Updates for Red Victory and Vietnam have been released on the HPS site:

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/Whatsnew/whatsnew.asp

More in the works as well...

We're ramping up to start rolling out updates for the entire Tiller catalog to resolve some graphical issues that have creept in, remove the CD check from all games, get all documentation in PDF format and so forth.

If you would like to help test out these updates as they become available please visit my forums:

http://hpssims.com.c7.previewyoursit...isplay.php?f=2

Chime in on the thread and stand by. We're hoping to make this a relatively rapid process if all goes well, so the more eyes looking things over the better.

Rich

3 more games updated today in the PzC series:

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/Whatsnew/whatsnew.asp

Smolensk has been updated...and more to come!

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/Whatsnew/whatsnew.asp

Kharkov '42 have been updated...and a whole batch of the games will be updated soon, so keep an eye on the site:

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/Whatsnew/whatsnew.asp

Campaign Atlanta has been updated, and only two games in the series left to go before theya ll are up to date.

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/Whatsnew/whatsnew.asp

Campaign Peninsula & Kursk '43 have been updated:

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/Whatsnew/whatsnew.asp

As the ACW series continues to be updated, Gettysburg has been released:

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/Whatsnew/whatsnew.asp

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/updates...up_CivWar.html

An update for Corinth has been released & the rest of the ACW series will be updated soon:

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/Whatsnew/whatsnew.asp

Some new updates have been released. Bulge '44 for the PzC series & then Antietam to kick off the ACW games updates:

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/Whatsnew/whatsnew.asp

From the guys on the Ancient Warfare Team:

We've created an on-line survey to gauge your feelings about Ancient Warfare. It's only 8 questions and won't take you more than a minute or two to complete. Please have a look at it. Your input is more important than you may realize to the development of the games.
You can find it here:

http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/ZLK73VV

Thanks!

And Happy New Year to one and all!

Tim

A new update for Budapest has been posted on the HPS site:

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/updates...pdates_PZC.asp

Also, there has been issues reported with the REN 1.03 update, but this update is required for anyone with a NVidia video card that is having issues with the game running. So, until we get it ironed out for all users both the 1.02 & 1.03 updates will be on the site.

With the release today of Panzer Campaigns: Kharkov '43 from John Tiller Software a new page has turned. This new title marks the beginning of a self-publishing effort by the JTS team as opposed to publishing through HPS Simulations. It also marks the beginning of Digital Downloads being offered for the current John Tiller products.

John TIller is still associated with HPS in that all existing software is still supported and will continue to be updated for the foreseeable future. All new content will go out over the new site however. HPS will continue to publish software from Scott Hamilton, Paul Bruffell & Jim Lunsford going forward & new material is slated to be making appearances in the not so distant future.

http://www.johntillersoftware.com/

The 1.03 update for the REN game has been posted at the HPS site:

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/updates...sket_pike.html

Primarily this has been released to address recent issues that have arisen with NVidia cards and the latest drivers. Updates for all the other games will be coming out before too long.

After a period of quiet things have begun to move again on the HPS site. We've released updates to Punic Wars & Gallic Wars. Punic includes a total reworking of most of the scenarios to incorporate new features and improve gameplay. Get them both here:

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/updates...p_Ancient.html

Naval Campaigns: Jutland has been updated, bring the engine up to speed with the new changes from Midway & yes, so air elements have been added in as well as new scenarios. Get it here:

http://hpssims.com/Pages/updates/up_...up_NAVCAM.html

Scenario Notes

Getting Started: The Guns of August

This scenario is meant to demonstrate the awesome firepower of the German siege guns against forts.

Many Belgian fortress garrisons surrendered from the siege gun bombardment. Instead of having Belgian units automatically withdrawn from the map, the surrendering procedure works perfectly when you disrupt *all* of the defenders of the fort with the siege guns, then surround and follow up with infantry assaults. When executed correctly, this procedure will yield large quantities of captured Belgian garrison troops.

Historically, the key forts that were blocking the roads into and out of Liège were “cleared” first so that the 1.Armee could advance unhindered. The last of the Liège forts would not fall until August 16th.

As war broke out on the western front, Germany raced to mobilize its forces to execute the Schlieffen Plan as soon as possible. During this "mobilization" period, it was recognized that the Belgian Fortress city of Liège needed to be taken in order to clear the route for the 1.Armee. A mixed force was comprised of various infantry brigades that were located along the frontier. These infantry brigades were from five separate divisions and were allotted cavalry, artillery and pioneers to comprise a combined arms force. When the German attack commenced, the Belgian 3e Division recognized the futility of the situation and made a run for the northwest, braving the swarming German cavalry patrolling the area. It was a risky strategy to be sure, but the Belgians succeeded in escaping the closing net. On the night of the 5th, the German infantry were in position to begin their assault. The infantry attacks were initially unsuccessful except for Infanterie.Bde.14 led by General Ludendorff. Ludendorff had taken command of the
brigade as the attack had faltered and led them through the defenses. By the next day Ludendorff's brigade had captured Liège itself.

1914_0804_01s: The Assault on Liège

This scenario covers the initial attack on Liège up to the point where the city itself was captured and the Belgian 3e Division escaped to the northwest. At this point it became a stalemate until the siege artillery arrived on August 12th.

Since the Germans attacked Liège while the rest of the troops mobilized, the infantry brigades involved in the attack were all at peace time levels, at approximately 75% strength.

On August 5th, Infanterie.Bde.14 will lose its HQ unit temporarily. Later in the day another HQ will arrive from Verviers which represents Erich Ludendorff. Ludendorff was a staff officer to von Emmich's Maas.Armee at the time and he seized command of the Infanterie.Bde.14 at the point in which the attack began to falter. Ludendorff personally led the brigade through the defenses around Fort de Fléron and captured the city of Liège. This action was to be the preliminary catalyst of his rise to power.

As the Maas.Armee approached Liège, General Leman, the Belgian commander at Liège, recognized the fact that expending the 3e Division in the defense of Liège would be a terrible error. On the morning of the 6th, Leman ordered the division to breakout and make a run for the west, braving the swarming German cavalry patrolling the area and link up with the Belgian Division de Cavalerie at Hallogne. The Belgians can indeed choose not to extricate the 3e Division, but this would pass up a large amount of VPs from the exit hexes to the west. The Belgian player is encouraged to exit this division as was historically the case, however, defending the fortress or a combination there of might also yield success. The worst case scenario would be the Belgians not being able to extricate themselves, and losing Liège as well.

Are the German cavalry divisions preventing the escape of the Belgian 3e Division? Try moving the division northwest to Ft Latin and deploying it. Once the division is deployed properly, no cavalry division will be able to stand in its way, but you most likely will
have to fight for the exit. If the German cavalry divisions attempt to block you then, with superior countering, you can inflict enough high VP point casualties to drive them off.

1914_0812_01s: The Battle of the Silver Helmets

Uhlan.Regt.9 is withdrawn from the scenario on the second turn to represent its recon and screening action to the northwest to hinder any possible Belgian attempt to flank the HKK.2 from that direction.

1914_0815_01s: A Crossing at Dinant

Keep in mind that the German are extremely limited in their river crossing options here. All German units, other than the bicycle jäger units, must cross at the heavy bridge at Dinant (the light bridges do not support horse or motorized units). The bicycle jäger companies, which begin the scenario combined into a battalion, should be reserved as a force to assault across the light bridges near either Yvior or Houx. They can also be sent south to Anseremme, or split into companies if needed. Utilize the other units available to soften up the crossing for this unit, and attempt to take the main crossing at Dinant by force.

A young French Lieutenant named Charles de Gaulle, of the 33e RI, was wounded in the clash at Dinant.

The commander of the German HKK.2 was the father of Manfred von Richtofen (aka. the Red Baron).

1914_0818_01s: Driving the Wedge

Historically, the Belgians withdrew to the River Dyle in the afternoon and early evening of the 18th, shortly after Haelen and Diest was taken by storm and their flank was exposed, with the 1er Division d.Armée being the primary force engaged. HRH Leopold II recognized that the Germans were trying to drive a wedge between his army and Antwerp and, shortly after the line along the Dyle was established, ordered a withdrawal. On the 19th of August his army conducted a skillful withdrawal to Antwerp, arriving there by the 20th and thus avoiding the trap.

This scenario ends at the point where the Belgians began falling back to Antwerp.

The main objective for the Belgians is to keep as many German units from exiting the map to the west, and, where possible, hold the objectives to prevent a total rout of the Belgian Army.

The Germans can choose to drive off the Belgian's left flank around Haelen by taking the objectives concentrated in that area; it is assumed that a successful wedge is driven between the Belgians and Antwerp if the Germans can take all of those objectives. The Germans can also choose to bypass the Belgian line and gain points by exiting units on the western map which is the route to Bruxelles. By doing this it should balance out any failure on the Germans to drive the Belgians away from Antwerp, but it will probably not gain them a major victory.

1914_0820_01s: Von Moltke's Indecisiveness

From turn the third turn on, two German and two French Corps will arrive along the length of the east edge of the map. Pay close attention to the protected hexes under the View > Shade menus. The French units will arrive first and then the pursuing German units will arrive the turn following. These arriving units represent the eastern tip of the French salient that was pushed back from about the vicinity of Diueze (10-20km off the east edge of the map).

The German 10.Ersatz-Div was deployed in this area in reserve. This unit has no release, and largely remained in reserve for the duration of this scenario. It is only included in this scenario for aesthetical purposes, and to provide a natural barrier or a force that can be released if the French somehow make contact with them (which is extremely unlikely). In other words, it is thought to be more accurate to include this formation than to just leave an empty area where this formation remained during the battle.

Even though the French were badly beaten in the frontier battles of Lorraine, the German counter offensive would force the French armies to retract to the west and it would be a big factor in Joffre's abandonment of Plan XVII. Rupprecht's counter offensive would place the French on the defense south of Metz. This shift in French posture allowed Joffre to transfer units west, thus creating another failure in von Moltke's execution of the (modified) Schlieffen Plan.

1914_0822_01s: Home Before the Leaves Fall

This campaign begins on the August 19th at a point where both sides were committed to their specific plans. Choosing any point earlier would results in an outcome that would never be close to the historical one (as the French player would certainly not commit to Plan XVII). Therefore, this scenario begins just after the long period of German marching on the wing and right at the moment that the French began to abandon Plan XVII. The battles in the period prior to this moment are all represented in separate scenarios (mentioned on previous pages).

This campaign ends when the Germans historically went on the defensive following their defeat at the Marne, covering the first day of what was historically the German withdrawal to the Aisne on the 10th of September (the campaign ends on the evening the 10th). This essentially grants the campaign one additional day beyond the Battle of the Marne where the Allies can push the Germans back, or the Germans can make up lost time, rather than just cutting it off at the moment in which the Germans began to fall back. Another reason why this campaign ends on September 10th is because a combination of things occurred to help draw this phase of the 1914 campaign an end. Besides the successful Allied counter offensive at the Marne, the weather began to deteriorate heavily on the 11th and both sides saw a large drop in supply as they exhausted the stockpiles that they had gathered for the short war, a war that was predicted to last only until the end of August. So, rather than have the "main event" (early phase) go out with a whimper with supply dropping, storms, and deteriorating ground conditions, it seeks to go out with a high intensity finale.

Historically, after the Battle of the Marne was decided on the 9th, the 10th-12th of September was the period in which the Germans retreated to the Aisne. The Battle of the Aisne historically began immediately following this point on the 13th, and it is covered in a separate scenario (#1914_0913_01s_Aisne). The Battle of the Aisne marked the “intermission” between the early campaign and the second phase of the war known as "the race to the sea". The race to the sea is beyond the scope of this campaign and there is a separate campaign covering this period as well (#1914_0917_01s_Campaign_Race). Once the race to the sea began, it was essentially a new phase in the conflict as both sides, having exhausted themselves, adopted a completely new strategy of turning the others flank as the rest of the front solidified.

Historically this campaign can be said to have ended in a draw with neither side victorious over the other; a victory to such a degree that would have forced an end to the conflict did not occur.

As the default Optional Rules suggest, this scenario (and all others) should be played with the Virtual Supply Trucks (VST) optional rule turned on. This rule creates a realistic situation where supply levels vary depending the location of the area in relation to friendly supply sources, where distance and the road and rail network play a factor. While this is not much of an issue in smaller scenarios with smaller maps, if this VST optional rule is turned off in this large campaign, then both sides will get their full supply no matter what the location of their units, which will cause unintended results. The outcome will be at a much higher intensity instead of the supply lines being realistically stretched with the advance.

The BEF begins fixed in the positions they historically were in at the battle of the Mons which occurred the next day. For the most part this is correct for the starting deployment but in the case of a few components, such as the 19th Infantry Bde who was just arriving to Valenciennes by train, the 22nd was spent arriving into those locations and creating hasty fortifications.

In order to ensure that the German attack and advance through Belgium proceeded according to the Schlieffen Plan, von Bülow (2.Armee) was given control over 1.Armee and 3.Armee on August 9th, an arrangement that had to be abandoned eight days later following disagreements between von Bülow, who was cautious by nature, and the aggressive commander of 1.Armee, von Kluck. However, even though the arrangement was abandoned, the HKK.2 (on the German extreme flank) would remain reassigned to 2.Armee. This resulted in poor cooperation with the cavalry and 1.Armee. The HKK.2 was reassigned to the 1.Armee shortly after the Battle of Mons.

The German GHQ, General von Moltke, begins the campaign off the map and arrives later on the August 30th. This is due to the fact that prior to August 17th, von Moltke.s HQ was in Berlin, and from the 17th to the 30th he relocated to Coblenz. Coblenz, the closer of the two points, is roughly 60km east of the map edge – a huge distance to say the least. Thus, during the crucial period of the campaign, von Moltke was over 200km from the critical areas where the fate of the campaign hung in the balance. This certainly contributed to the outcome of the campaign as it historically caused problems in the German chain of command. In the early stages of the campaign, all German armies are intentionally detached from OHL since OHL was well out of range. On October 30th, OHL arrives in the city of Luxembourg (at the little red school house) where it remains as a static unit for the remainder of the campaign.

The Royal Ordinance Survey created a map in 1920 that placed the German HKK.1 in the vicinity of Binche on August 23rd. In 1924 the Royal Ordinance Survey revised this map and placed the HKK.1 northwest of Namur, in reserve positions recovering from their previous actions. Germans sources also place them in this reserve location, so this is
where they begin the scenario. This is only mentioned because of the confusion created by early British maps.

The "non priority" areas of the front line in the southwest (around Nancy) have lower level supply sources which represent the fact that both sides were concentrating their main efforts in other places.

The Belgian field army HQ is fixed for the duration of this campaign within the fortified area of Antwerp. The reason for this is to discourage the Belgians from going on an all out offensive. By fixing the field army HQ, as well as the overall Belgian HQ, any a-historical all out offensive will come with a disadvantage of risking the loss of valuable objectives within Antwerp (if the region is vacated), objectives which historically all remained under Belgian control for the duration of this campaign, and it ensures that subordinate formations will be out of command if they stray too far from Antwerp. The position of the fixed superior HQs should still allow (and encourage) periodic limited attacks and demonstrations out of Antwerp.

See the notes on the 1914_0822_02s and 1914_0822_03s scenarios (below) for information on the details concerning the Charleroi and Ardennes sectors.

This campaign works well as a TCP/IP team based game of eight (Allied) versus seven (German). The Allied players should consist of #1 [Overall commander (Joffre) & 9e Armée (formed later) & GQG Réserve & Les défenses mobiles du nord-est & Réserve Régional & Réserve Territoriale], #2 [Belgian Army], #3 [BEF], #4 [IIe Armée], #5 [IIIe Armée], #6 [IVe Armée], #7 [Ve Armée], #8 [VIe Armée & Armée de Lorraine & Gouv. militaire de Paris]. The German players should consist of #1 [Overall commander (von Moltke) & OHL Reserve], #2 [1.Armee], #3 [2.Armee], #4 [3.Armee], #5 [4.Armee], #6 [5.Armee], #7 [6.Armee]. A PBEM team based game could consist of three (Allied) versus two (German), with Allied players consisting of 1# [Belgian Army], #2 [BEF], #3 [French Army (with additional players splitting up the French forces)], and the German team should consist of #1 [1.Armee & 5.Armee & 6.Armee], #2 [2.Armee & 3.Armee & 4.Armee], with additional players splitting up the forces from there but, for the sake of historical accuracy, 1.Armee and 2.Armee should not be controlled by the same player in a team based game and overall command should not fall under the player that controls 1.Armee.
Code: (74.050)

1914_0822_02s: Lanrezac, the Defiant

The scenario begins just after the bloody French assault towards the Sambre was halted. Historically the French surged forward to destroy the German bridge heads on the south side of the river and they expected to drive the Germans back at the point of the bayonet. The assault failed and the ensuing German counter attack nearly caused the rout of the entire Ve Armée. It was only the timely arrival of the XVIIIe Corps that ultimately prevented it.

