per weapon rises to approximately 15, with an average of 30 men per heavy machine gun section.

This entire crew of men assigned to the heavy machine gun's direct and indirect operation would have been utilized to maintain and operate the machine gun if attrition took its toll. Therefore, in the order of battle, for every 15 men in a heavy machine gun unit there is one heavy machine gun present, so the smallest unit consists of 30 men.56

56 The smallest machine gun unit is a section, therefore 15 men per gun, two guns per section, 15*2 equals 30 men.

Machine Gun and Field Gun Unit setup

In First World War Campaigns, a design approach was taken which requires machine gun and field gun units to expend their full movement point to exit from Travel Mode. These units only require 1/3 of their movement allowance to enter Travel Mode though. This approach was taken because this requirement to exit from Travel Mode represents the actual setting up of these units into firing positions. This setting up involved setting up the guns themselves, stockpiling and preparing ammunition, and communicating with their local HQ. All of these required a substantial amount of time to do when taken as a whole, and this process left the unit vulnerable the enemy until it was completed.

The primary reason for this approach is game play considerations on how these units were historically used. By requiring a full turn to exit from Travel Mode, it puts the advantage of these units squarely in the hands of the defense, which is where these units excelled. These units can enter Travel Mode quickly and move away to another position, but any attempt to use these units as a leading force in an attack will intentionally subject them to enemy fire before they have a change to deploy (since one turn must be spent in Travel Mode). This also means that these units are extremely vulnerable to counter assault by the enemy and especially vulnerable to enemy cavalry in general. In other words, if the attacker intends to move these gun units adjacent to the enemy as some sort of driving force, they can certainly choose to do so but it will come with a consequence. These units should always be accompanied by friendly infantry to protect them from assault, and the guns should expect retaliatory fire on the enemy.s turn. It also means that this vulnerability discourages these units from being able to race forward alone to a strategic location (such as a crossroads) in order to quickly plant themselves as an immovable force. This all contributes to “influencing” a more historical use for these units.

In the offensive, care must be taken with their employment so as to not subject them to too much enemy fire as they move forward. It also means that once these units are setup and rooted to the ground, you should avoid moving them unless they are completely out of range with the enemy. Ideally, the “safe” approach would be to move these units forward to a stand off range of two hexes from the enemy, in order to safely avoid the most harmful retaliatory fire, then deploy into this hex in order to lay down disrupting fire before your infantry moves forward for the assault. If you, as the attacker, intend to be bold and bring these units up as a killing force, then you must contend with the draw back that you will ultimately lose valuable guns and men to enemy fire, and this is especially true if you decide to mass multiple such units into the same hex. You will also inherently accumulate a large amount of fatigue in the process and possibly get them disrupted as well. The defender could then wisely choose to fall back once these units have deployed, thus requiring you to move forward and repeat the same bloody process again, trading the strength of these valuable units for ground.

On the defensive, when being perused by an enemy, you would want to use these units to move rearward, picking out your key defensive points, and screened them by friendly infantry to keep the enemy away from the machine guns and field guns until they deploy. Once these machine gun and field gun units are deployed, the screening friendly infantry should retire onto them to form the main line of resistance. As the main line gives way to enemy assault, these field gun units and machine gun units should be the first to fall back to their next position where the process repeats if necessary.

Towed Gun Limitation (stacking)

First World War Campaigns has a new feature where limitations are set on exactly how many Towed Guns can be deployed in a single hex. Towed Guns consist of all manner of artillery units, as well as machinegun units. The rationale behind this limiting is that there was a practical limit on the number of guns that could be deployed in any one given area. This practical limit was based on the fact that the guns needed room to operate effectively, and the fact that it was very difficult to supply large concentrations of guns with the amount of ammunition they whey would require to be effective. The engine places a limit on the number of guns that could be effectively employed in any given hex, requiring the excess to remain in Travel Mode. Naturally this limit exists primarily to place guidelines on historical behavior and to prevent the creation of "super stacks" of guns. It is important to note that Towed Gun type units in Travel Mode do not have to abide by the Towed Gun stacking limit, these Travel Mode units reference the Towed Gun stacking limit once they attempt to deploy from Travel Mode. So, while the guns remain in travel mode, they are subject only to the normal stacking limits.
It is advised that the user examines the Parameter values under the Help menu (or by pressing the F4 key) and see what the Towed Gun stacking limit is, keeping in mind that one gun is equal to 10 men.57 It is certainly possible to subject your Towed Guns to unnecessary fire by moving a quantity of guns to one location, only to find out (after the enemy conducts their next turn of retaliation) that the number of guns you moved to that hex is in violation of the Towed Gun stacking limit. In this case you will only be able to deploy a portion of the guns and should move the rest away to another position. The current Towed Gun limit is quite generous and historically accurate, so it is not very likely that you will violate this limit unless your field gun units are stacked extremely dense.