On the evening of the 22nd, the Ier Corps was given orders to move to and strengthen the crumbling line to its northwest. Hours later this order was cancelled ordering them back to their positions on the Meuse. Some historians say this was a huge mistake on Lanrezac's part, and this allowed von Hausen's troops to cross the Meuse at Dinant. However, at the time, the Prussian Guard was threatening to destroy Lanrezac's centre and he was unsure if the XVIIIe Corps would arrive in time. When playing against an AI allied opponent, the AI will issue these historically countermanding orders. However, with a human player as the Allies, you can decide to leave the Ier Corps on the Meuse, to commit it to the assistance of Xe Corps, or even decide to send a portion to assist the Belgians in Namur. Any approach you take though will no doubt center on what to do with the Ier Corps since, no matter how you look at it, the situation will grow increasingly desperate with each passing turn.

Historically, Sordet's Corps de Cavalerie was falling back from Gambloux, in hot pursuit by the Germans. Sordet's troopers rode almost completely around Belgium since the war began, and because of this they were exhausted at the time of this battle. Sordet's troopers were to move into an area south of Thurin to thwart any German breakthrough in that area and to rest and reorganize briefly before high tailing it off again. Their rest would last approximately two days before taking flight again on a twelve day exhausting ride from Thurin to Paris that almost drove Sordet.s mounts and troopers into the ground (Sordet was later sacked and replaced by General Bridoux on September 8th).

The 4e GDR is located in reserve and took no part in the heavy fighting (although it did see some minor action on the 23rd). On the 23rd the 4e GDR moved north to the Sambre (north of where it starts) and took up position to oppose the approaching German formations, where the 4e GDR essentially acted as a deterrence to any major German activity in that area. In this scenario, the 4e GDR is fixed in the area where it was historically assembling (in the vicinity of Beaumont). This unit has a moderate chance of release and has a fail safe triggered release so that it will release when the Germans get an LOS to a unit in that organization if they push hard on the Sambre, and their normal release is such that they will be allowed to become active at around the historical time if the Germans do not trigger their release. Two cavalry units from the 4e GDR are deployed overlooking the Sambre forward of the formation and act as the triggering release mechanism for German units which advance to the Sambre in this area. The entire 4e GDR is withdrawn on the 24th, which is the day when the formation disengaged and began moving south to Maubeuge.

The Belgian 4e Division d.Armée is withdrawn on the night of the 23rd, as it historically withdrew south across France and embarked by ship for Antwerp. This division would not make it to Antwerp until after the Battle of the Marne.

On the night of the 22nd, the German 13.Infanterie-Division becomes fixed in place. This was done because historically it moved into the Binche area and remained there to cover the flank of the 2.Armee against the BEF (see the Mons scenario which takes place on the following day). This division then assisted in the attack against the BEF there on the 23rd. Two approached were considered here. The first option was obvious, to simply have the 13.Infanterie-Division withdraw on the night of the 22nd. The only problem is that even though this division did not play any role in the fighting in this scenario after this point, removing it from the map would leave a huge gap in the German right flank, which could allow some "gamey" movement on the part of the French or, at the very least, it would leave Binche open and require more German units to move there to secure it. This of course would not make sense given that the 13.Infanterie-Division remained in the area. It is rationalized that if the French try to do something bold on the 23rd to the degree that they move along the map edge toward Binche, then the 13.Infanterie-Division would get released again by line of sight and would use its full force to counter that movement, rather than conducting their historic attack on the BEF right.

1914_0822_03s: Offensive à Outrance!

The Battle of the Ardennes officially began on the 21st when Joffre first issued the order to the IVe Armée to attack into the Ardennes. However, the entire day was spent marching north. This scenario begins just as the Germans and French were making contact on the morning of the second day.

The French advance has been likened to a "flight of steps" with each corps offset in a descending “stair” pattern from west to east. The intent was that each corps would be able to turn and face any threat from the east if needed, and for any two corps to theoretically be able to come to the aid of the other. In reality, it was to become a fatal flaw in that if one corps in the pattern of steps was routed, then the rest would come down like a house of cards. Historically, three French corps (the Colonial Corps, XVIIe Corps and Ve Corps) were to be dealt a crushing blow which would in turn cause gaping holes to develop in the French line.

In almost every place, the deployment of the front line formations are about two or three turns ahead of where they historically began on the morning of 22nd of August. On average, the front line deployment is what it would have been on the 1200 turn. This was intentionally done so as to "force" both sides into the historical situation they found themselves in after first contact was made. Because of hindsight and game play considerations, if this approach was not taken then the fighting in the Ardennes would in no way represent even a vaguely historical outcome; the French would likely pull back immediately without suffering a single loss. The obvious disadvantage of this approach is that it allows three more turns of fighting in the Ardennes than was historically the case. However, this disadvantage is offset by the fact that it forces at least three turns of "hindsight free" combat before the French can break off and start acting more intelligently than was historically the case (since the French player is fully aware of the German strength). In this case, an accelerated a-historical setup is more important in order to create a historical flow of the battle.

Near Rossignol (35,37), the French 3e Division d'Infanterie Colonial (DIC) was in a bad position. Specifically, the division was split as one of the brigades was ahead of the other and advancing on Neufchateau. To make matters worse, the division's elite cavalry regiment was behind the infantry advanced guard and was not used for reconnaissance. This was mostly because the 3e DIC was convinced that its right flank was secured by the 4e Division d'Infanterie, which had falsely reported its location that morning. Historically, the separated brigade was hit in the flank as it advanced and promptly fell back towards Rossignol, but it was too late; the brigade was cut off from the remainder of its division at the Semois River by the German Infanterie-Brigade.22. Prior to the battle, General Lefevre, the Colonial Corps commander, was ordered to keep his 2e DIC in reserve at Jamoigne, despite repeated pleas to IVe Armée HQ for its release. The blame can certainly be equally placed on the army, corps, and division level commanders, but the fact is that most of the 2e DIC sat in reserve the entire day while the 3e DIC was systematically destroyed. By nightfall the 3e DIC, an elite fighting force, had ceased to exist and an entire brigade was completely overrun in a climactic battle at Rossignol. It was a tragedy of the highest order, one in which over 11,000 veteran colonial French soldiers would be lost. The event of the day would cause the name "Rossignol" to evoke French memories similar to American memories of the Alamo, or the Little Big Horn, but on a much grander scale.

For lack of a better term, think of this scenario as a Pearl Harbor type situation for the French. The French were basically surprised with the meeting engagement and the German commander's main intent should be to capitalize on this as much as possible in the first few turns. The Germans must cause maximum havoc and damage before the French can recover, reorganize, fall back or press forward. There are great expectations placed on the Germans in this scenario to eliminate a large quantity of French forces as was historically the case, as well as the expectation that they will both take and hold the same objectives that they historically held and captured (the historical result is assumed to be a German victory). The French commander must not have a weak stomach: he will take heavy losses as was historically the case but if the French can save some of the units that were historically destroyed, as well as capture some German objectives and prevent the Germans from taking several French ones, then you will stand a good chance of winning.

This was to be Erwin Rommel.s first battle. At the time of this battle, the twenty-two year old Leiutenant commanded the 1st infantry platoon in the 7.kompagnie, II.Battalion, Infanterie-Regiment.124. He and his unit fought in a famous action in and around the town of Bleid.

This was also to be Freiherr Manfred von Richthofen's first battle (the future Red Baron). Von Richthofen was a young lieutenant in Ulanen-Regt.1 which was part of the 9.Infanterie-Division. On 21 August, von Richthofen was part of a 15 man cavalry patrol which was sent out to locate the French. Upon seeing a French patrol of Dragoons, von Richthofen's patrol charged and came across French infantry. Von Richthofen and four other men were the only ones able to escape on horseback, the others returned later on foot or were killed. It was an obscure and nearly fatal beginning for the man that would become the greatest ace and one of the most well known people of the Great War!

1914_0823_01s: The Contemptibles Make Their Stand

This scenario covers the entire clash at Mons, including the second day when von Kluck attempted to turn the British left flank and push the BEF towards Maubeuge.

The entire British I Corps will be withdrawn on the morning of the 24th to simulate their withdrawal to the southwest (see the map label and impassible area east of Maubeuge which shows their fallback position). This is done because the I Corps historically started withdrawing south before the II Corps received orders to do so, which left the latter exposed on the right flank. The scenario design rationale here is that if the I Corps in not withdrawn from the scenario, then the British player has no reason to do so themselves since historical issues do not have to be taken into consideration (such as the French withdrawing on the BEF.s right at Charleroi, and the German cavalry moving around the BEF.s left flank). With the I Corps' forced withdrawal, then the II Corps must begin falling back to avoid being flanked, and other units may have to be sent to cover its flank.

Historically, part of the British 4/Royal Fusiliers was deployed in the town of Nimy, but this was actually only a small portion of the regiment. The other 4/5ths of the regiment was deployed facing west on a north-south line from Nimy to Mons along the Canal du Centre. Since the majority of the regiment was not located in Nimy, and since the regiment cannot break down into companies, it would make perfect sense to deploy the regiment in the average position of all of its companies (which would be one hex south of Nimy). However, this would be impractical in regards to the historical context that the regiment fiercely opposed the bridge crossing in the town of Nimy, and would allow the Germans to walk across the canal relatively effortlessly. Therefore, to make the scenario more historical, the 4/ Royal Fusiliers must be placed entirely in Nimy in order to hold the bridges in a historical manner.

1914_0823_02s: First Clash at Mons

This scenario covers the first clash between the BEF and the Germans between Jemappes, Nimy, Obourg and la Bois Haute.

Historically, part of the British 4/Royal Fusiliers was deployed in the town of Nimy, but this was actually only a small portion of the regiment. The other 4/5ths of the regiment was deployed facing west on a north-south line from Nimy to Mons along the Canal du Centre. Since the majority of the regiment was not located in Nimy, and since the regiment cannot break down into companies, it would make perfect sense to deploy the regiment in the average position of all of its companies (which would be one hex south of Nimy). However, this would be impractical in regards to the historical context that the regiment fiercely opposed the bridge crossing in the town of Nimy, and would allow the Germans to walk across the canal relatively effortlessly. Therefore, to make the scenario more historical, the 4/ Royal Fusiliers must be placed entirely in Nimy in order to hold the bridges in a historical manner.

1914_0824_01s: Flank Guard at Elouges

The battle begins just after the failed cavalry charge on the Sugar Factory (which would have been around hex 8,7) by the British 9th Lancers and 4th Dragoon Guards. Following that, the British cavalry retired east to Elouges where they were subjected to more German fire.

The Cheshire would fight stubbornly and almost hold to the last man. The Cheshires, who at the start of the battle mustered over one thousand soldiers, would suffer severely. At role call the next morning only two officers and two hundred men would answer to their name.

1914_0825_01s: The Rage of Dreaming Sheep (1st Sortie)

The Belgian's first sortie made good progress but it was abandoned with the Belgian retirement back to Antwerp on the 26th of August. Arguably the Belgians could have broken out of Antwerp during this battle but they historically called off the sortie when it was learned that the BEF and French were falling back after the Battles of Mons and Charleroi. Another reason for the decision to withdraw was because the Belgians were informed that Joffre was suspending allied counter offensive operations until a later date. This meant that any breakout of Antwerp would essentially not accomplish much since the Belgian Army would be completely on its own.

At the time of this scenario, the 4e Division d.Armée was still extricating itself from Namur, so it was not present during this battle.

1914_0826_01s: Taking One for the Team

The British 1/Duke of Cornwall's and 1/East Surrey were historically formed up on the road southeast of Le Cateau (34,18) when the action began. At 0600 hours, just as the order came for these two units to move south, these two units began to take fire from Germans who had managed to move into town and around their flank. The British suffered around 200 casualties before falling back to the southwest of town, along the valley to the main British line. For several hours a desperate battle echoed through the narrow valley, unseen by anyone else along the entire British battle line.

Since the historical battle saw the British fall back from their initial positions by the end of the 26th (to the Haucourt-Ligny-Bertry-Honnechy line), and since there is no way to encourage the British user to actually do so in such a short scenario where there are no strategic aspects to take under consideration, this scenario effectively ends after nightfall. This is the point when the British historically began to fall back from the line because of strategic considerations (they needed to disengage so that they could continue the retreat). This makes this scenario very busy, yet short and sweet. The German user should be mindful of this and should do everything he can to "soften up" the British positions at the objectives for an assault on the final two turns. Be careful not to spend your force early on.

On the British left flank of the battlefield the 1/Royal Lancaster was caught alone in the open and, as the morning fog lifted, they were cut to ribbons by fire from 21 German machine guns and over 36 field guns. After their double envelopment by two jäger battalions, the British 1st Warwicks and others rushed forward to save them. Among the soldiers of the 1/Warwicks was a young junior officer named Bernard Montgomery.

Most of the British 4th Infantry Division starts the battle as disrupted. Although it was fresh, it had marched into position during the night and at least one of the brigades (the 11th) got disoriented and lost their way, and the remainder of the division could be said to be in a state of disruption.

Historically, Sordet's Corps de Cavalerie was located in the vicinity of Lesdain but, as soon as day broke, it galloped off to the west through Banteux. It then supported the 84e Division d'Infanterie Territoriale near Cambrai until the evening. In this scenario, it is understood that Sordet's Corps de Cavalerie has already left and his exhausted troopers will return in the evening near the end of the battle.

As the Germans, avoid sending the 22.Reserve-Division into the line. It was historically used to cover the German right flank around Cambrai, to protect the forces fighting in this sector for the arriving French cavalry (see the map label for where they arrive). Also, be sure to turn on the Protected Hex shading to see both where the French cavalry arrive and which areas to avoid. If you have units located in this protected area when the French cavalry arrive, then your units will be broken. This prevents "gamey" behavior of the Germans being able to sit in their arrival area as a method to block the French from
arriving. If the French cavalry are blocked properly then they will play little effect on the battle, but if they are not blocked properly then they may be able to wreak havoc on the flank.

It is interesting to note that Smith-Dorrien's decision the night before to stand and fight triggered Sir John French, in his pessimistic and depressive state of mind, to write the II Corps off "as good as lost" to the enemy.

For the sake of honoring the memory, it must be mentioned that if you look to the northwest of the map you will see Cambrai. The events the 1914_0826_02s_Cambrai scenario are occurring at precisely the same moment as this scenario is unfolding. If you play both scenarios it is easy to see how the bravery of the men of the French 84e DIT, a territorial unit made up of reservists, and the Corps de Cavalerie helped save the British II Corps. It is not difficult to speculate that had the 84e DIT not fought off the elite German II.Armeekorps in that area, then the II.Armeekorps would have been able to flank around the rear of the British II Corps, making it impossible for them to extricate themselves. It is tragic how little has been written about the action at Cambrai, and how it has been completely overshadowed by the battle at Le Cateau.

1914_0826_02s: Unwritten Valor

The Germans will receive bonus points for exiting units at the south of the map. This represents the intended long flanking movement being a success, which would have placed the German II.Armeekorps deep behind the BEF line at Le Cateau (the #1914_0826_01s_Le_Cateau scenario occurs just off the east of this map).

The French Corps de Cavalerie will arrive during the course of the scenario but it has a possibility of being withdrawn again. Pay close attention to the withdrawal announcements in the Command Report so that you are not caught off guard when the cavalry units are withdrawn. It is a good idea to fall back with the 167e Brigade of the 84e DIT immediately, so it can be in a position to cover the areas that are left vacant when the Corps de Cavalerie is withdrawn. The French 5e Division de Cavalerie has a very low change of being withdrawn, so that it becomes likely that it will remain for the duration of the scenario. This is done so that this division can be used to hold off the Germans moving towards the exit hex. However, it is still possible that this division too will be withdrawn so the French player should have a contingency plan if this happens. Historically, the Corps de Cavalerie withdrew to move east to assist the BEF at Le Cateau. See that scenario for when this occurred. The quick arrival and departure of the Corps de Cavalerie should give some insight on just how frantic General Sordet was moving his corps from place to place, never really staying around long enough in once place to make his presence truly effective.

1914_0829_01s: French Morale Restored

The remainder of the German VII.Korps (specifically the 14.Infanterie-Division) was located off to the west of the map along with the HKK.1. These units were positioned to cover the flank of von Kluck's 1.Armee and were in screening positions in front of the BEF, who was positioned in the vicinity of La Fère.

The battered BEF to his west, being in no condition to support the French attack, would use the entire day of the 29th for some much needed rest. It is arguable that the French Ve Armée was in just as bad of shape as the BEF, yet Sir John French's paranoia and pessimism kept him out of the battle.

Although the battle that ensued was a tactical French defeat, it would be regarded as a strategic victory because it would briefly check von Bülow's 2.Armee, and allow the allies to resume a more orderly withdrawal and gain some much needed rest from the German brief operational pause while the 2.Armee recovered.

1914_0901_01s: A Desperate Rear Guard

In the historical battle, the British 6th Brigade turned back north to cover for the 4th Guards Brigade as it began to become overwhelmed. The 6th Brigade was positioned slightly south of Villers-Cotterets, just barely off the map edge, and does not take part in this scenario.

1914_0905_01s: Uncovering the Enemy's Hand

According to the impression left by orders issued from GQG, the French were not expecting any contact to occur west of the Ourcq. At the start of this battle, the French were marching east towards the Ourcq and were just stopping to rest and prepare for lunch.

With the exception of the Battle of Le Cateau, the IV.Reservekorps saw little action since the start of the conflict, being tasked out for various details, lines of communication security, and the occasional siege. As a matter of fact, a brigade of the 22.Reserve-Division was returning from being tasked out to security of Bruxelles. Von Gronau's troops were itching to prove themselves and were in good condition.

Von Gronau's spoiling attack disrupted the French advance and eliminated the element of surprise, thus allowing von Kluck to start taking immediate action on the night of the 5th/6th to counter it. The result of the Battle of the Marne could have been far worse for the Germans had von Gronau not made this vital decision. Von Gronau's decision to attack has often been compared to von Alvensleben at the Battle of Vionville in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.

1914_0906_01s: Miracle at the Marne

This scenario represents what is historically known as The First Battle of the Marne, and, rather than only covering the famous Paris sector, it covers the entire battle from Paris to Verdun. After careful consideration it has been determined that the Nancy sector would not be covered in this scenario. While it is true that the battle raged around Nancy during the battle of the Marne, the Nancy sector was largely stagnant in comparison to the mobile action to the west. Also, it was felt that by expanding the battle to the relatively stagnant Nancy area, the scenario would bog down and be too large to be enjoyable. This is especially true since this was the point in which both sides began drawing away forces from the Nancy sector which means that as the battle progresses it would become less eventful.

The scenario begins at what is largely recognized as the start of the battle, when the French counterattack from Paris began to seriously develop. It is important to understand that the battle actually began the day before near Iverny which is represented in another scenario. During that battle, the French had stumbled into the force which von Kluck assigned to screen his flank from any minor patrols or raids from Paris. In reality, the clash around Iverny served to warn von Kluck of a major French attack and, by the time this scenario begins, he was already sending the II.Armeekorps north to aid his screening force.

The scenario ends at the point in which the Germans began to withdraw to the Asine (evening of September 9th). It is rationalized that if the Allies can get a victory by this point then the Germans would historically retreat to the Aisne. If not, then the Germans probably would have redirected the 1.Armee towards Paris or gotten a breakthrough at some other point between Melun and Verdun.

It is uncertain what precise role Sordet's Corps de Cavalerie played in the fighting on the 6th of September as it does not appear to be mentioned in any French sources. It is practically certain that it was still south of the Seine (southwest off the map) refitting from its exhausting one month ride through France and Belgium. It is recorded that an ad hoc cavalry brigade (brigade de cavalerie Gillet) was located between the French and BEF. Sordet's Corps de Cavalerie did arrive later to help secure VIe Armée's left flank. It is almost impossible to determine the exact composition of the brigade de cavalerie Gillet, but some educated assumptions have been made. What is known is that it was an ad hoc unit comprised of a mix of eight cavalry squadrons which were hastily thrown together.

The German 4.Kavalerie-Division on von Kluck's flank was a shell of its former self. It suffered severely in a clash with BEF cavalry (primarily the 1st Cavalry Brigade) at Néry on the morning of September 1st.

As a result of the Battle of Iverny, the German II.Armeekorps has begun to march north to relieve the IV.Reservekorps, now withdrawn to Trocy.

The French 63e DR of Groupe Ebner remained in Paris for most of the duration of this scenario. The 63e DR, Bde de Fusiliers Marins and the RMCIC (Spahis cavalry brigade) all began moving on the afternoon of the September 8th to a line Dalmartin - Montge. They were sent to form a second line of defense in that area. These units have been left out of the scenario since they were tasked with defending the rear area of the VIe Armée, because they would arrive so late in the scenario (they would have arrived in the area on the morning of the 9th with five turns remaining). From a design point of view it is better to leave these units out rather than allowing the possibility of an allied player sending them into a final rush.

The French 7e DI is the unit that historically arrived by taxis from Paris. In the annuls of history this event has been exaggerated to mythological proportions. Historically the infantry component of this division was sent by Paris Taxi while the rest of the division was sent by rail. Since the sudden Paris Taxi movement cannot be represented in the game (other than having them magically appear at their destination). The Taxi transport is abstractly represented by giving the infantry brigades a head start over the other elements in the division, therefore the infantry arrives several turns prior to the rest of the division.

The BEF cavalry brigade locations have been pinpointed using war diaries and, as such, they do not agree with official GHQ situation maps of the day. This disagreement is exists because on the night of the 5th, the majority of the brigades were located behind the BEF (since they were formerly in front of the BEF's direction of travel to the south) --which is more or less where the GHQ situation maps has them. However, during the late evening of the 5th, the cavalry brigades were ordered to move north and to the east flank. At some point during the issuance of orders and the actual movement is where the contradiction occurs. With that in mind, it is more accurate to go with war diary locations than the situation maps.

The BEF is in terrible condition regarding its fatigue. This was done because at this point it had been marching for thirteen straight days with only one day of rest over a distance of one hundred and thirty-six miles. Although the French Ve Armée was suffering from a similar situation, its retirement was better managed. To put it bluntly, the BEF was near a state of total exhaustion from the retreat and the constant harassment from the German 1.Armee. One British officer summed it up at the time, "I would never have believed that men could be so tired and so hungry and yet live." At various points Sir John French made the BEF's withdrawal seem more like a hopeless rout with (mentally) the only good destination being the nearest channel port. Historically the BEF moved very slowly on the first and second days of the Battle of the Marne. This is justifiable and easily represented if we consider that their fatigue was almost at maximum level from such a long and relentless retreat. In other words, it is better to not push the BEF forward too hard during the first couple of days of the battle so as to allow them to recuperate and have some semblance of effectiveness.

Von Hausen's (3.Armee) memoirs paint him as a guileless straight forward commander that was more interested in the quality of the quarters that he slept in each night rather than the outcome of the campaign. As accurate or inaccurate of a judgment this might be, throughout the invasion of France he constantly provided neighborly aid and co-operation that was unique among German army commanders. However, this aid always came at an expense of initiative of his 3.Armee. In a sense, he was a sort of mobile reserve for the 2 and 4.Armee; always providing assistance but never leading and rarely getting any assistance in return. At the start of the Battle of the Marne, von Hausen had divided his army in half to simultaneously aid the 2.Armee and 4.Armee. This created a gap in his sector but there also existed an identical gap between the French IXe and IVe Armée directly opposite of him.

Von Hausen had rested his 3.Armee the entire day of the 5th. Because of this, his army had lost contact with the French but his troops were well rested.

Foch's 42e DI, Division Morocaine and IXe CA (-) were all given offensive orders for the day of the September 6th. However, just after dawn, the Germans would attack first across the marshes of St Gond. The 42e DI, Division Morocaine and IXe CA (-) was in the process of moving north to accomplish this task when a meeting engagement developed north of the marshes.

Between Revigny and Verdun there are a large quantity of objectives that begin under German control even though they are forward of the German positions. This was done primarily to influence the Allied player to move forward as was historically the case. The idea is that the French must advance forward as was historically the case, otherwise the French will probably permanently surrender these objectives to the Germans in this scenario.

There are a great number of victory points located immediately south of Verdun. This was done to influence the French player to resist and maintain contact with the fortified area of Verdun, as was historically the case (and even though this was a dangerous and
reckless decision by Sarrail), rather than influencing the French to move south and form a more advantageous, but completely a-historical, defensive position.

This scenario works well as a TCP/IP team based game of six (Allied) versus five (German). The Allied players should consist of #1 [VIe Armée], #2 [Ve Armée], #3 [BEF], #4 [IXe Armée], #5 [IVe Armée], #6 [IIIe Armée]. The German players should consist of #1 [1.Armee], #2 [2.Armee], #3 [3.Armee], #4 [4.Armee], #5 [5.Armee]. A PBEM team based game could consist of two versus two, with Allied players consisting of #1 [VIe Armée & Ve Armée & IVe Armée] and #2 [BEF & IXe Armée & IIIe Armée]. The German team should consist of the #1 [1.Armee & 5.Armee] and #2 [2.Armee & 3.Armee & 4.Armee].

1914_0906_02s: The Juggernaut Exposed

The scenario begins at what is largely recognized as the start of the battle, when the French counterattack from Paris began to seriously develop. It is important to understand that the battle actually began the day before near Iverny which is represented in another scenario. During that battle, the French had stumbled into the force which von Kluck assigned to screen his flank from any minor patrols or raids from Paris. In reality, the clash around Iverny served to warn von Kluck of a major French attack and, by the time this scenario begins, he was already sending the II.Armeekorps north to aid his screening force.

The scenario ends at the point in which the Germans began to withdraw to the Asine (September 9th). It is rationalized that if the Allies can get a victory by this point then the Germans would historically retreat to the Aisne. If not, then the Germans probably would have redirected the 1.Armee towards Paris or gotten a breakthrough at some other point between Melun and Verdun.

It is uncertain what precise role Sordet's Corps de Cavalerie played in the fighting on the 6th of September as it does not appear to be mentioned in any French sources. It is practically certain that it was still south of the Seine (southwest off the map) refitting from its exhausting one month ride through France and Belgium. It is recorded that an ad hoc cavalry brigade (brigade de cavalerie Gillet) was located between the French and BEF. Sordet's Corps de Cavalerie did arrive later to help secure VIe Armée's left flank. It is almost impossible to determine the exact composition of the brigade de cavalerie Gillet, but some educated assumptions have been made. What is known is that it was an ad hoc unit comprised of a mix of eight cavalry squadrons which were hastily thrown together.

The German 4.Kavalerie-Division on von Kluck's flank was a shell of its former self. It suffered severely in a clash with BEF cavalry (primarily the 1st Cavalry Brigade) at Néry on the morning of September 1st.

As a result of the Battle of Iverny, the German II.Armeekorps has begun to march north to relieve the IV.Reservekorps, now withdrawn to Trocy.

The French 63e DR of Groupe Ebner remained in Paris for most of the duration of this scenario. The 63e DR, Bde de Fusiliers Marins and the RMCIC (Spahis cavalry brigade) all began moving on the afternoon of the September 8th to a line Dalmartin - Montge. They were sent to form a second line of defense in that area. These units have been left out of the scenario since they were tasked with defending the rear area of the VIe Armée, because they would arrive so late in the scenario (they would have arrived in the area on the morning of the 9th with five turns remaining). From a design point of view it is better to leave these units out rather than allowing the possibility of an allied player sending them into a final rush.

The French 7e DI is the unit that historically arrived by taxis from Paris. This event has been exaggerated to mythological proportions. Historically the infantry component of this division was sent by Paris Taxi while the rest of the division was sent by rail. Since the sudden Paris Taxi movement cannot be represented in the game (other than having them magically appear at their destination). The Taxi transport is abstractly represented by giving the infantry brigades a head start over the other elements in the division, therefore the infantry arrives several turns prior to the rest of the division.

The BEF cavalry brigade locations have been pinpointed using war diaries and, as such, they do not agree with official GHQ situation maps of the day. This disagreement is exists because on the night of the 5th, the majority of the brigades were located behind the BEF (since they were formerly in front of the BEF's direction of travel to the south) --which is more or less where the GHQ situation maps has them. However, during the late evening of the 5th, the cavalry brigades were ordered to move north and to the east flank. At some point during the issuance of orders and the actual movement is where the contradiction occurs. With that in mind, it is more accurate to go with war diary locations than the situation maps.

The BEF is in terrible condition regarding its fatigue. This was done because at this point it had been marching for thirteen straight days with only one day of rest over a distance of one hundred and thirty-six miles. Although the French Ve Armée was suffering from a similar situation, its retirement was better managed. To put it bluntly, the BEF was near a state of total exhaustion from the retreat and the constant harassment from the German 1.Armee. One British officer summed it up at the time, "I would never have believed that men could be so tired and so hungry and yet live." At various points Sir John French made the BEF's withdrawal seem more like a hopeless rout with (mentally) the only good destination being the nearest channel port. Historically the BEF moved very slowly on the first and second days of the Battle of the Marne. This is justifiable and easily represented if we consider that their fatigue was almost at maximum level from such a long and relentless retreat. In other words, it is better to not push the BEF forward too hard during the first couple of days of the battle so as to allow them to recuperate and have some semblance of effectiveness.
Code: (8.500)

1914_0906_03s: Foch Stands Firm

The scenario ends at the point in which the Germans began to withdraw to the Asine (September 9th). It is rationalized that if the Allies can get a victory by this point then the Germans would historically retreat to the Aisne. If not, then the Germans probably would have redirected the 1.Armee towards Paris or gotten a breakthrough at some other point between Melun and Verdun.

Von Hausen's (3.Armee) memoirs paint him as a guileless straight forward commander that was more interested in the quality of the quarters that he slept in each night rather than in the outcome of the campaign. As accurate or inaccurate of a judgment this might be, throughout the invasion of France he constantly provided neighborly aid and co-operation that was unique among German army commanders. However, this aid always came at an expense of initiative of his 3.Armee. In a sense, he was a sort of mobile reserve for the 2 and 4.Armee; always providing assistance but never leading and rarely getting any assistance in return. At the start of the Battle of the Marne, von Hausen had divided his army in half to simultaneously aid the 2.Armee and 4.Armee. This created a gap in his sector but there also existed an identical gap between the French IXe and IVe Armée directly opposite of him.

Von Hausen had rested his 3.Armee the entire day of the 5th. Because of this, his army had lost contact with the French but his troops were well rested.

Foch's 42e DI, Division Morocaine and IXe CA (-) were all given offensive orders for the day of the September 6th. However, just after dawn, the Germans would attack first across the marshes of St Gond. The 42e DI, Division Morocaine and IXe CA (-) was in the process of moving north to accomplish this task when a meeting engagement developed north of the marshes.

1914_0906_04s: Opportunity Lost

The scenario ends at the point in which the Germans began to withdraw to the Asine (September 9th). It is rationalized that if the Allies can get a victory by this point then the Germans would historically retreat to the Aisne. If not, then the Germans probably would have redirected the 1.Armee towards Paris or gotten a breakthrough at some other point between Melun and Verdun.

1914_0906_05s: Flirting With Disaster

The scenario ends at the point in which the Germans began to withdraw to the Asine (September 9th). It is rationalized that if the Allies can get a victory by this point then the Germans would historically retreat to the Aisne. If not, then the Germans probably would have redirected the 1.Armee towards Paris or gotten a breakthrough at some other point between Melun and Verdun.

Between Revigny and Verdun there are a large quantity of objectives that begin under German control even though they are forward of the German positions. This was done primarily to influence the Allied player to move forward as was historically the case. The idea is that the French must advance forward as was historically the case, otherwise the French will probably permanently surrender these objectives to the Germans in this scenario.

There are a great number of victory points located immediately south of Verdun. This was done to influence the French player to resist and maintain contact with the fortified area of Verdun, as was historically the case (and even though this was a dangerous and reckless decision by Sarrail), rather than influencing the French to move south and form a more advantageous, but completely a-historical, defensive position.

1914_0909_01s: The Belgian Diversion (2nd Sortie)

The 4e Division d.Armée had just recently arrived from Namur. Historically it was evacuated across France from Namur and embarked on ships and sent to Antwerp. It remains in this scenario in a fixed status as it was being reconsolidated.

Historically, the Germans reacted quickly to the second Belgian sortie from Antwerp. They brought the 6.Reserve-Division back to the area permanently; halted the march of the IX.Reservecorps (which was on its way to France, off the map to the south and does not appear in the scenario); and they diverted the lead division of von Herringen's 7.Armee, which was on its way from Alsace to the extreme right flank of the German armies along the Aisne.

One objective of the second Belgian sortie was to turn the German's east flank and sweep around and disrupt German lines of communication. However, due to the German reaction, the Belgians had to abandon the sortie after heavy fighting that inflicted over 8,000 Belgian casualties. Even though the Belgians called off the attack, they succeeded in attracting German attention with their sortie, and greatly disrupted German movement and planning.

The German 5.Reserve-Division intentionally has a 0% triggered release by subunit. In other words, this division will not be released unless it is in contact with the enemy. Once the division makes contact, it will release parts of the division depending on which brigade made contact. The intent is that, historically, this division remained in place to cover the left of the line. In order to prevent the German player from sending this division on the offensive or sending it around to the east, it must be fixed in its historic place. However, if the Belgian player becomes aggressive in the 5.Reserve-Division's area then it will become active and can be used accordingly. The Division and Corps HQs will not be released unless they have direct line of sight with an enemy unit, therefore, the intent is that the brigades in this division should not go very far from the immediate vicinity of the rest of the division.

The Belgian Division de Cavalerie is fixed in place during the first night (from 1800 on the 9th, to 0600 on the 10th). This was done because the division was supposed to screen the left flank while the Belgian infantry moved forward. Since the Belgian user has the gift of knowing that there is no threat to the east and southeast, this division is forced to screen the flank on the first night, thus limiting the advance of it to a more historical rate.

The three historical Belgian covering positions (objectives) southwest of Malines have intentionally high VP levels. This was done so as to provide historical objectives to the flank, which is what the 1er and 5e Division occupied and held throughout the battle (securing the Belgian right flank). These objectives were occupied just prior to when this scenario begins, in the day spent moving forward from the attack positions.

1914_0913_01s: Everything at Stake!

This scenario covers the mobile portion of the battle which was historically known as the First Battle of the Aisne.

The historical battle continued off and on until the end of the month, but deadlock was achieved by the end of the third day (September 15th) and trench warfare, in the sense of what most people come to think about when they think of the Great War, began in this sector. This start of stagnation is when this scenario ends.