57 For example, a Towed Gun stacking limit of 450 men means that 45 guns can deploy in a single hex, or any combination of guns and machine gun units that will equal that amount.

Brigade and regimental HQ units

Unlike in the Panzer Campaign's series where regimental and brigade HQ units usually provide more flexibility to a division, in the First World War Campaigns series it has a different effect. Given the rather strict command system in this series where units that are out of command suffer a one step loss in morale, brigade and regimental HQ units, with their small command radius, intentionally restrict a division's effective “foot print”. This is necessary to properly represent the rigid command structures present during the First World War and to keep a division from being too intermixed which would allow a player to put battalions and MG units anywhere they are needed. A user can still choose to do this, but there are consequences if the units being "shoved into the breach" are outside of their parent brigade's range (they will not perform as effectively as they normally would). The relatively small command ranges of brigade and regimental
HQs can prove to be an Achilles heel to the entire structure. If one such HQ unit is eliminated or disrupted then the entire chain is affected and attacks and defenses could falter. If, for example, you cut off the head of a division then all brigade HQs will most likely fail their command checks, which could affect their command radius or replacement and recovery levels. The command structures during this period were not at the level of capability where small units were able to operate on their own initiatives. In later war scenarios this will gradually begin to change with brigade and regimental HQ units getting a larger command radius, or possibly being removed altogether to allow greater flexibility.

When moving brigade and regimental HQs you should keep them as close to their subordinate units as possible but also out of danger as much as possible. You do not want to risk losing the HQ unit in a fight, but it is a balance between risk versus maintaining an effective link with your units on the battlefield. Front lines can be penetrated and HQ units overrun to great effect, possibly routing or disrupting a larger force when they are further pressed.

Off map HQ units with 0% arrival

In some scenarios there are supreme HQ units, such as OHL; GQG; and GHQ; which have a 0% chance of arrival. Any scenario where an HQ unit is scheduled for a 0% arrival chance is an intentional representation that the higher HQ is out of range and remains out of range of the units that are depicted in the scenario. These out of range HQ units usually show up as arriving in one of the corner map hexes and are labeled as “out of range” to serve as a reminder of this fact. Given how the engine works, if a higher HQ is not present on the map nor scheduled as reinforcement then it is assumed that the higher HQ is off map but within range of the units on the map. By placing the HQ as reinforcement with 0% chance of arrival, it effectively breaks the link between the units on the map and the scheduled HQ unit, which represents the fact that this HQ units was very far away from the battle area.

Commanders

With the exception of the BEF, in France .14 you will find that only the GHQ, Army HQs, and Corps HQs, have commander names. This was done because the game covers several months, and given the scale of the order of battle, it is impractical to properly name commanders at division level and below because of how often they changed during this period. There are a few exceptions to this of course, and these exceptions are usually made for only the most famous or most capable commanders. The effect of naming every division commander within the time frame represented by the game would be a complex changing of HQs and almost twice the amount of HQ portraits for the various commanders. On the west front, the corps level and above is really where the commanders stood out from their peers. For the most part, a division commander during this period of warfare was about as special as a brigade commander; the corps was the basic unit of action in most cases.

Historically, many commanders were relieved and replaced throughout the 1914 campaign. However, it is quite unreasonable to expect that every commander is properly represented and replaced when it historically occurred, so several design decisions had to be made. Firstly, only the most important commander changes are represented when it actually occurred, such as the replacement of the French IIIe and Ve Armée commanders, as well as the promotion of Foch to command the new IXe Armée. In these cases, it is important to represent the change of command when it happened because of the change in HQ rating, or the formation of a new army. Of course, many brigade and division commands changed as well but it is not practical to represent this except in cases where an exceptional commander appeared. When Army HQs are changed, it is handled with strategy | operation selections so that you can choose the best location for the change of command to occur in relation to the current location of the army. Corps commanders that were replaced or promoted with a comparable replacement appear with a hyphenated name depicting the {first}-{second} commanders.