The bridges located at Chavonne (76,40) and south of Vailly (71,40) were indeed destroyed at the start of this battle. At Chavonne the Germans, in their haste to get across the river, had left a temporary trestle construction over a broken span. At Vailly the destroyed section was small enough that British infantry were able to bridge it with a single plank of wood. In game play terms this means that neither bridge is destroyed especially since both of them were historically in a crossable condition.

The German 5.Kavallerie.Div does not appear in this scenario since it was moving east to reinforce 3.Armee. Historically, at the start of this scenario, the division was located roughly behind the 2.Armee so they played no part in the battle in this sector.

The German XVIII.Armeekorps was sent from 4.Armee to 2.Armee during the battle but it was held in a strategic reserve on the 15th so it does not appear in the scenario.

The French XIIIe Corps d'Armée was en route from the VIe Armée from the Ier Armée and began arriving near the end of this scenario. It was not until 17th September that this corps actually came into the battle line at the (at that time) extreme left flank to the west of IVe Corps d'Armée. This is the point in which the "Race to the Sea" began.

The French Corps de Cavalerie (formerly under the command of Sordet, but now under the command of Bridoux) was positioned on the far left of the Allied front line. Two of the cavalry divisions (1er and 5e DC) were just off the map to the left of the 3e Division de Cavalerie. These two cavalry divisions pushed north throughout the battle nearly reaching the Somme near Bray (around 25km north-northwest of Roye). These two cavalry divisions pushed stragglers before them and never turned inward behind the German 1.Armee so they are not included in this scenario.

South of the town of Bourg (83,42), there is a British artillery unit that may seem out of place. The XXXII Bde RFA was temporarily loaned to The Cavalry Division (from the 4th Division).

The German 13.Infanterie-Division (HQ at 107,40) was retreating northeast and not advancing (in case anyone there is some confused as to which direction they should be heading by their starting disposition). The division was conducting rear guard actions
with the gem.Landwehr-Brigade.25 (HQ at 83,41), and both organizations suffered heavily from it.

In desperation, the Germans employed their 15cm and 21cm howitzers in the direct fire role around Vregny and along the Chemin des Dames. This tactic allows the Germans to bring in immediate heavy fire but it comes with the inherent cost the guns must be vulnerable in order to be used in this way (they are naturally spotted and can be fired on, and they can be overrun in an assault). The Allies should try to put effective fire on these guns.

This scenario works well as a TCP/IP based team based game of three versus three. The Allied players should consist of #1 [Ve Armée], #2 [VIe Armée], #3 [BEF] and the German players should consist of #1 [1.Armee], #2 [2.Armee], #3 [7.Armee]. A PBEM team based game could consist of two versus two, with Allied players consisting of #1 [French Army], #2 [BEF] and the German players consisting of #1 [1.Armee], #2 [2.Armee & 7.Armee].

1914_0917_01s: The Race to the Sea

This campaign ends after Antwerp was evacuated, the Belgians reached their positions behind the Yser, and just before #1914_1018_01s_Campaign_Flanders begins (October 17th, evening). At this point, both sides essentially reached the channel coast and the great flanking maneuvers had ended and a new phase began.

As the default Optional Rules suggest, this scenario (and all others) should be played with the Virtual Supply Trucks (VST) optional rule turned on. This rule creates a realistic situation where supply levels vary depending the location of the area in relation to friendly supply sources, where distance and the road and rail network play a factor. While this is not much of an issue in smaller scenarios with smaller maps, if this VST optional rule is turned off in this large campaign, then both sides will get their full supply no matter what the location of their units, which will cause unintended results. The outcome will be at a much higher intensity instead of the supply lines being realistically stretched with the advance.

The Royal Marine Brigade was not intended to be a front line force. Where as the British Naval units were an improvisation, the Royal Marine Brigade was not. On the outbreak of war, the brigade was planned to be formed from recruits and used to secure and guard any temporary port that might be necessary. In September 1914, this brigade was intended to guard Dunkerque and secure a line of communication and supply to the channel port as the BEF was shifting its base of operations from the Aisne to Flanders. However, the events unfolding in Antwerp forced this brigade to be sent forward as a token reserve force to try to aid the Belgians in any way possible. British sources state that when the Royal Marine Brigade was moved from Dunkerque to Cassel on the 30th of September, it left behind its "untrained recruits" which was about half of its strength (the brigade numbered 2085 men when it moved out, which is approximately 52% strength). There is no effective way to represent this in game play other than having the brigade arrive at this reduced strength. This reduced strength has been carried over to each scenario in which the Royal Marine Brigade is involved in during the period of August through October.

This scenario does not include withdrawals for the British 1st Royal Naval Bde, the user can instead choose to move them north to the border with Holland (either the northern map edge or the impassible hexes in the north) and exit the units from map. Historically the 1st Royal Naval Bde fled into Holland, a neutral country, and was disarmed at 2200 hours on October 9th.

Historically, the reason the British 1st Royal Naval Bde had to flee into Holland was because the order for the brigade to withdraw on the night of 8/9 October was mistakenly delivered to the brigade.s Drake Bn. The Drake Bn withdrew on its own and the mistake was not noticed until the early morning hours of the 9th. This historical blunder is simulated by fixing the brigade (less the Drake Bn) on the night of the 8th and creating a variable percentage that the brigade will be released by morning.

Congestion markers are used to represent the massive flow of panicked civilians that were fleeing Antwerp as the city.s final hour approached. This congestion only affects the Allied Powers since it is rationalized that the congestion would be ahead of the German advance.

Actual French rail transit time tables were used to determine exact departure and arrival times of the reinforcements. The reinforcements arrive on the map edges at the point in which they are able to move to, and disembark at, their historical points at the historical time. Some random variation in unit arrival probability (for both sides) is added, in order to provide a degree of variation each time this campaign is played.

The British I Corps does not appear in this scenario. Historically it was arriving near St. Pol on the 19th, which is two days after this scenario ends.

Some reinforcements will arrive away from the map edge. These units will arrive in Travel Mode and, when they arrive, they may be placed along roads or rail lines. The reason for this is that these units were historically disembarked in these locations near the map edge, where they then marched from that point to the front line. The initial units that arrived were historically dropped in these out of the way locations because commanders did not know where the exact position of the enemy. Having the advantage of perfect hindsight, if these units arrived on the map end in Rail Mode, then the user would obviously move them to a better location across the map.

Avoid the temptation of sending a column of Rail Mode units into enemy territory as some sort of rapid moving vanguard. The enemy could ambush the train to devastating effect either by assault or by attack by fire.

As the Belgian Army withdraws from Antwerp (if it does), Belgian and British engineer units should consider destroying rail lines between Antwerp and the Yser, or else you
may find German corps arriving quickly by train in these areas near the end of the campaign.

Avoid the temptation of using allied units at Dunkirk as some sort of force to move into German rear areas and cause mischief. The British Oxfordshire Hussars, British Eastchurch Squadron, French Brigade de Fusiliers Marins, and the British Royal Marine Brigade are better utilized in assisting the extrication of the Belgians from Antwerp, and in screening allied objectives in Calais. Do not complain if you send these units into German areas only to have the German cavalry capture the allied objectives across Calais and cause equal mischief behind the Allied front lines.

This scenario works well as a TCP/IP based team based game of four (Allied) versus three (German). The Allied players should consist of #1 [VIe Armée & IIe Armée], #2 [Xe Armée & GAN (Foch)], #3 [BEF], #4 [Belgian Army] and the German players should consist of #1 [1.Armee & 2.Armee], #2 [6.Armee], #3 [AG.Beseler]. A PBEM team based game could consist of three (Allied) versus two (German), with Allied players consisting of #1 [French Army], #2 [BEF], #3 [Belgian Army] and the German players consisting of #1 [1.Armee & 2.Armee & 6.Armee], #2 [AG.Beseler].

1914_0919_01s: A Dagger to the Heart

The Crown Prince's attack (off the northwest map edge) would gain little ground, but det.Strantz's attack was a great success, forming the Saint Mihiel salient and capturing the Fort du Camp des Romains. However, he was unable to advance beyond Saint Mihiel.

The bayer.Ersatz-Division historically arrived in sector at the end of September to reinforce the III.bAK and has been left out of the scenario. German sources state that the division arrived late in September to reinforce the III.bAK after the salient had formed, which is essentially when this scenario ends.

This scenario ends on the evening of September 26th, when Fort du Camp des Romains historically fell and the front began to solidify.

1914_1001_01s: Never Give Up!

This scenario is unconventional in that it is a tug of war of sorts, similar to #1914_0804_01s_Liege and #1914_0818_01s_Gette situations. The German objective is simple; take as many objectives as possible and to block allied unit withdrawals to the west if possible. The allied objective is to hold the objectives as long as possible while at the same time exiting forces to the west, thereby weakening their capability to hold those objectives. The proper balance is for the allies to hold as long as possible with the least amount of forces as possible, and exit forces to the west to cancel out German gains. A successful allied player must strike a balance between both options with the most successful being able to hold off the German advance and prevent the capture of Antwerp by the end of the scenario while at the same time extricating at least 85% of their forces. Historically, all of the Belgian divisions (with the exception of about half of the 2nd Division) retreated west between October 6th and 7th while the other half of the 2nd Division, fortress troops, and most of the British Royal Naval Division retreated on the 8th. The city fell around October 9th (formally surrendered on October 10th), and this result is considered to be a draw since the bulk of the Belgians escaped but the Germans took the city.

The scenario ends on the evening of October 10th which was after Antwerp historically (and formally) surrendered, and after the bulk of the Belgian Army retreated to the west and the remaining Belgian defenders surrendered.

The Royal Marine Brigade was not intended to be a front line force. Where as the British Naval units were an improvisation, the Royal Marine Brigade was not. On the outbreak of war, the brigade was planned to be formed from recruits and used to secure and guard any temporary port that might be necessary. In September 1914, this brigade was intended to guard Dunkerque and secure a line of communication and supply to the channel port as the BEF was shifting its base of operations from the Aisne to Flanders.
However, the events unfolding in Antwerp forced this brigade to be sent forward as a token reserve force to try to aid the Belgians in any way possible. British sources state that when the Royal Marine Brigade was moved from Dunkerque to Cassel on the 30th of September, it left behind its "untrained recruits" which was about half of its strength (the brigade numbered 2085 men when it moved out, which is approximately 52% strength). There is no effective way to represent this in game play other than having the brigade arrive at this reduced strength.

This scenario does not include withdrawals for the British 1st Royal Naval Bde, the user can instead choose to move them north to the border with Holland (either the northern map edge or the impassible hexes in the north) and exit the units from map. Historically the 1st Royal Naval Bde fled into Holland, a neutral country, and was disarmed at 2200 hours on October 9th.

Historically, the reason the British 1st Royal Naval Bde had to flee into Holland was because the order for the brigade to withdraw on the night of 8/9 October was mistakenly delivered to the brigade.s Drake Bn. The Drake Bn withdrew on its own and the mistake was not noticed until the early morning hours of the 9th. This historical blunder is simulated by fixing the brigade (less the Drake Bn) on the night of the 8th and creating a variable percentage that the brigade will be released by morning.

Congestion markers are used to represent the massive flow of panicked civilians that were fleeing Antwerp as the city.s final hour approached. This congestion affects both sides.

1914_1001_02s: Turning the Flank

This scenario represents what is historically known as the First Battle of Arras.

This battle historically began to subside at the end of the 4th of October, which is when this scenario ends. On the 5th, the situation was mostly stabilized in this sector and the fighting shifted north.

The French 21e Corps d'Armée is not present because it was not until the 7th of October when this force arrived from the north (specifically from the Lille-Armentières area). At that point the battle to turn the flank was carried further north.

1914_1018_01s: Where Valor Sleeps

The British Official History of the War series (and any books or maps based on it) imply that the Belgians had formed a second cavalry division near Veurne after the Belgian Army took up permanent residence along the Yser in mid October of 1914. However, Belgian records consistently state that there was still only one cavalry division in existence at this time and that the second cavalry division was not established until late 1916 to early 1917 (from various divisional cavalry regiments that were previously assigned to Belgian infantry divisions), and then changed back to one cavalry division in 1918. It is possible that a number of cavalry regiments which would eventually make up the Belgian 2e Division de Cavalerie were located in reserve near Veurne and it is also possible that British sources incorrectly assume that a second division was had been established when this occurred. In France .14, the decision was made to follow Belgian sources and represent only one cavalry division for the Belgian Army throughout 1914. In this scenario, some of the various cavalry units which would eventually make up the 2e Division de Cavalerie are placed in reserve in the vicinity of Vuerne, since it is obvious that there was a concentration of cavalry in this area.

The Dover Patrol Flotilla arrived in time to help breakup the German attack from the 4.Ersatz-Divison along the coast. Historically the fire was accurate along the coast which stopped the German advance and eventually caused the 4.Ersatz-Division to withdraw back to Oostende. The flotilla also directed their guns inland on areas where they suspected the German heavy artillery to be firing from, but the flotilla.s fire was mostly ineffective and scattered because of lack of accurate spotting.

The marsh area along the Yser was flooded near the end of this scenario. Given that the map is static and is based on the master map, this area must begin in its flooded state. Since marsh terrain has a positive combat modifier (it penalizes the defender), the Belgians should either dig in this area to negate the penalty, or pull back beyond the
marsh as soon as these units are released (the historical choice). It can be rationalized that the moment the Germans reached the Yser (either sooner or later than was historically the case), the Belgians would have released the sluices at that moment.

When the scenario begins, the German III.Reservekorps (in the Yser sector) was just now drawing off to the north, away from the French cavalry advancing towards Roulers. The III.Reservekorps was screening for the arrival of the new reservekorps of the 4.Armee, of which it was remarkably successful.

Congestion markers are used around Ypres to represent the congestion caused by masses of rear area personnel and support units moving in and out of the small area. Congestion in this area is specifically mentioned in official British historical accounts as the primary delaying factor to the units moving in and out of the salient. Congestion only affects the Allied Powers side since it is rationalized that this congestion would be driven off by any German advance into the area.

This scenario works well as a TCP/IP based team based game of three (Allied) versus three (German). The Allied players should consist of #1 [French Army], #2 [BEF], #3 [Belgian Army] and the German players should consist of #1 [4.Armee], #2 [6.Armee], #3 [AG.Beseler & AG.Fabeck & AG.Linsingen]. A PBEM team based game could consist of two (Allied) versus two (German), with Allied players consisting of #1 [French Army], #2 [BEF & Belgian Army] and the German players consisting of #1 [4.Armee & AG.Beseler], #2 [6.Armee & AG.Fabeck & AG.Linsingen].

1914_1018_02s: The Belgian Bulwark

The British Official History of the War series (and any books or maps based on it) imply that the Belgians had formed a second cavalry division near Veurne after the Belgian Army took up permanent residence along the Yser in mid October of 1914. However, Belgian records consistently state that there was still only one cavalry division in existence at this time and that the second cavalry division was not established until late 1916 to early 1917 (from various divisional cavalry regiments that were previously assigned to Belgian infantry divisions), and then changed back to one cavalry division in 1918. It is possible that a number of cavalry regiments which would eventually make up the Belgian 2e Division de Cavalerie were located in reserve near Veurne and it is also possible that British sources incorrectly assume that a second division was had been established when this occurred. In France .14, the decision was made to follow Belgian sources and represent only one cavalry division for the Belgian Army throughout 1914. In this scenario, some of the various cavalry units which would eventually make up the 2e Division de Cavalerie are placed in reserve in the vicinity of Vuerne, since it is obvious that there was a concentration of cavalry in this area.

The Dover Patrol Flotilla arrived in time to help breakup the German attack from the 4.Ersatz-Divison along the coast. Historically the fire was accurate along the coast which stopped the German advance and eventually caused the 4.Ersatz-Division to withdraw back to Oostende. The flotilla also directed their guns inland on areas where they suspected the German heavy artillery to be firing from, but the flotilla.s fire was mostly ineffective and scattered because of lack of accurate spotting.

The marsh area along the Yser was flooded near the end of this scenario. Given that the map is static and is based on the master map, this area must begin in its flooded state. Since marsh terrain has a positive combat modifier (it penalizes the defender), the Belgians should either dig in this area to negate the penalty, or pull back beyond the marsh as soon as these units are released (the historical choice). It can be rationalized that the moment the Germans reached the Yser (either sooner or later than was historically the case), the Belgians would have released the sluices at that moment.

When the scenario begins, the German III.Reservekorps was just now drawing off to the north, away from the French cavalry advancing towards Roulers. The III.Reservekorps was screening for the arrival of the new reservekorps of the 4.Armee, of which it was remarkably successful.

Both sides will have units gradually drawn off during the course of this scenario as the battle shifted south towards the Ypres salient (into the impassible areas on the south edge of the map). Most notably, the German XXVI and most of the XXIII.Reservekorps will be drawn away as they diverted their axis of advance to the south. Historically these two corps would still have been located on the map, but with the absence of any physical threat to them in the south, they would a-historically be used to the attack to the allies in this sector. It is advisable for the remaining elements of the XXIII.Reservekorps to go on the defensive in the south at the time in which these German units began to get withdrawn.

1914_1018_03s: The Graveyard of the Contemptibles

This scenario covers what is historically known as the First Battle of Ypres.

Congestion markers are used around Ypres to represent the congestion caused by masses of rear area personnel and support units moving in and out of the small area. Congestion in this area is specifically mentioned in official British historical accounts as the primary delaying factor to the units moving in and out of the salient. Congestion only affects the Allied Powers side since it is rationalized that this congestion would be driven off by any German advance into the area.

The German XIII.Armeekorps moved south on the 19th to assist in the battle in that area (you can find it near Loos in the #1914_1020_02s_Armentieres-La_Bassee scenario).

Historically, on the 23rd and 24th, the French and British launched a counter offensive aimed at taking back Passchendaele. This is a viable option once the French 9e Corps d.Armée arrives.

The French 2e Corps de Cavalerie and 9e Division de Cavalerie being the scenario in the positions that they reached at the end of the day. In other words, the French cavalry in the north of the map begin the scenario in the positions that the historically moved to by the end of the first day in this scenario, and they start the scenario as fixed. This was done to force the scenario to play out historically in the north, because otherwise a user would probably send these cavalry formations all over the map at the start, since there is no threat from the off map German units in the Yser area.

Keep a close eye on the protected hex shading feature to know what hexes you should stay away from. Given the abundance of German troops approaching this area, in the north, east, and south of the map the Germans intentionally arrive in long columns with
each stack having a large protected range of hexes. This was done to prevent any gamey attempt by the allies of moving into this area where the Germans arrive in force. The same is true for the Allies in the western map edge.

The British 1st Division was in the process of being relieved by the French and was falling back to the vicinity of Ypres to rest. This division had been single handedly holding back the German XXIII.Reservekorps for four days and had been bombarded all throughout the night on the 24th when it was supposed to be extricated. As a result, the division was in poor shape and the it had only begun to pull out of the line in the early morning hours of the 25th, and it was not until 0800 that the division was fully clear of the line.

Historically, the massive German offensive by Heersgruppe.Fabeck was to commence on the 30th of October. The 29th was to have an attack to take Gheluvet by the XXVII.Reservekorps, supported by the newly formed 6.bayer.Reserve-Div. The German cavalry of HKK.1, 2 and 4 were also to advance and pin the enemy in place. All of these attacks were primarily intended to cover the buildup of Heersguppe.Fabeck and the attack of it on the 30th was made in complete surprise.

After the German infantry divisions began to take over the front line from the cavalry divisions along the Lys Canal on the evening of the 30th of October, most of the German cavalry divisions were pulled back into reserve north of Lille (in this map area). This reserve of cavalry was intended to be called up to exploit a breakthrough or to fill in and cover the flanks of the spearhead that would be formed by Armeegruppe Fabeck.

The French 32e Division d.Infanterie, which arrived on the 30th of October, was split up piece meal and sent to each place in the line where the Germans were threatening to breakthrough. Of primary importance was an entire brigade of infantry and some artillery that were rushed to the British Cavalry Corps sector near Wyschaete.

The BEF 7th Division, battered and exhausted, began to move into reserve on the 5th of November. On the 6th of November, the 20th Infantry Brigade from this division was moved west off the map to Meteren and the Northumberland Hussars and various division assets followed the next day. These units have a chance of withdrawal at the start of their respective dates, so the Allied player needs to adjust accordingly.

During the 10th of November, the battered 22nd Infantry Brigade of the BEF 7th Division moved west to Merris into reserve, southwest of Bailleul, off map and out of sector. This unit joined the other elements of the division out of sector, minus the 21st Infantry Brigade which was in the line at Ploegsteert. These off map units remained for the duration of the Ypres battle. Thus, the 22nd Infantry Brigade has a chance of withdrawal their respective day.

This scenario intentionally has duplicate units in it. If you open it in the scenario editor you will be presented with messages of duplicate units. Historically, many units were withdrawn from the sector and then returned later on so the duplicate units are necessary to represent this, but no two of the same units should even be on the map at the same time since they are always withdrawn before returning.

This scenario works well as a TCP/IP and PBEM team based game of two (Allied) versus two (German). The Allied players should consist of #1 [Dét d'Armée de Belgique], #2 [BEF & Belgian Army] and the German players should consist of #1 [4.Armee & AG.Linsingen], #2 [6.Armee & AG.Fabeck]. For TCP/IP, any further players could break down each side by corps.

1914_1018_04s: The Salient is Formed

The German XIII.Armeekorps moved south on the 19th to assist in the battle in that area (you can find it near Loos in the #1914_1020_02s_Armentieres-La_Bassee scenario).

This scenario ends at the end of the 24th of October where the #1914_1025_01s_Ypres scenario resumes the battle.

Historically, on the 23rd and 24th, the French and British launched a counter offensive aimed at taking back Passchendaele. This is a viable option once the French 9e Corps d.Armée arrives.

The French 2e Corps de Cavalerie and 9e Division de Cavalerie being the scenario in the positions that they reached at the end of the day. In other words, the French cavalry in the north of the map begin the scenario in the positions that the historically moved to by the end of the first day in this scenario, and they start the scenario as fixed. This was done to force the scenario to play out historically in the north, because otherwise a user would probably send these cavalry formations all over the map at the start, since there is no threat from the off map German units in the Yser area.

Keep a close eye on the protected hex shading feature to know what hexes you should stay away from. Given the abundance of German troops approaching this area, in the north, east, and south of the map the Germans intentionally arrive in long columns with each stack having a large protected range of hexes. This was done to prevent any gamey attempt by the allies of moving into this area where the Germans arrive in force. The same is true for the Allies in the western map edge.

Congestion markers are used around Ypres to represent the congestion caused by masses of rear area personnel and support units moving in and out of the small area. Congestion in this area is specifically mentioned in official British historical accounts as the primary delaying factor to the units moving in and out of the salient. Congestion only affects the Allied Powers side since it is rationalized that this congestion would be driven off by any German advance into the area.

1914_1020_01s: The Unglamorous Struggle

To the south of the well known Ypres sector lies a forgotten front: the La-Bassee sector which held the southern flank of the Ypres salient. So far as valor and determination of the troops that fought here are concerned, the fighting was equally ferocious and desperate as the fighting that occurred immediately around Ypres, but the La Bassee sector never had the same strategic or sentimental importance. The La Bassee sector was originally supposed to be the area that the BEF would outflank the Germans in early October as they advanced towards Lille, but the advance quickly ran into resistance and attention shifted to the north. In the middle of October, as the Ypres salient was only beginning to be formed, the German 6.Armee launched a powerful offensive with the attempt of smashing through the Allied line, which would thereby put the allied forces to the north in untenable positions.

This scenario obviously covers the Armentieres and La Bassee sector but is named “La Bassee” since the majority of the hard fighting occurred to the north and west of this town around Neuve Chappelle. It is also named “La Bassee” because, quite simply, “La_Bassee-Armentieres” does not fit in the File Selection Dialog box.

This scenario covers the full German 6.Armee offensive from 20th October to 2nd November when the area largely became stagnant following the capture of Neuve Chappelle. The “first phase” from the 20th to the 23rd was an all out offensive to accomplish a breakthrough, and when this failed a “conclusion” phase began which saw the objectives change from breakthrough to simply pinning the enemy and preventing them from assisting the fight around Ypres. Because of this shift in strategy, there are exit hexes in friendly territory along the north edges of the map (both French and British units may use the British exit hex at 9,0). These exit hexes provide victory points under the rationale that forces sent north to assist the fighting around Ypres could play a decisive role on the outcome of the battle there. However, if either side sends forces north to the Ypres sector then they will significantly weaken their own ability to hold or take objectives in the La Bassee sector. In other words, if one side or the other exits units to the north then it will upset the historical balance of forces in the area. If such an occasion occurs, then the opposing side can either exit forces of their own or push their attack on enemy objectives. This will undoubtedly produce wildly varying results depending on what happens in the campaign. Users may want to consider conducting aerial recon missions around enemy exit hexes near the end of the scenario and are encouraged to keep a close eye on the victory levels so that you are not caught off guard by a sudden exit of forces to Ypres. The Germans should provide constant pressure on the Allied line to prevent them from disengaging a sizable force, and the Allies should counter attack if the Germans feel that they have the luxury to exit units. Since the user is free to exit units for points, units that were historically withdrawn (ie. East Lancashire, Somerset LI, Hampshire – the entire 6.bayer.Res.Div etc) do not have a withdrawal in this scenario. The user can instead decide to use them in the area or withdraw them as was historically the case. Keep in mind that units that were historically withdrawn have already been factored into the victory point total (so as to force their withdrawal). For historical unit withdrawals, see #1914_1020_02s_La_Bassee withdrawal dialog. For obvious reasons, HKK.1 is not included in the scenario since it is rationalized that this unit was already committed to the north (historically it was located at Lille and moved north as soon as this scenario begins).

The official British history includes this area in the overall battle for Ypres, where it is basically considered the southern shoulder of the Ypres salient. In the practical sense the Armentieres area was indeed a separate sector from the main event around Ypres in the same sense that the Yser sector (north of Ypres) was also separate. Despite what the official British history states, it divides Ypres and Armentieres into separate maps and the official German history considers it a separate conflict from Ypres. It is important to state these facts because careful consideration has been made on whether or not to include this area in the Ypres sub scenarios. While it is true that the entire Flanders front fought for the same purpose, the final decision was that the individual Yser, Ypres, and La Bassee-Armentieres areas had conflicts and concerns of their own and are more practically represented as separate scenarios. Those who want the “full effect” have the option to play the entire massive Flanders front campaign in scenario

#1914_1018_01s_Campaign_Flanders.

This battle was to be the scene for the death of the British 2/Royal Irish. On October 19th, the regiment had launched a gallant attack, in which it lost over 200 men, and seized the town of Le Pilly. The French cavalry, from the Ier Corps de Cavalerie, were supposed to cover the unit's flank as it simultaneously attacked towards the town of Fournes. However, the French had difficulty meeting their objectives and the Irish were left to stand alone and fought bravely to the bitter end after the Germans surrounded and annihilated them.

1914_1020_02s: A Taste of Hell

This scenario obviously covers the Armentieres and La Bassee sector but is named “La Bassee” since the majority of the hard fighting occurred to the north and west of this town around Neuve Chappelle. It is also named “La Bassee” because, quite simply, “La_Bassee-Armentieres” does not fit in the File Selection Dialog box.

This is the short version of the battle which ends on the 23rd of October, essentially at the end of the first onslaught. Given the objectives of the first phase, there are no exit hexes to the north of the map nor is there an objective in Estaires (see #1914_1020_01s_Campaign_La_Bassee).

This battle was to be the scene for the death of the British 2/Royal Irish. On October 19th, the regiment had launched a gallant attack, in which it lost over 200 men, and seized the town of Le Pilly. The French cavalry, from the Ier Corps de Cavalerie, were supposed to cover the unit's flank as it simultaneously attacked towards the town of Fournes. However, the French had difficulty meeting their objectives and the Irish were left to stand alone and fought bravely to the bitter end after the Germans surrounded and annihilated them.

1914_1025_01s: The Salient Pushes Back

This scenario ends on the 28th of October where the #1914_1029_01s_Ypres scenario resumes the battle.

The British 1st Division was in the process of being relieved by the French and was falling back to the vicinity of Ypres to rest. This division had been single handedly holding back the German XXIII.Reservekorps for four days and had been bombarded all throughout the night on the 24th when it was supposed to be extricated. As a result, the division was in poor shape and it had only begun to pull out of the line in the early morning hours of the 25th, and it was not until 0800 that the division was fully clear of the line.

Congestion markers are used around Ypres to represent the congestion caused by masses of rear area personnel and support units moving in and out of the small area. Congestion in this area is specifically mentioned in official British historical accounts as the primary delaying factor to the units moving in and out of the salient. Congestion only affects the Allied Powers side since it is rationalized that this congestion would be driven off by any German advance into the area.

1914_1029_01s: Enter the Conqueror

This scenario ends at the end of the 10th of November where the #1914_1110_01s_Ypres scenario resumes the battle.

Historically, the massive German offensive by Heersgruppe.Fabeck was to commence on the 30th of October. On the 29th, a German attack commenced to take Gheluvet by the XXVII.Reservekorps, supported by the newly formed 6.bayer.Reserve-Div. The German cavalry of HKK.1, 2 and 4 were also to advance and pin the enemy in place. All of these attacks were primarily intended to cover the buildup of Armeegruppe Fabeck and the attack of it on the 30th was made in complete surprise.

After the German infantry divisions began to take over the front line from the cavalry divisions along the Lys Canal on the evening of the 30th of October, most of the German cavalry divisions were pulled back into reserve north of Lille (in this map area). This reserve of cavalry was intended to be called up to exploit a breakthrough or to fill in and cover the flanks of the spearhead that would be formed by Armeegruppe Fabeck.

The French 32e Division d.Infanterie, which arrived on the 30th of October, was split up piece meal and sent to each place in the line where the Germans were threatening to breakthrough. Of primary importance was an entire brigade of infantry and some artillery that were rushed to the British Cavalry Corps sector near Wyschaete.

The BEF 7th Division, battered and exhausted, began to move into reserve on the 5th of November. On the 6th, the 20th Infantry Brigade from this division was moved west off the map to Meteren and the Northumberland Hussars and various division assets followed the next day. These units have a chance of withdrawal at the start of their respective dates, so the Allied player needs to adjust accordingly.

Congestion markers are used around Ypres to represent the congestion caused by masses of rear area personnel and support units moving in and out of the small area. Congestion in this area is specifically mentioned in official British historical accounts as the primary delaying factor to the units moving in and out of the salient. Congestion only affects the Allied Powers side since it is rationalized that this congestion would be driven off by any German advance into the area.

1914_1110_01s: Last Chance for Glory

During the 10th of November, the battered 22nd Infantry Brigade of the BEF 7th Division moved west to Merris into reserve, southwest of Bailleul, off map and out of sector. This unit joined the other elements of the division out of sector, minus the 21st Infantry Brigade which was in the line at Ploegsteert. These off map units remained for the duration of the Ypres battle. Thus, the 22nd Infantry Brigade has a chance of withdrawal their respective day.

Congestion markers are used around Ypres to represent the congestion caused by masses of rear area personnel and support units moving in and out of the small area. Congestion in this area is specifically mentioned in official British historical accounts as the primary delaying factor to the units moving in and out of the salient. Congestion only affects the Allied Powers side since it is rationalized that this congestion would be driven off by any German advance into the area.

1914_1111_01s: The Prussian Guard's Grand Finale

This scenario begins after the fierce two hour German heavy artillery bombardment of the allied line in this sector, thus most of the German artillery is low on ammo (unavailable).

The scenario occurs near the end of 1914 where both sides were running low on supplies. Firing in this scenario will most likely cause the unit to go low on ammo and thus, reduce its assault rating. This is something the German user should keep in mind, since you will want to maximize your assault power. Fire with disrupted units that cannot assault, or with MG, field guns, and artillery and use the other good order units for assaults.

Technically, the Prussian Guard did not have special assignment to issue the “knock out blow” or “main attack” on the Ypres salient, but given that the Guard division and the 4.Infanterie-Division were both fresh and elite troops, and given their placement in the center of the line, high expectations were naturally placed upon them to help deliver the decisive result.

Tragically, and wastefully, the Prussian Guard was shot down en masse by accurate British rifle and machine gun fire and was, in all practicality, utterly destroyed. When the battle subsided and the remnants of the Prussian Guard withdrew, they were unaware that they had come perilously close to smashing through the final British defenses, the only thing lying between them and the Channel coast. The Guard would go on to fight in the remainder of the war, but the organization would be a shadow of its former glory.

While there are many reasons for the failure of the Prussian Guard attack, one of the primary reasons for their failure was from the fact that the Guard had divergent attack orders to the north and west, rather than convergent orders to overrun any one part of the British line. The German player can of course attack however they like, and possibly achieve success, but the British player may also reinforce his line in his own way to counter it.

Congestion markers are used around Ypres to represent the congestion caused by masses of rear area personnel and support units moving in and out of the small area. Congestion in this area is specifically mentioned in official British historical accounts as the primary delaying factor to the units moving in and out of the salient. Congestion only affects the Allied Powers side since it is rationalized that this congestion would be driven off by any German advance into the area.

Gameplay tips

When to assault

The most important thing to know in First World War Campaigns, is when to press home an assault and when not to assault. Generally speaking, you should of course get accustomed to the particular strengths and weaknesses of the units in general. For example, an infantry unit can almost always assault a mounted (Travel Mode) cavalry unit, bicycle unit or engineer unit with success, without having to disrupt them before hand. "Success" in this case is defined as taking the ground. You should also always to have at least a 2:1 advantage when making an assault, try to avoid 1:1 assaults as much as possible.

In the case of enemy cavalry, you can usually tell whether it is a pesky cavalry squadron or a full cavalry regiment by seeing what the effect is of their return fire. If the enemy is deemed to be nothing more than a cavalry squadron, then you can press home the assault to great effect, again without waiting for the enemy to be disrupted. This is also true for engineer units which might also be broken down into companies. If you have a pesky engineer unit barring the way somewhere, then simply overrun it with a massed infantry assault and you can probably rest assure that the enemy is throwing "the kitchen sink" in the line at this point if they are wasting engineer units in this manner.
And finally and most importantly, you should NEVER wait for field gun or machine gun units to be disrupted before carrying out an assault. If said units are disrupted then that is great, otherwise always try to disrupt the enemy infantry battalions at the very least. In almost every case, all you need to do is disrupt the enemy infantry battalions, then press forward with an assault of two or more infantry battalions of your own. Such an assault will force the non disrupted field gun and machine gun units to bear the brunt of the attack and will cause them to take significant losses. This can then be followed by more assaults if possible to drive the enemy out of the hex. Either way, if you are not able to take the hex then you have likely caused a great loss to the core defense of the hex, thus making it easier to take in future turns or forcing the enemy to withdraw on his own turn altogether.