The primary disadvantages to replacing HQ units when a change of command occurred are that the user might choose a location that has been overrun by the enemy, and for that, it is completely up to the user to pay attention to where they are deploying the replacement HQ. Also, the user may have moved the army in such a way that the HQ locations are very distant. This has hopefully been negated by providing many different locations in which the HQ can be deployed, and from there the user can move the HQ by rail or road to where it is needed. Of course the HQ locations are in the general historical location of where the change of command occurred, but there are a few choices provided that should allow flexibility. The actual location of the change of command does not necessarily represent where the former commander was replaced, as they could have been "summoned" to any given location and relieved of their command. Corps HQs that appear hyphenated also have a disadvantage because the quality of the first leader may not represent the quality of the one who took his place. Foch is a clear example where, upon his promotion to commander of the new IXe Armée, his post at XXe CA commander was taken over by Balfourier. However, since Balfourier and Foch shared the same corps level HQ unit, they both have the same quality.58 This is a necessary evil given that it is impossible to predict the location of specific corps at the time in which the HQ unit should get replaced.
58 Balfourier carries Foch.s B quality.

In all cases, everything is correct by the time of the second phase race to the sea period, which is the “late” order of battle. In some cases several changes in command do not occur at their historical time if it occurred near the transition period between the early and late order of battle. As already mentioned, every change in command may not be represented; only the most important cases that have the most impact on play actually occur.

Engineer units, minefields, and obstacle clearing

During the early part of World War I, neither participant utilized mines or constructed minefields to a large degree. To a large extent mines were something that was known about, as Imperial Germany created the first modern fused land mine in 1912, however they were not widely used at this point on the battlefield. It was not until around 1917 that minefields began to see widespread use, particularly during the battle of Passchendale of that year. From this point onward it is still not accurate to allow engineer units of this period to lay minefields or obstacles within the scope of a scenario; they were instead something that was only put into place over a long period of fortifying. The same is true of clearing obstacles and mines. Obstacles tended to be extremely thorough forms of barbed wire, which were arrayed in hellish and elaborate concentric belts. During the duration of a scenario, it was only possible to cut through them for a passage lane. These wire constructions were so elaborate that it would be impossible to
completely clear the area within the scope of a several hour turn.59 Also, accurate and thorough mine clearing, also known as demining techniques, were not adopted until World War II, particularly with the invention of the electronic mine detector in 1941. With the exception of some units, "mine clearing" during The Great War was almost strictly limited to engineers clearing and maintaining passage lanes. In game play terms, this means that engineer units in France '14 do not have the capability to lay mines nor clear obstacles or minefields. It is decided that these traits are largely absent from engineer units until the battles covered in the Panzer Campaigns series.

59 The obstacle counters in the First World War Campaigns series represents the most elaborate wire obstacle contructions of the period, and not the often erected single strand obstacle. Unlike the Panzer Campaigns or Modern Campaigns series where obstacles usually represent a hasty abatis or several strands of rolled wire, the most elaborate wire obstacles of the Great War were elaborate and
complicated constructions that could not be easily cleared and removed.

Engineer type units are also the only units that can destroy rail lines and ferries, which is different from both Panzer Campaigns and Modern Campaigns. This was done because the line units of the period did not yet carry the demolition equipment required to conduct these tasks. It was also a desired change so that every unit in the order of battle was not capable of destroying these features, which would result in an a-historical wide spread destruction of rail lines, and it also places greater value on engineer units.

There are documented cases where some engineer units in The Great War constructed boats or rafts and ferries friendly troops across the river. However, it is undesirable for engineer units to be as flexible as they are in the Panzer Campaigns, where engineers in that series can ferry infantry across rivers. The ferry ability for infantry in First World War Campaigns was removed because it was felt that, in the cases where infantry were ferried across the river, this is adequately represented by having a bridging engineer unit construct a bridge, and these rafts and boats were usually constructed by the engineers that had bridging capability. In most of the documented cases of engineers constructing rafts or boats, it took these engineer units a lengthy amount of time to construct such devices which would be represented by many turns. However, if engineers retained the Panzer Campaigns ability to ferry troops then they would become too effective since they would be able to move to and send infantry and cavalry across a river in the span two turns at most. The rapid engineer troop ferrying capability is more of a characteristic of blitzkriegesque modern warfare, not a characteristic of warfare of the early 1900s.

It was decided early on that only engineer units that were company sized or larger should be included in the order of battle. This means that the detachment and platoon sized engineer units of the German and French cavalry divisions,60 are intentionally omitted from the order of battle. This was done primarily to cut down on counter density and the amount of units that the user must manage in relation to their actual usefulness. These small units would, historically, provide menial tasks to the division such as providing at least some sort of minimal fortifying asset. On the other hand, division level bridging detachments are included in the order of battle, but given that they were so small, they are not represented by an explicit unit. Instead, these divisional bridging detachments, if present, are represented by giving the division level engineer unit the bridging capability, resulting in a hybrid bridging / pioneer type unit.61 These units are capable of deploying a bridge, but the corps level bridging train units are better at this task since they can construct it quicker (the division level bridging units are small units). This approach works well since it makes the actual bridge / pontoon bridging units better

60 German and French engineer platoons (in the cavalry divisions) consisted of 90 and 36 men respectively.
61 Historically the bridging detachments were indeed attached to the division level engineer units and did not operate on their own.

at constructing bridges, while still maintaining a minimal bridging capability at bridging level. It must be noted that the Germans had exceptional bridging capability with every division formation containing its own bridging detachment. One the other hand, the French had very little bridging capability, relying almost entirely on the corps level bridging assets.62

62 Prior to the outbreak of the war, France had planned to create division level bridging detachments but this organization not formed in time. This meant that the only real division level bridging detachments were that of the few independent regular divisions. General Staff, War Office. Hand Book of the French Army 1914., 294-295.

Stacking limits

In France '14 it may be notice extremely high stacking limits. A balance is struck between maximum physical space and maximum practical space. Also, the area stacking and road stacking limits are intentionally not a straight 3:1 ratio in relation to each other.

Area stacking: Assuming that, for the sake of simplicity, a soldier with ruck sack takes up approximately a 1 square meter area. Within a 1,000 square meter, there could physically exist about ~10,000 soldiers. This would obviously be quite outrageous. In 1914 unit formations, the appearance tended to resembled that of a Napoleonic unit so a large amount of men must be allowed to stack in one hex: much more than previous games allowed. Tactically, and with some exceptions, soldiers certainly did not march arm in arm in dense formations of infantry as their Napoleonic ancestors did, quite the contrary, they operated loose skirmisher formations. However, small unit tactics that characterize modern infantry tactics did not yet exist, and tactical command and control was still as crude as it was during the Napoleonic Wars. For this reason, despite the fact that individual infantry had about two meter intervals between them, in skirmish formations infantry still had to remain relatively close together, in long ranks with
subsequent ranks following one after the other, rather than small groupings of squads which characterize modern warfare and the “assault” infantry of late World War One. With this in mind, it was decided that the stacking limit should be less than one half of this "physically possible" approach, with the maximum area stacking at ~4,200 men per hex. This still might seem like a lot of men, and certainly is, but this is the extreme case and you will likely pay for high stacking with horrendous losses due to stack density.

Road stacking: Road stacking is a rather unique situation in this series. The battlefields of World War I did not have the same level of threats to rear areas like that of World War II or modern times, so units tended to move in what could be called "parade ground" columns. Around the period of World War II, infantry began to move in tactical columns along the sides of the road with substantial intervals to avoid air interdiction. However, in early World War I this threat did not exist and units would move along the road in massed, dense columns. Where it might be completely outrageous to take the maximum physically possible approach to area stacking, it is not so outrageous when it comes to road stacking since these units tried to keep the column as short as possible. In the above example of a soldier taking up a one meter square area, this means that you could fit approximately 1,000 men in a file across a 1,000 meter long road. Units tended to march in three to four files so this would mean that you could fit 3,000-4,000 men along a 1,000 meter stretch of road. For the sake of generosity and the fact that companies often marched with a slight interval between them, this has been lowered to a road stacking limit of ~2,600 men.