Breaking contact, retreating

When attempting to fall back or retreat in the face of an overwhelming attack or an unfavorable disposition, you have to first break contact with the enemy. Breaking contact with a superior force can be tricky in a period of warfare where everything moves at roughly the same speed, and is even trickier if your force is lower quality than the enemy's force. When attempting to break contact, use any method necessary that puts the most distance between your forces and the enemy. Use of a rear guard is vital in most cases and cavalry and field artillery (field gun) units work particularly well at this task. Cavalry and field artillery units can delay an enemy advance long enough to put some distance between the advancing enemy infantry and friendly forces, then mount / limber up and fall back to their next delay position which should be just behind the last friendly infantry unit in the retreating force.

When your force contains inferior quality troops then you must take into account that you will move slower than your pursuing enemy. This is also true if your force contains a large number of disrupted or broken units. In either of these cases, you must plan your retreat in advance, using good order units to act as a rear guard in order to give
these slower units time to get a head start on the movement. You must also take care not to stick around too long in any one place, lest you end up in a situation where it is impossible for you to retreat back fast enough. In all of these cases, you should try to stay close to primary roads as they are critical in your ability to fall back. Not taking these things in consideration will result in the devastating loss of many an infantry battalion.

Understanding how night movement works in this series is also the key to breaking contact. The best result is to prepare your units for movement and get them into position to move strategically along the roads during the night turn. Cavalry and field gun units can be placed at key road junctions to block any enemy units that try to pursue along the roads during the night. Night retreats come at the expense of a large amount of extra fatigue, but occasionally this is necessary in order to safely extricate forces. Unless it is in an emergency, avoid the temptation of holding a rear guard to the "last man" with cavalry and field gun units. Doing so will definitely buy more time but will also reward the enemy with a large number of victory points. If you are not careful, the victory points the enemy gains from the careless loss of valuable cavalry and artillery guns can easily make up for lost time and objectives.

The art of taking ground

Where possible, avoid direct assaults when trying to take ground from the enemy. The best way to take ground is by simply making it untenable. On the attack, you make ground untenable by pushing around the flanks of the strong point. By doing this you leave the defender with two options: either displace and save the units or allow them to be bypassed, isolated, and eventually destroyed. The act of making ground untenable can be done at both the tactical level (divisions, brigades and battalions), but more
importantly it can be done at the strategic level with corps and armies. Always look at "the big picture" to see where you can flank an entire enemy corps or army, thereby forcing the defender to give up ground wholesale or by causing the destruction of an entire army (which was the holy grail of objectives in the 1914 "early" campaign; in game play terms, the destruction of an army could yield around 10,000 Victory Points!). Getting tactical level "tunnel vision" and not recognizing strategic opportunities is the most common cause of failure in a campaign.

Cyclist units, the use of

Use cyclist units for their high mobility on primary roads as a probing or screening force. When the cyclist.s host unit is traveling in column, use the cyclists to “orbit” the unit as it moves to get eyes on the enemy. This can be done by seeking out good vantage points along the parent unit.s axis of advance. These cyclist units can also move forward to secure key road junctions or bridges that the host unit needs to accomplish its mission. Beware though, these cyclist units are not intended to hold ground for too long; they should only be used to delay or probe if they are needed for combat. Using cyclist units as some sort of rapid force to sweep behind the enemy for isolation is a waste; cyclist units used in this manner will likely be easily overrun by an assault from cavalry or any line infantry battalion. Also, be sure not to advance cyclist units too far in Travel Mode, it is better to move them just far enough that they can quickly retire or that they can deploy at the end of the turn. A Travel Mode cyclist unit that ends its turn in contact with the enemy is a dead cyclist unit. It is intentional that cyclist units are not “recon” units that are capable of Recon Spotting; cyclist units are intended to be supplemental and to work in conjunction with reconnaissance capable cavalry.

Another important use of cyclist units is to have these units be the ones who conduct "Patrolling". These units can be useful to move quickly to an area, hide in a forest or get behind a hill, then patrol to see if there are any enemy units within two hexes. Obviously this works best when there is a terrain type or elevation in front of the cyclist unit to where it does not have a line of sight to the second hex. Cyclist units are also great units to devote to "Patrolling" during night turns. This can be done in places where they are stacked with a rear guard force, or in places where they are stacked with line units on the front line. In this way, you can have a sort of early warning on enemy movements that are two hexes distant during night turns. It is important to remember that other units can patrol as well, it is not a unique ability for cyclist units. Cavalry should be used to patrol to good effect, and line infantry units can certainly patrol, but it is suggested that cyclist units be used to patrol so that other units, such as infantry and cavalry units, can be freed up to do other important tasks, and so that they are not left in a weakened state such as what occurs when "patrolling". A stacked cyclist unit that is patrolling is secured by the stacked infantry or cavalry unit, while the infantry or cavalry unit rests, digs in, or engages the enemy.

Rail lines, the use of

Do not underestimate the importance of rail roads. Rail lines were particularly vital during this period of warfare for the rapid movement of troops and materials. Care should be taken to protect rail lines with detachments of lines of communication troops to ensure that the rail lines are not obstructed or cut. Rail lines are primarily used for
transporting complete corps from one sector of the front to another, but are also important for the mobility of some siege guns. When explicit supply is used, rail lines should be utilized to the fullest to transport supply units quickly to front. These supply units will arrive on map at major roads and should be moved to the nearest railhead and sent forward. Originally it was planned to make separate rail type supply units but this was abandoned because these types of units would be totally restricted to rail lines. Instead, the user has the freedom to move the explicit supply units by rail (as long as the rail capacity for that side is not exceeded) and unload and continue to move them when necessary. If an army loses access to a rail line then it can quickly become detached from the overall strategic situation and runs the risk of being defeated by an opposing army that has access to a rail line.

Playing as the French

Playing the French in 1914 is not for the faint-hearted. The French in “early” battles of France'14 are best utilized in massed bayonet assaults on the enemy, supported by or preceded by bombardments from their rapid firing field guns. French infantry unit ratings are directly representative of their doctrine, and their somewhat flawed equipment. Direct fire with their infantry should only be done in order to disrupt the enemy, or when in good defensive positions. The French should rely almost exclusively on their excellent 76mm field guns to cause casualties and disrupt attacking enemy infantry. The MG sections can also be useful to strengthen its parent infantry battalions footing in the defense.

When you are on the offensive and you find yourself facing murderous defensive fire, sometimes it is better for French infantry to give the bayonet and carry out the
assault before the enemy is completely disrupted (as long as you outnumber the defenders at least by 3:1). Knowing when to do this and when to back down is crucial. Such is the dilemma when learning to deal with the advantages and disadvantages inherent with the "cult of the offensive”. Try to avoid stacking more than two infantry battalions in a single hex if it can be avoided so that you limit your losses from retaliatory fire. In most cases it is better to keep infantry battalions in reserve to push forward and assault en masse at the right moment, rather than having them massed adjacent to the enemy at all times.

Keep in mind that as you retreat your supply lines retract and improve. This means that the closer you pull back a unit then the better their replacement rate might be (depending on how low your supply level is at the extremities of your front). Once you reach the historical battle of the Marne location you should be gaining much needed replacements and supplies which were historically the case as fresh troops were arriving from the close depots. It is also better to completely pull a unit out of the battle line if possible, in order to replenish its losses and recover fatigue rather than continue to leave it on the firing line.

Playing as the British

The BEF's main strength is in the quality of the British professional soldier and their awesome direct fire with the SMLE rifle. You should rely on delaying actions and inflict as many casualties as possible with your superior marksmanship before you fall back. In the campaign, try to avoid prolonged exposure to German massed infantry assaults because the Germans can replace their losses with ease, whilst the BEF cannot. The BEF will die off, there is no avoiding this. The trick is to make the tiny BEF last as long as possible and to maximize their effectiveness throughout 1914.

Another strength of the BEF is that they have a fairly decent amount of indirect fire howitzers at their disposal, unlike the French who have almost none at all in 1914.
Playing as the Belgians The strength of the Belgians lies in the fact that their army, while not being strong in any one area, does not have any serious weaknesses other than their almost total lack of indirect fire capable artillery (the do have one siege gun regiment of antiquated guns from the 1800s), and their low troop quality which is attributed to their flawed mobilization program. The Belgians should rely on harassing and slowing the German advance and causing as much trouble from Antwerp as possible.

Playing as the Germans

The German.s strength lies in their numbers, their good quality infantry, and their massive amount of howitzers and in their employment of machine gun units. German infantry formations on the advance are almost an unstoppable steam roller. When the infantry is backed up by howitzers there is almost no defensive barrier that cannot be breached. When the Germans are forced on the defensive, their MG kompagnien can be used to solidify the line along with supporting fire from howitzers and field guns. In 1914 the biggest problem the Germans have is that they seem to be always racing against the clock and spreading themselves thin. You will need to make split decisions on when to charge home and push the enemy back at the expense of more casualties so that you can keep your forward momentum, or engage the enemy in direct and indirect fire attacks at the expense of forward movement.

Knowing when to rest your attacking forces is also the key to victory. Rest them too often and you will lose the initiative. If you do not rest them often enough then your attack will falter and your lines will begin to break.

* * *

Glossary of abbreviations used in the Order of Battle in the First World War Campaigns Series

French / Belgian

ACMs Auto-Canons-Mitrailleuses - Armored Machingun Cars
BA Bataillons “Alphabétiques" - Formation of Zouaves, most likely temporary battalions
BCA Bataillon de Chasseurs Alpins - Alpine Chasseurs Battalion
BCI Bataillon de Chasseurs Indigènes - Indigenous (Moroccan) Infantry Battalion, light infantry unit
BCP Bataillon de Chasseurs à Pieds - Chasseurs Infantry Battalion, light infantry unit
Bie Batterie - Battery
Btn Battalion
CA Corps d'Armée - Army Corps
CAC Corps d'Colonial - Colonial Corps
CC Corps d'Cavalerie - Cavalry Corps
Chas. Chasseurs - literal: "hunters"
Cie Compagnie - Company
Dét Détachement – Detachment
DAB Détachement d.Armée de Belgique – French army detachment for the Belgian area (Flanders)
DIC Division d'Infanterie Colonial - Colonial Infantry Division
DC Division d'Cavalerie - Cavalry Division
DIT Division d.Infanterie Territoriale - Territorial Division
DM Division Marocaine - Moroccan Infantry Division
DR Division d'Réserve - Reserve Division
GAN Groupe d'Armées du Nord - Group of Armies of the North (Flanders sector)
GDR Groupe de Division de Reserve - Group of Reserve Divisions
GQG Grand Quartier Général - Supreme Headquarters
GR Groupe d'Réserve - Reserve Group
Mit Mitrailleuse - Machine Gun
RAC Régiment d'Artillerie de Campagne - Campaign Artillery Regiment
RACC Régiment d'Artillerie de Campagne Colonial - Colonial Campaign Artillery Regiment
RAL Régiment d'Artillerie Lourde - Heavy Artillery Regiment
RAM Régiment d'Artillerie Montagne - Mountain Artillery Regiment
REI Régiment Etranger d'Infanterie - Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment
RFM Régtiment d'Fusiliers Marin - Marine Fusiliers Regiment
RI Régiment d'Infanterie - Infantry Regiment
RIC Régiment d'Infanterie Colonial - Colonial Infantry Regiment (European, not native troops)
RIT Régiment d'Infanterie Territoriale - Territorial Infantry Regiment
RM Régiment de Marche - ad hoc Regiment; used seperately in early 1914 designations
RMCIC Régiment de Marche de Chasseurs Indigènes à Cheval - ad hoc Spahis Regiment, RMSM in 1915
RMT Régiment de Marche Tirailleurs - ad hoc "rifleman" Regiment
RMZ Régiment de Marche Zouaves - Zouaves ad hoc Regiment
RMZT Régiment Mixte de Zouaves et Tirailleurs - Mixed Zouaves and Tirailleurs ad hoc Regiment
RTM Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains - Moroccan Tirailleurs
Sec Section - Section
Tir. Tirailleurs - literal: "sharpshooters" These were African troops serving in the French colonial army

German

Abt Arbeitlung - Battalion, detachment
AOK Armee Oberkommando - Army Command, as in the Army headquarters
AR Artillerie Regiment - Artillery Regiment
Art Artillerie - Artillery
b Bayerische - Bavarian
bayer Bayerische - Bavarian (long abbreviation)
baden Badisches - Grand Duchy of Baden
Bde Brigade
Bel Belagerungstrain - (preceded by "Pionier" or abbreviation "Pio") Pioneer Siege Train
Battr Battarie - Battery
Btl Battalion
CR Carabinier Regiment - Essentially these were dragoons
Div Divisione - Division, a combined arms force of various types of components
DR Dragoner Regiment - Dragoon Regiment, cavalry used for dismounting and fighting on foot
ErsR Ersatz Regiment - Depot or replacement Regiment
Esk Eskadron - Cavalry Squadron
FAR Fußartillerie Regiment - Heavy Artillery Regiment
FüsR Füsilier Regiment - Fusilier Regiment
GAR Garde Artillerie Regiment - Guard Artillery Regiment
GC Garde du Corps - Life Guard Cavalry Regiment, Heavy cavalry, the German cavalry elite
Gd Garde - Guard
GDR Garde Dragoner Regiment - Guard Dragoon Regiment
gem Gemischt - Mixed, combined arms
GErsR Garde Ersatz Regiment - Guard Depot or Replacement Regiment
GFAR Garde Fußartillerie Regiment - Guard Heavy Artillery Regiment
GGR Garde Grenadier Regiment - Guard Grenadier Regiment
GHQ Großen Hauptquatier - Supreme Headquarters
GKR Garde Kürassier Regiment - Guard Armored Cavalry Regiment
GR Grenadier Regiment
GResR Garde Reserve Regiment - Guard Reserve Infantry
GResDR Garde Reserve Dragoner Regiment - Guard Reserve Dragoon Regiment
GRzF Garde Regiment zu Fuß - Guard Infantry Regiment, literal: "Guard Regiment of Foot"
GRzP Grenadier Regiment zu Pfrede - Horse Grenadiers, light cavalry used for skirmishing
GUR Garde Uhlan Regiment - Guard Lancer Cavalry Regiment
hesse Hessisches - Grand Duchy of Hesse
HKK Höhere Kavallerie-Kommandeur - Senior Cavalry Commander; essentially this is a cavalry corps although it worked a bit differently than a regular army corps: the HKK commander was essentially a senior cavalry commander that was only a command authority concerning tactics and strategy of the employment of the cavalry divisions and support assets within the grouping
HR Husaren Regiment - Hussar Regiment, medium cavalry
ILR Infanterie Leib Regiment - Body Infantry Regiment, literal: "body guard"
IR Infanterie Regiment - Infantry Regiment
Kp Kompagnie - Company (German spelling changed to "kompanie" in 1929)
KR Kürassier Regiment - Armored Cavalry Regiment, heavy cavalry used for shock
kz Kürze - short
Ldw Landwehr - Militia
LdwIR Landwehr Infanterie Regiment - Militia Infantry Regiment
LGR Leib Grenadier Regiment - Life Grenadier Regiment
LgR Leibgarde Regiment - Life Guard Regiment, literal: "life guard" (Hessian)
LHR Leib Husaren Regiment - Life Guard Hussar Regiment
LIR Lehr Infantry Regiment - Infantry Instruction Regiment, as in the "instructors"
LKR Leib Kürassier Regiment - Life Guard Armored Cavalry Regiment
Lndstrm Landstrum - Reservists / Territorial Troops
MFüsR Marine Füsilier Regiment - Marine Regiment
MG Maschinengewehr - Machine Gun
MGK Maschinengewehr Kompagnie - Machine Gun Company
MGSfK Maschinengewehr Schärfschützen Kompagnie - Machine Gun Sharpshooter Company
MörR Mörser Regiment - Mortar Regiment
MR Matrosen Regiment - Sailor Regiment
Mwf Minenwerfer - Trench mortar
Nr Nummer - Number
OHL Oberste Heeresleitung - Supreme Army Command
Pio Pionier - Pioneers, engineers
Regt Regiment - comprised of several battalions; could also appear as "Rgt" to prevent text overflow
Res Reserve
RR Reiter Regiment - cavalry, literal: “rider regiment", usually preceded with an “s”, designating a heavy cavalry regiment.
Rtnd Reitende - riding
s schwere - heavy
sächs Sächisches - Kingdom of Saxony
UR Ulanen Regiment - Lancer Cavalry Regiment, light cavalry at this time used for reconnaissance
württ Württembergisches - Kingdom of Wurttemberg

Austro-Hungarian

FsAB. Festungsartilleriebataillon - Fortress Artillery Battalion
k.u.k. Kaiserlich und Königlich - "Imperial and Royal"; the regular army of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire



* * *
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Websites (in no particular order):

*Links are functional as of 30 JAN 2009*

Volcano Mods.com http://www.volcanomods.com
(website site for games modifications and forums for this and other Tiller games)

The Blitz.org http://www.theblitz.org
(excellent site for ladder wargaming to setup play-by-email matches with others, and forums for discussing this and other Tiller games)


First World War.com http://www.firstworldwar.com
(excellent site for general facts and topics about WWI)

Belgian Fronts http://users.skynet.be/fonck/
(good information on the Belgian Army of WWI)

Tulip Academy http://www.tulipacademy.org/gew/index.htm

Historique de Régiments http://www.chtimiste.com/
(excellent source for WWI French regimental history)

Mark Conrad's homepage http://marksrussianmilitaryhistory.info/
(excellent source for Allied 1914 order of battles)

Axis History Forum http://forum.axishistory.com/

Der erster Weltkrieg http://www.1914-18.info/

World War One Image Archive http://www.gwpda.org/photos/greatwar.htm
(excellent site for World War One photos; some of the images in this notes document came from this website)


Other sources:

Belgian Ministry of War's army budget summary for the year 1914, presented to the Belgian parliament on March 10, 1914. (In Flemish; used for order of battle information of the Belgian Army.)