In both cases, care should be taken so as not to provide too dense of a target to the enemy. Only stack more than one infantry battalion in a hex if there is a low threat level to that hex, or only if it is absolutely necessary to do so.63 In most cases it is advisable to have one infantry battalion deployed adjacent to the enemy to disrupt them and two behind it in order to execute an assault if need be.

63 It may be beneficial to stack several infantry battalions or cavalry regiments in a single hex when conducting an assault, but overstacking will cause high losses to opportunity fire or on the enemy.s next turn.
64 Wireless telegraphs of the period were utlitized at the strategic level of almost every army in Europe at the time. The Russian army of 1914 extensively used wireless telegraphs during the 1914 campaign in East Prussia. The Germans intercepted these strategic transmissions which, to the German.s delight, were broadcasted in the clear, and were able to anticipate Russian movements and determine unit locations.
65 It was not until World War II that modern wireless radios were introduced, thereby rectifying the tactical level command and control difficulties.

Night operations

Wireless radios of the Great War were known as "wireless telegraphs" or "radiotelegraphs", and were large, primitive, fixed stations where the transmission tower either had to be constructed or already in place.64 Wireless telegraphs provided brief text based communication and were usually employed at army, corps, division and brigade headquarters. Text messaging on a modern cell phone could be considered a form of radiotelegraphy so, needless to say, even though the radiotelegraph was a technological advancement for the day, strategic level orders were slow to transmit, receive, and disseminate.

During the Great War, units lacked tactical man portable wireless radios, henceforth referred to as “modern wireless radios”. This lack of modern wireless radios meant that company and platoon level units could not effectively communicate “on demand” with their sister companies or battalion HQ. This meant that tactical level command and control was extremely difficult at best and completely non existent at worst.65 Anyone with military experience knows that tactical level command and control is absolutely necessary during night operations, and even with the aid of modern light amplification equipment, night operations can be a difficult and clumsy affair. In a period where effective command and control at the tactical level was nonexistent, “efficient” night movement and night combat operations was practically impossible. Night operations had not yet matured, and effective night movement was limited to following roads and rail lines in column formation.66 This translates into game play that, unless you are moving strategically in Rail Mode or in Travel Mode along roads, your units will become disrupted any time they move during a night turn.67

66 During darkness, it is much easier to follow in a file, one behind the other, in a column formation, along a known road, that it would be to move tactically or in a column across open terrain.
67 In other words, if you are not utilizing the road movement rate of the unit then the unit will disrupt when it moves during night turns. See the User Manual for more information about movement and night operations.

Several realistic situations and tendencies occur because of this rule. The first is to make it more obvious that, unless you absolutely need to move your units, you should be resting them during night turns. Doing so is not only a good decision to prevent disruptions from tactical movement, but it also keeps units from gaining more fatigue during night turns. If you do need to move your units then you should only be moving them strategically to break contact, put more distance between you and a pursuer, or to move units up to the front line from rear areas. You can also choose to drive the advance forward along roads, but doing so is quite a risky proposition. The second tendency that occurs is that, during night operations, it is often wise to cover road junctions to protect against a forced night advance by the enemy. If you are conducting a rearward night march, then it can be more effective to temporarily leave some units along major roads to act as a rear guard to stop any night pursuits. Cavalry work particularly well in this regard role, and you can recall any units used as rear guards on the morning turn.

Siege Gun Units

Some artillery of the period, such as the massive German 42cm howitzer "Big Bertha" and the Austro-Hungarian 30.5cm howitzer “Schlanke Emma”, was designed with the sole intent of penetrating and destroying fortresses. These units are designated as Siege Guns in the order of battle and are primarily effective against fortresses, redoubts, and pillboxes. The more capable the fort or redoubt is, the more resistant it is against the siege artillery. The smallest pillboxes, such as citadels and obsolete forts, were veritable graves to these guns.

In the First World War Campaigns series, there are a number of other heavy artillery units that are not considered Siege Guns in the same sense as the heaviest ones were, but these non Siege Gun units were still intended to be used against smaller forts and bunkers, such as the German 21cm howitzer and the German 28cm mortar. In game play terms, obviously neither of these non Siege Gun units are as effective at reducing fortresses as the “true” Siege Guns are, but these non Siege Guns are more effective at targeting bunkers and enemy units located in non fortified areas.68

68 Siege Gun units are not effective against bunkers or lesser fortified hexes, they do not receive their Siege Gun benefit in these cases. See the User Manual for more information about Siege Gun units.
69 “Rail capacity” refers to the amount of units that both sides can transport, on demand, with rail movement.

Rail capacity

Getting the rail capacity level correct was a tricky issue.69 Both sides largely transported their supplies and heavy artillery by rail when the situation permitted, but neither side had the capability to transport massive amounts of troops on a whim: it required careful planning of rolling stock movements and time tables. With that in mind, the rail capacity level was determined by first determining the largest sized corps unit on both sides; this was then determined to be the optimal rail capacity amount. The optimal rail capacity level was then reduced by three quarters to provide the final, less than optimal level. This approach was taken for several reasons.

Firstly, the rolling stock of both sides were gainfully employed transporting various units, supplies, and replacements between different sectors and were not available to draw upon at will. It was not as if hundreds of locomotives and train cars were just standing by to be summoned to a certain area on a moments notice. French corps from the Alsace region did arrive in the early campaign by rail, as well as various German units, and these transports are considered to be of the carefully planned and coordinated variety, where the rolling stock was gathered for the effort and then dispersed to continue its other tasks. If a full corps or division were allowed to be rail headed on demand, then it would create an a-historical rail transport capability since arriving reinforcement corps and supplies would exceed the practical capacity; this would allow far too much mobility.

In other words, a corps or two could arrive by scheduled reinforcement on rail, before which the user embarked a corps of choice by rail, thus ending up with far too much rail heading capacity than was historically available.

The second reason for the reduction is to prevent rapid “on demand” rail transit. If a corps must be broken in small pieces to rail head to an area then it would encourage short movements and quick debarkations in order to move the other half of the corps, essentially discouraging wholesale troop readjustments, thus minimizing “gamey” levels of mobility.

Thirdly, as more supply units and reinforcements arrive by rail, and as the Germans move their siege artillery by rail, the capacity will be intentionally exhausted and it will prevent any further rail movement until existing units are debarked.70 This means that when a reinforcement does arrive by rail it should encourage the user to quickly move and unload the troops where needed, rather than leaving them on the rail as a rapid deployment force of sorts. The user should also make sure that they unload the reinforcements exactly where they are needed because chances are they will not have the rail capacity to embark the entire force again, since the trains are considered to be sticking to their planned schedules and have moved on to other tasks. If a reinforcement corps is unloaded in a location that is deemed incorrect, then the user will have to march from there, or transport the corps piece meal by rail to a new area. From a game design point of view, it is better to have less rail capacity than is fully needed in order to create a dilemma for the user, rather than having an abundance of rail heading capacity which does not encourage careful management and planning.

70 Supply units are only available when the Explicit Supply rule is selected in the Optional Rules Dialog at the start of a new scenario. See the User Manual for more information about Explicit Supply.

It is worth noting that the “late” campaign, the period known as the “Race to the Sea” and beyond, rail capacity is at minimal levels. This is done because the rolling stock of both sides was exceptionally busy during this period, transferring many corps around France and Belgium and this left little “on demand” rail head capability to either side.

Artillery setup parameter

In First World War Campaigns, especially in the early years of the war, the artillery setup parameter is set to an intentionally low parameter.71 This was done because setting up guns for indirect fire, getting the ammo in place and establishing communication with their HQ could become an extremely time consuming process in a period before portable radios. The position of the guns had to be determined by terrain association and map reading, and this position had to be relayed to the HQ and, in many cases, wire had to be run between the artillery unit and the HQ for the use of field phones if the situation permitted. If field phones were not used, such as in the case of a period of high mobility, then someone had to physically travel from the higher HQ.s position to the artillery unit.s position (or vice versa) in order to establish a communication link, and thus had to travel between the two to relay messages. It was not the most effective system to say the least, and the only way to model this is to have varying degrees of probability for setting up indirect fire artillery. It may take only several turns to setup an artillery unit or it may take many turns, so you should the location that you want your artillery to setup very carefully.