Great Britain. War Office. Army Orders, 1914. (Published 1 January 1915. Contains very detailed organizational charts of all types of units.)

Great Britain. War Office. Monthly Army List - July, 1914.

Special Thanks

While I conducted my own research, it was helpful to brainstorm ideas and come to a consensus on how to best represent historical situations with the abstractions inherent in a war game. I want to thank Dr. Robert Bruce for his time, patience, and ideas. However, Dr. Bruce.s most significant contribution is one that he is probably not aware of: the instillment of a desire to create the most detailed wargame series about the Great War that has yet been created. It speaks volumes about the effectiveness of a teacher that can inspire creativity and the desire for further learning.

Also, I want to thank the testers. Great testers are a valuable resource and are quite hard to find. Over the year that France '14 was tested, the testers did an outstanding job on a project that probably seemed to them like it was never going to end. Despite this, they continued to test for over a year and did as best as anyone could humanly hope for. Without their help, France '14 would not be a reality.

The guys on the Ancient Warefare team have been hard at work hammering on the games and refining them to make them better than ever. This has resulted in updates for all four current titles in the series, which you can check out here:

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/updates...p_Ancient.HTML

A first update has been released this weekend for the new France '14 game:

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/updates...14/UP_wwi.HTML

Changes to France '14 V1.01
- Change so that Interdiction attacks have twice the chance of Disruption and can cause the loss of up to half the movement allowance in movement points.
- Added a range 1 hard target artillery fire modifier (see Users Manual under Firing).
- Added Optional Rule for delayed reporting of enemy Disruption.
- Added Quality Fire Modifier Parameter Data Value which applies to quality A and B units.

Replacements

Replacements is the strength recovery of a unit based on the individual unit's replacement rate that is applied in the Order of Battle. Replacements are in addition to the recovery rate (if any) which is specified in the parameters data. It important to familiarize yourself with replacements and how to get the maximum amount of replacements to your units. The most critical aspect of gaining replacements is the Local Supply Level. First World War Campaigns titles are meant to be played with the Virtual Supply Truck optional rule activated. By activating this rule, your supply levels can vary across the map depending on the location of the hex in relation to the nearest supply source that is providing supply to that hex. The replacement rate of the unit is directly influenced by the supply level, therefore if your units are located in an area with poor supply then you will receive a reduced rate of replacements. When the local supply is greater than 50%, you will receive 100% of the assigned replacement rate of that unit each turn, which is typically 3 or 4% strength for 1914. This might seem like a lot, but the supply levels decline a great deal by the end of 1914 and during the later periods of the campaign it is quite unrealistic to expect your units to have a > 50% local supply value level at all times. As your units advance and as the campaign progresses to the late period, the local supply level will drop and you will receive less replacements based on the local supply level. If a unit has a replacement rate of 3% and is drawing on a local supply of 40%, then that unit will receive only 2/3rds of its maximum replacement rate (which would be 2%).42 The replacement rate is reduced even further (halved) if the unit in question is out of range of its parent HQ (detached). With this in mind, when resting units it is advisable to position them in range of its parent HQ and to position the units in an area that is getting a "good" supply level that is greater than 50% (this might require you to move the units out of a forested or swampy area and move them closer to a road or rail network).

42 See the user manual for more information on Replacements.
Infantry movement speed

The regular infantry speed decided on was 3 hexes per turn, which turns about to be about 1.86 miles per two hour turn of cross country, tactical movement. Non-tactical road movement is about 3.72 miles per two hour turn.43 These movement rates might seem slow, and they are indeed regulated, but when factors are considered such as the general over burdening of the average infantry soldier during this period, a steady, regulated road march pace to manage fatigue, and the general cautiousness when moving in the face of the enemy, then it is indeed a realistic rate. Tactical movement during this period was practically done at a snail's pace when compared to the mechanized warfare of the 1940s. Tactical movement is always exponentially slower than a non-tactical road march movement since contact with enemy is either likely or possible, and the unit is advancing slowly and cautiously scanning its surroundings because of this. Typical training manuals of the period stated that divisions could be expected to obtain a 4 km/h road march speed, but it is arguable if this speed was sustainable for many days in a row, but most importantly, given the nature of a wargame, users are inclined to constantly keep their units on the march rather than stopping for any reason whatsoever. Rather than allow a constant 4 km/h road march speed, a more conservative 3 km/h movement rate is used. This makes it so that in order to obtain a forced march of 50 km distance, the user would have to march his units for every turn in the day and night (thus gaining fatigue at night and preventing this speed from being sustained indefinitely).44 The best infantry of the period had the ability to march 40-50 km a day in a forced march,45 and in First World War Campaigns and average line infantry unit can achieve 48 km a day on flat terrain if it force marches during the night turns. This approach works well since it causes the unit to get fatigue (when the Night Fatigue Optional Rule is used). There are of course "light infantry" units in the Order of Battle that have faster speeds (4 km/h)

43 This is .93 miles per hour and 1.86 miles per hour respectively.
44 A “normal” day.s march for infantry of the period was 22-25 km. Zuber, 29.
45 Zuber, 29.

because they had lighter packs, were generally in better physical condition, and were trained and conditioned to maintain higher paced movement (64 km forced march distance is possible for average light infantry units).

As a former light infantryman myself, I have personally conducted a forced 30 mile (50 kilometers to the people in the rest of the world) road march in one day, with modern equipment and weapon, and I was unable to walk properly for several days thereafter.46 Sustaining this pace over several days would certainly not be possible or practical, unless the unit in question was of elite quality. Although modern infantry are increasingly being over burdened with equipment at weights that are becoming progressively similar to the weight of load that infantry of the First World War carried, infantry of the First World War typically carried up to 60 lb (30 kg) loads of equipment,47 which was quite heavy compared to the typical rifleman of the Second World War.48

46 This forced road march was conducted with a full ruck sack, an M16A2 with 120 rounds of ammo, Kevlar (helmet), LBE (belt and suspenders with canteens), protective mask and MOPP suit (carried, not worn). Given the distance covered and the time it took to complete, the road march rate was roughly 2.5 miles per hour, factoring in stops to change socks, drink water, and consume food.

47 Zuber, 29.
48 Depending on the source, while also keeping mind that Second World War infantry did not fight with their packs on, where as early First World War infantry did.

Panzer Campaigns users may notice that the movement cost parameters differ slightly in this series, and that is due to a slight difference in time scale. A typical Panzer Campaigns day has 10 turns in it while a typical First World War Campaigns day only has 8 turns in it. So, with that in mind, infantry in First World War Campaigns can actually achieve similar (almost identical) road movement speeds as they can in Panzer Campaigns. However, it must be considered that the infantry of both wars differed to the point that it can be considered that World War Two infantry were the direct descendent of the light / assault infantry hybrid that came into being at the end of World War One (Sturmtruppen / Stoßtruppen).
Unit frontages, attack formation

A successful attack comes from knowing where and how to concentrate your forces. Typical German “by the book” attack formations of the period shed light on how you should concentrate your forces.49 In the attack, a German infantry regiment.s frontage was only 1 km wide, with the regiment deployed in depth. Depending on the situation, usually only one battalion would be in the front and the other two battalions would be in reserve, ready to relieve the front battalion, or ready to move forward to administer an assault. The infantry regiment.s MG companies were usually in front with the lead battalion, ready to deploy to provide a base of fire, as was the division.s field guns. The “book” attack frontage for a brigade was therefore only 2 km wide, the division was 4 km wide, and a corps was 8 km wide.50 It is easy to see how the Germans intended to concentrate as much force on a small area to provide for a sustained attack. The deployment in depth was a direct result of observation experience of the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria. On the attack, the deployment in depth ensures that reserves can move forward to provide a fresh impetus to the momentum of the advance. The Japanese deployed on too broad of a front on the attack and did not have reserves in depth so their attacks frequently stalled. Of course, the situation did not always allow the book to be followed, but it does give the attacker a guideline to follow; attacking in depth should always be preferred to width in World War One. And if it can be spared, a defense in depth is almost an immovable force.

49 The “book” is referring to the 1909 Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie, the German infantry field manual.
50 Zuber, 53.

On the attack, if you follow this strict frontage guideline where possible, then you should be able to use the front battalion to absorb fire and whittle away the defenders to get disruptions, then commit the reserve to assault and get a breakthrough. The key here is knowing when to commit the reserve for the assault and when to simply relieve the forward battalion to continue the attack by fire. The “book.s” decision point on when to commit the assault is in the cold calculated moment that the attack begins to suffer from noticeably less retaliatory fire, when it is discovered that they are disrupted or low on ammo or suffering from some other combat related stresses like high fatigue.

Unit frontages, defense formation

In the defense, the “book” prescribed that wider frontages could be the norm given that a defending force could spread out and still effectively hold ground. The frontages were essentially doubled in the defense, with a regiment usually holding a 2 km front (two battalions on the line, one in reserve), a brigade holding a 4 km front, a division holding an 8-9 km front and a corps holding a 16-18 km front. As mentioned, if it can be spared, a defense in depth is obviously preferred over width. It is important, much more so than is true in the Panzer Campaigns and Modern Campaigns series, to keep track of enemy formation names on enemy units with Fog of War on. In other words, you should keep a careful eye on enemy unit.s organizational names in order to determine if the defender is spreading himself too thin. It cannot be stressed enough that this can be a revealing sign on where to strike. The same is true if the roles are reversed, if you can determine that an enemy division or other formation is spread out, then you will know where you do not need to concentrate your reserves. During this period of warfare, extensive records were kept on enemy formation locations to ascertain strength
and intentions; an effective commander in First World War Campaigns should do the same.

Forts

Forts come in two types: strong and weak, or in game terms, vacated and non-vacated. In the game rules, any vacated fortification is one half the normal defensive bonus applied to the fortification. The actual size of a particular fort in no way translates into the defense value of the fort, nor whether or not it is considered to be a “strong” or “weak” fort at start. Several factors are considered when determining if a fort should begin the game in a vacated status.

The primary factor beyond the actual study of each fortification was a research chart that was constructed showing the number of days a fort held out against bombardment of a particular caliber of siege gun. For example, seven of Liege's twelve forts held out for only one day, most being bombarded by 210mm howitzers. The other five held out from a period of two to four days again being bombarded by 210mm howitzers. A few of the forts were hit by 305mm Mortars and 420mm "Big Bertha" howitzers and these fell promptly afterwards. The same is true for Namur. The forts of Antwerp held out from five to thirty days of bombardment from 420mm Howitzers. This translates to Namur and Liege having weaker forts, however both were armed with a rather large amount of cannon as they had a wide range of artillery ranging in caliber from 57mm to 210mm guns that were, for the most part, obsolete.

So, what is the rationale behind the placing of fortification types? In most cases fort strengths, whether they are vacated or not, are determined mainly by how long they historically held out in bombardments, as mentioned above. In most cases the actual size of the fort is ignored in terms of defensive ability, with the size only determining how large the garrison and gun battery is. In some cases more capable forts will also have higher quality defenders. However, as a general rule, the following guidelines are applied:

FORT: The most capable of forts. These were modern constructions that usually were equipped with gun turrets and modern guns but this is not always true. The most capable forts were elaborate constructions that were quite impenetrable, before the world witnessed the power of Big Bertha and other massive siege guns of course.

Fort: Lesser forts, either of stone construction or because they had less capable defenses either through neglect, or obsolescence. Within the rules of the game, this also represents destroyed or damaged capable forts (vacated).

REDOUBT: Redoubts, ouverages, small forts or any lesser fortification made of concrete (above or below ground). This could be equipped with guns or gun turrets but most often only contained a garrison of infantry.

Redoubt: Citadels and obsolete forts (ancient fortresses) or destroyed (vacated) redoubts. These are usually scattered across the map and are no longer garrisoned or equipped with guns.

BUNKER: Earthen bunkers and trenches.
Bunker: Primitive or damaged or destroyed (vacated) bunkers.
In cases where a supply source is present on a fortification hex and there is no fortress gun unit (static), or fortress battalion unit present then a small, static, garrison unit of less than 100 men will be present. The more capable fortified zones will also have an HQ assigned to the garrison and the less capable zones will need to rely on the currently assigned Army HQ radius for command. The sole purpose for these small garrison units is to man the fortifications and keep an accidental move that would vacate the fortification from occurring, from a user moving a unit into and out of a FORT or REDOUBT hex, and to keep LOS to such fortification hexes and make them easy to find. The SHIFT key can also be used to locate fortifications as the positions of all forts are pinpointed with labels.51

51 The exact locations of fortresses of the period were well known to both sides. It is intentional that the enemy can note fortress locations that he does not have LOS to by using map labels.

It is important to note that fortresses in general are abstractions. Given the amount of forts located in France, not every single fort has been placed on the map. Only the most important ones are present and, in the case of obsolete forts, only the ones that were temporarily used for refuge or were used for landmarks are present.

Trenches and Improved Positions

The trenches that were dug in 1914 were extremely primitive. These early field works were simply nice straight and narrow ditches that were rarely continuous and barely capable of covering a standing man. There were no traverses, were severely overcrowded, and were extremely vulnerable to artillery fire. Many of these early trenches were the graves of many soldiers as nearby exploding artillery fire collapsed the walls and buried the men alive as they knelt for protection. For this reason, trenches in France '14 do not have the high defensive ratings as they in no way represent the more elaborate trenches constructed out of experience in the later years of the war.52 Improved hexes represent the piling of debris, man made or natural, to create a more defensible position. It also represents a hastily dug scrape in the ground or the simple act of creating a concealed position. An alternate term for these positions might be "breast works".

52 The elaborate trenches that most people characterize as standard World War I trenches did not come into existence until mid 1915 and early 1916, after both sides obtained substantial entrenching experience.

Given the low entrenching value, it is the designer's intent to mainly allow improved positions to be built, with it taking a lengthy amount of time to construct a primitive trench. Engineers will be vital in order to speed up the process and make it more likely to successfully construct fighting positions. This decision is primarily due to the lack of training, doctrine or entrenching equipment that resided in the line units of 1914. This would of course change drastically in the following years.

Heavy Machine Gun Units

Note: "Heavy machine gun" and "machine gun" is referenced interchangeably elsewhere in the notes document but all refer to the "heavy machine gun" units that are described in this section.

It was a tedious process to determine exactly what kind of combat factors heavy machine gun units of the period should have. But before this is discussed, it is important to understand that the term "heavy machine gun" differs from the modern terminology. The term today usually refers to a heavy barrel machine gun of 12.7mm53 or higher. However, in the early 1900's, it referred to a machine gun which was on a heavy mount to stabilize the weapon in which to provide it with a stable firing platform. Unlike World War II and later periods, the ratings for these heavy machine gun units had to be completely different and in a class of its own. The manner in which heavy machine guns were employed in an artillery type role, combined with the limited infantry tactics of the day, results in a period where the heavy machine gun reigned supreme and necessitates that they be completely separate units, not factored into infantry battalion combat ratings. The result is a unit with combat factors that greatly differ from anything in the Panzer Campaigns or Modern Campaigns series.
53.50 caliber.

The source of the formula that determined their combat ratings was based in professional military studies of the period. These historical studies calculated that one heavy machine gun was essentially worth the firepower of approximately 60-100 rifles, with the more consensual figure being around 80 rifles. This estimate was a cold harsh calculation of firepower versus the rigid early war infantry tactics and effectiveness of the day. Maxim and Maxim copy heavy machine gun soft attack and assault strengths are derived from calculations based on number of weapons per element in question, compared to the soft attack strength of an average infantry battalion in the order of battle by using a ratio of 80:1, which is determined at the maximum effective range to target. Specifically, the rating at two hexes is (A * E * R) / M, where A = average infantry Bn soft attack [2.5]54, E = per rifle estimate [80], R = range value denominator [3], M = number of men per heavy machine gun [15]. In other words, the heavy machine gun units have a standard attack strength directly based upon their 1914 firepower effectiveness estimate at 2,000m range. This base rating is then adjusted higher or lower to represent various different types of heavy machine guns, with the Maxim and Maxim copy being the median. The resulting high, almost artillery like, rating makes heavy machine gun units particularly deadly during this period in the history of warfare, but a cumbersome and slow to deploy unit that is only really useful in the defense.