71 See the User Manual for more information about the artillery setup rule.

Multiplayer

As with every other game in existence, France '14 is definitely more enjoyable when played against a human opponent. In World War I, and especially during the early period of 1914, army commanders seldom cooperated with each other in the optimal sense, and often had conflicts of interest, rivalries, or competing ambitions (think of von Kluck.s and von Bülow.s relationship during the German invasion of France in early 1914, or Rennenkampf.s and Samsonov.s relationship in the Russian invasion of East Prussia in 1914). This facet more than once influenced how the two sides advanced and, at various points of the campaign, directly influenced the front line situation. With enough users available, France '14 becomes more historical when there are multiple players per side, particularly for the allies. While this can be accomplished either through PBEM or through TCP/IP, I will concentrate on PBEM here because this method is usually the most practical.72

72 PBEM team based play is accomplished by forming a chain of players that mail the turn to each other, with the last player on that side ending the turn and emailing it to the other side where the process is then repeated.

The most enjoyable situation is a balance of having the most players involved, without detracting from the length of the turn from the time it takes to email it to the participants in the chain. This problem does not exist in TCP/IP games since the general rule is that the more players involved, the faster the turn will be. In PBEM team games, having one player per available army produces the most exciting results, provided that the turns could be passed along the chain of players quickly enough. At the very least, France '14 is most enjoyable with four human players assigned to the following positions: the BEF commander, the Belgian Army commander, the French Army commander and the German Army commander. If only three players are available then the BEF and Belgian Army should be combined under the same player. The BEF and French should never fall
under the same player if possible. Any inclusion of further players should be used to divide up the German armies.

During the early half of the campaign, before the Race to the Sea period, emphasis should be placed on isolating the German 1, 4, and 6.Armee into one player, with the other player having the 2, 3, and 5.Armee as well as overall command. Division of German forces should primarily stress separation of the 1.Armee and 2.Armee into separate users, since the historical coordination between these two armies was lacking, with the overall command not falling under the player that has control of the 1.Armee. Three German players should see the forces divided up further, into one player having the 1.Armee, the second player having the 2 and 3.Armee, and the third player having the 4, 5, and 6.Armee and so on. The result of this is to better simulate the often general lack of cohesion and stress the amount of communication that was required to coordinate actions, which often resulted in failure.

While splitting the campaigns into multiple players creates the most excitement, smaller scenarios are also very enjoyable with multiple users per side as well.

As mentioned, TCP/IP team play of France '14 is particularly entertaining with the same force divisions already described and are usually faster with the more people that participate, thus making it practical to have one user per army or an even greater division of forces if enough users are available.

Listening Music

I found that my gaming experience was greatly enhanced when I listened to Napoleonic period music using Windows Media Player, with the Media Player's volume at 20% so I could still clearly hear the game. The early period of the Great War was both struggling to find its own identity as well as seemingly mimicking the tactics, élan, and appearance that characterized the Napoleonic period or, at the very least, the Franco-Prussian War period. As a result, I think that this type of music fits the early years of The Great War quite well. Some affordable and excellent CDs you might want to consider picking up and adding to your media player play list are:

. Bagpipe Marches and Music of Scotland, Legacy International.
. French Military Marches, Legacy International.
. Famous German and Austrian Marches, Premium Music Collection.
. German Military Marches, Legacy International.
. Highland Pipes and Drums, Legacy International.
. Regimental Marches of the British Army Vol. 1, Chandos Collect.
. Regimental Marches of the British Army Vol. 2, Chandos Collect.
. Tchaikovsky: 1812 Overture - Marche Slave, Deutsche Grammophon.

Obviously, these CDs also provide great listening music for HPS' Napoleonic Campaigns series.

Conclusion

I hope you enjoy playing this game as much as I have enjoyed creating it. I can only hope that the years of toil spent will help inspire further reading and study, and revitalize interest in the history of The Great War. This work is my feeble attempt to contribute to the memory of The Great War, and to honor the millions that gave their lives during this conflict. Perhaps it is not until you play First World War Campaigns that you realize the full awe inspiring scope of the conflict, and the tragic loss of humanity.

The four years spent creating this work is dedicated to all brave soldiers of the world both past and present, who have fought and died in battle. Most of all, I want to dedicate this to a personal friend, SSG Christopher L. Everett. May his memory, and others like him, never be forgotten.

Courage Conquers!
31 March 2010

Edward L. Williams
volcano@esimgames.com