54 The average infantry battalion soft attack rating is 2.5, which is an average of the Gewehr 98 [2] and SMLE [3] equipped infantry soft attack ratings.
55 This increased survivability is especially true for the smaller two gun section sized units. See the User Manual for more information on combat resolution.

Deciding on the number of men per weapon was a serious headache. The idea initially was to convert these units into gun type units and avoid the issue altogether but it was decided that is more accurate to have crew casualties than it would be to have losses jump in increments of guns. This makes heavy machine gun units more effective and increases their survivability.55 The strength in men of the heavy machine gun unit is derived from an average so as to maintain a consistency regardless of any small variance in crew strength between the different nationalities. The actual number of men assigned to physically operate the weapon was usually six, regardless of nationality. However, there were addition soldiers that were assigned to the crew that had nothing to do with its direct operation but were still vital to the function of the heavy machine gun such as range takers, ammunition carriers, gun captains, layers, loaders, assistant loaders, and so forth. When all of these operators are taken into account, the number of men per weapon rises to approximately 15, with an average of 30 men per heavy machine gun section.

This entire crew of men assigned to the heavy machine gun's direct and indirect operation would have been utilized to maintain and operate the machine gun if attrition took its toll. Therefore, in the order of battle, for every 15 men in a heavy machine gun unit there is one heavy machine gun present, so the smallest unit consists of 30 men.56

56 The smallest machine gun unit is a section, therefore 15 men per gun, two guns per section, 15*2 equals 30 men.

Machine Gun and Field Gun Unit setup

In First World War Campaigns, a design approach was taken which requires machine gun and field gun units to expend their full movement point to exit from Travel Mode. These units only require 1/3 of their movement allowance to enter Travel Mode though. This approach was taken because this requirement to exit from Travel Mode represents the actual setting up of these units into firing positions. This setting up involved setting up the guns themselves, stockpiling and preparing ammunition, and communicating with their local HQ. All of these required a substantial amount of time to do when taken as a whole, and this process left the unit vulnerable the enemy until it was completed.

The primary reason for this approach is game play considerations on how these units were historically used. By requiring a full turn to exit from Travel Mode, it puts the advantage of these units squarely in the hands of the defense, which is where these units excelled. These units can enter Travel Mode quickly and move away to another position, but any attempt to use these units as a leading force in an attack will intentionally subject them to enemy fire before they have a change to deploy (since one turn must be spent in Travel Mode). This also means that these units are extremely vulnerable to counter assault by the enemy and especially vulnerable to enemy cavalry in general. In other words, if the attacker intends to move these gun units adjacent to the enemy as some sort of driving force, they can certainly choose to do so but it will come with a consequence. These units should always be accompanied by friendly infantry to protect them from assault, and the guns should expect retaliatory fire on the enemy.s turn. It also means that this vulnerability discourages these units from being able to race forward alone to a strategic location (such as a crossroads) in order to quickly plant themselves as an immovable force. This all contributes to “influencing” a more historical use for these units.

In the offensive, care must be taken with their employment so as to not subject them to too much enemy fire as they move forward. It also means that once these units are setup and rooted to the ground, you should avoid moving them unless they are completely out of range with the enemy. Ideally, the “safe” approach would be to move these units forward to a stand off range of two hexes from the enemy, in order to safely avoid the most harmful retaliatory fire, then deploy into this hex in order to lay down disrupting fire before your infantry moves forward for the assault. If you, as the attacker, intend to be bold and bring these units up as a killing force, then you must contend with the draw back that you will ultimately lose valuable guns and men to enemy fire, and this is especially true if you decide to mass multiple such units into the same hex. You will also inherently accumulate a large amount of fatigue in the process and possibly get them disrupted as well. The defender could then wisely choose to fall back once these units have deployed, thus requiring you to move forward and repeat the same bloody process again, trading the strength of these valuable units for ground.

On the defensive, when being perused by an enemy, you would want to use these units to move rearward, picking out your key defensive points, and screened them by friendly infantry to keep the enemy away from the machine guns and field guns until they deploy. Once these machine gun and field gun units are deployed, the screening friendly infantry should retire onto them to form the main line of resistance. As the main line gives way to enemy assault, these field gun units and machine gun units should be the first to fall back to their next position where the process repeats if necessary.

Towed Gun Limitation (stacking)

First World War Campaigns has a new feature where limitations are set on exactly how many Towed Guns can be deployed in a single hex. Towed Guns consist of all manner of artillery units, as well as machinegun units. The rationale behind this limiting is that there was a practical limit on the number of guns that could be deployed in any one given area. This practical limit was based on the fact that the guns needed room to operate effectively, and the fact that it was very difficult to supply large concentrations of guns with the amount of ammunition they whey would require to be effective. The engine places a limit on the number of guns that could be effectively employed in any given hex, requiring the excess to remain in Travel Mode. Naturally this limit exists primarily to place guidelines on historical behavior and to prevent the creation of "super stacks" of guns. It is important to note that Towed Gun type units in Travel Mode do not have to abide by the Towed Gun stacking limit, these Travel Mode units reference the Towed Gun stacking limit once they attempt to deploy from Travel Mode. So, while the guns remain in travel mode, they are subject only to the normal stacking limits.
It is advised that the user examines the Parameter values under the Help menu (or by pressing the F4 key) and see what the Towed Gun stacking limit is, keeping in mind that one gun is equal to 10 men.57 It is certainly possible to subject your Towed Guns to unnecessary fire by moving a quantity of guns to one location, only to find out (after the enemy conducts their next turn of retaliation) that the number of guns you moved to that hex is in violation of the Towed Gun stacking limit. In this case you will only be able to deploy a portion of the guns and should move the rest away to another position. The current Towed Gun limit is quite generous and historically accurate, so it is not very likely that you will violate this limit unless your field gun units are stacked extremely dense.

57 For example, a Towed Gun stacking limit of 450 men means that 45 guns can deploy in a single hex, or any combination of guns and machine gun units that will equal that amount.

Brigade and regimental HQ units

Unlike in the Panzer Campaign's series where regimental and brigade HQ units usually provide more flexibility to a division, in the First World War Campaigns series it has a different effect. Given the rather strict command system in this series where units that are out of command suffer a one step loss in morale, brigade and regimental HQ units, with their small command radius, intentionally restrict a division's effective “foot print”. This is necessary to properly represent the rigid command structures present during the First World War and to keep a division from being too intermixed which would allow a player to put battalions and MG units anywhere they are needed. A user can still choose to do this, but there are consequences if the units being "shoved into the breach" are outside of their parent brigade's range (they will not perform as effectively as they normally would). The relatively small command ranges of brigade and regimental
HQs can prove to be an Achilles heel to the entire structure. If one such HQ unit is eliminated or disrupted then the entire chain is affected and attacks and defenses could falter. If, for example, you cut off the head of a division then all brigade HQs will most likely fail their command checks, which could affect their command radius or replacement and recovery levels. The command structures during this period were not at the level of capability where small units were able to operate on their own initiatives. In later war scenarios this will gradually begin to change with brigade and regimental HQ units getting a larger command radius, or possibly being removed altogether to allow greater flexibility.

When moving brigade and regimental HQs you should keep them as close to their subordinate units as possible but also out of danger as much as possible. You do not want to risk losing the HQ unit in a fight, but it is a balance between risk versus maintaining an effective link with your units on the battlefield. Front lines can be penetrated and HQ units overrun to great effect, possibly routing or disrupting a larger force when they are further pressed.

Off map HQ units with 0% arrival

In some scenarios there are supreme HQ units, such as OHL; GQG; and GHQ; which have a 0% chance of arrival. Any scenario where an HQ unit is scheduled for a 0% arrival chance is an intentional representation that the higher HQ is out of range and remains out of range of the units that are depicted in the scenario. These out of range HQ units usually show up as arriving in one of the corner map hexes and are labeled as “out of range” to serve as a reminder of this fact. Given how the engine works, if a higher HQ is not present on the map nor scheduled as reinforcement then it is assumed that the higher HQ is off map but within range of the units on the map. By placing the HQ as reinforcement with 0% chance of arrival, it effectively breaks the link between the units on the map and the scheduled HQ unit, which represents the fact that this HQ units was very far away from the battle area.

Commanders

With the exception of the BEF, in France .14 you will find that only the GHQ, Army HQs, and Corps HQs, have commander names. This was done because the game covers several months, and given the scale of the order of battle, it is impractical to properly name commanders at division level and below because of how often they changed during this period. There are a few exceptions to this of course, and these exceptions are usually made for only the most famous or most capable commanders. The effect of naming every division commander within the time frame represented by the game would be a complex changing of HQs and almost twice the amount of HQ portraits for the various commanders. On the west front, the corps level and above is really where the commanders stood out from their peers. For the most part, a division commander during this period of warfare was about as special as a brigade commander; the corps was the basic unit of action in most cases.

Historically, many commanders were relieved and replaced throughout the 1914 campaign. However, it is quite unreasonable to expect that every commander is properly represented and replaced when it historically occurred, so several design decisions had to be made. Firstly, only the most important commander changes are represented when it actually occurred, such as the replacement of the French IIIe and Ve Armée commanders, as well as the promotion of Foch to command the new IXe Armée. In these cases, it is important to represent the change of command when it happened because of the change in HQ rating, or the formation of a new army. Of course, many brigade and division commands changed as well but it is not practical to represent this except in cases where an exceptional commander appeared. When Army HQs are changed, it is handled with strategy | operation selections so that you can choose the best location for the change of command to occur in relation to the current location of the army. Corps commanders that were replaced or promoted with a comparable replacement appear with a hyphenated name depicting the {first}-{second} commanders.

The primary disadvantages to replacing HQ units when a change of command occurred are that the user might choose a location that has been overrun by the enemy, and for that, it is completely up to the user to pay attention to where they are deploying the replacement HQ. Also, the user may have moved the army in such a way that the HQ locations are very distant. This has hopefully been negated by providing many different locations in which the HQ can be deployed, and from there the user can move the HQ by rail or road to where it is needed. Of course the HQ locations are in the general historical location of where the change of command occurred, but there are a few choices provided that should allow flexibility. The actual location of the change of command does not necessarily represent where the former commander was replaced, as they could have been "summoned" to any given location and relieved of their command. Corps HQs that appear hyphenated also have a disadvantage because the quality of the first leader may not represent the quality of the one who took his place. Foch is a clear example where, upon his promotion to commander of the new IXe Armée, his post at XXe CA commander was taken over by Balfourier. However, since Balfourier and Foch shared the same corps level HQ unit, they both have the same quality.58 This is a necessary evil given that it is impossible to predict the location of specific corps at the time in which the HQ unit should get replaced.
58 Balfourier carries Foch.s B quality.

In all cases, everything is correct by the time of the second phase race to the sea period, which is the “late” order of battle. In some cases several changes in command do not occur at their historical time if it occurred near the transition period between the early and late order of battle. As already mentioned, every change in command may not be represented; only the most important cases that have the most impact on play actually occur.

Engineer units, minefields, and obstacle clearing

During the early part of World War I, neither participant utilized mines or constructed minefields to a large degree. To a large extent mines were something that was known about, as Imperial Germany created the first modern fused land mine in 1912, however they were not widely used at this point on the battlefield. It was not until around 1917 that minefields began to see widespread use, particularly during the battle of Passchendale of that year. From this point onward it is still not accurate to allow engineer units of this period to lay minefields or obstacles within the scope of a scenario; they were instead something that was only put into place over a long period of fortifying. The same is true of clearing obstacles and mines. Obstacles tended to be extremely thorough forms of barbed wire, which were arrayed in hellish and elaborate concentric belts. During the duration of a scenario, it was only possible to cut through them for a passage lane. These wire constructions were so elaborate that it would be impossible to
completely clear the area within the scope of a several hour turn.59 Also, accurate and thorough mine clearing, also known as demining techniques, were not adopted until World War II, particularly with the invention of the electronic mine detector in 1941. With the exception of some units, "mine clearing" during The Great War was almost strictly limited to engineers clearing and maintaining passage lanes. In game play terms, this means that engineer units in France '14 do not have the capability to lay mines nor clear obstacles or minefields. It is decided that these traits are largely absent from engineer units until the battles covered in the Panzer Campaigns series.

59 The obstacle counters in the First World War Campaigns series represents the most elaborate wire obstacle contructions of the period, and not the often erected single strand obstacle. Unlike the Panzer Campaigns or Modern Campaigns series where obstacles usually represent a hasty abatis or several strands of rolled wire, the most elaborate wire obstacles of the Great War were elaborate and
complicated constructions that could not be easily cleared and removed.

Engineer type units are also the only units that can destroy rail lines and ferries, which is different from both Panzer Campaigns and Modern Campaigns. This was done because the line units of the period did not yet carry the demolition equipment required to conduct these tasks. It was also a desired change so that every unit in the order of battle was not capable of destroying these features, which would result in an a-historical wide spread destruction of rail lines, and it also places greater value on engineer units.

There are documented cases where some engineer units in The Great War constructed boats or rafts and ferries friendly troops across the river. However, it is undesirable for engineer units to be as flexible as they are in the Panzer Campaigns, where engineers in that series can ferry infantry across rivers. The ferry ability for infantry in First World War Campaigns was removed because it was felt that, in the cases where infantry were ferried across the river, this is adequately represented by having a bridging engineer unit construct a bridge, and these rafts and boats were usually constructed by the engineers that had bridging capability. In most of the documented cases of engineers constructing rafts or boats, it took these engineer units a lengthy amount of time to construct such devices which would be represented by many turns. However, if engineers retained the Panzer Campaigns ability to ferry troops then they would become too effective since they would be able to move to and send infantry and cavalry across a river in the span two turns at most. The rapid engineer troop ferrying capability is more of a characteristic of blitzkriegesque modern warfare, not a characteristic of warfare of the early 1900s.

It was decided early on that only engineer units that were company sized or larger should be included in the order of battle. This means that the detachment and platoon sized engineer units of the German and French cavalry divisions,60 are intentionally omitted from the order of battle. This was done primarily to cut down on counter density and the amount of units that the user must manage in relation to their actual usefulness. These small units would, historically, provide menial tasks to the division such as providing at least some sort of minimal fortifying asset. On the other hand, division level bridging detachments are included in the order of battle, but given that they were so small, they are not represented by an explicit unit. Instead, these divisional bridging detachments, if present, are represented by giving the division level engineer unit the bridging capability, resulting in a hybrid bridging / pioneer type unit.61 These units are capable of deploying a bridge, but the corps level bridging train units are better at this task since they can construct it quicker (the division level bridging units are small units). This approach works well since it makes the actual bridge / pontoon bridging units better

60 German and French engineer platoons (in the cavalry divisions) consisted of 90 and 36 men respectively.
61 Historically the bridging detachments were indeed attached to the division level engineer units and did not operate on their own.

at constructing bridges, while still maintaining a minimal bridging capability at bridging level. It must be noted that the Germans had exceptional bridging capability with every division formation containing its own bridging detachment. One the other hand, the French had very little bridging capability, relying almost entirely on the corps level bridging assets.62

62 Prior to the outbreak of the war, France had planned to create division level bridging detachments but this organization not formed in time. This meant that the only real division level bridging detachments were that of the few independent regular divisions. General Staff, War Office. Hand Book of the French Army 1914., 294-295.

Stacking limits

In France '14 it may be notice extremely high stacking limits. A balance is struck between maximum physical space and maximum practical space. Also, the area stacking and road stacking limits are intentionally not a straight 3:1 ratio in relation to each other.

Area stacking: Assuming that, for the sake of simplicity, a soldier with ruck sack takes up approximately a 1 square meter area. Within a 1,000 square meter, there could physically exist about ~10,000 soldiers. This would obviously be quite outrageous. In 1914 unit formations, the appearance tended to resembled that of a Napoleonic unit so a large amount of men must be allowed to stack in one hex: much more than previous games allowed. Tactically, and with some exceptions, soldiers certainly did not march arm in arm in dense formations of infantry as their Napoleonic ancestors did, quite the contrary, they operated loose skirmisher formations. However, small unit tactics that characterize modern infantry tactics did not yet exist, and tactical command and control was still as crude as it was during the Napoleonic Wars. For this reason, despite the fact that individual infantry had about two meter intervals between them, in skirmish formations infantry still had to remain relatively close together, in long ranks with
subsequent ranks following one after the other, rather than small groupings of squads which characterize modern warfare and the “assault” infantry of late World War One. With this in mind, it was decided that the stacking limit should be less than one half of this "physically possible" approach, with the maximum area stacking at ~4,200 men per hex. This still might seem like a lot of men, and certainly is, but this is the extreme case and you will likely pay for high stacking with horrendous losses due to stack density.

Road stacking: Road stacking is a rather unique situation in this series. The battlefields of World War I did not have the same level of threats to rear areas like that of World War II or modern times, so units tended to move in what could be called "parade ground" columns. Around the period of World War II, infantry began to move in tactical columns along the sides of the road with substantial intervals to avoid air interdiction. However, in early World War I this threat did not exist and units would move along the road in massed, dense columns. Where it might be completely outrageous to take the maximum physically possible approach to area stacking, it is not so outrageous when it comes to road stacking since these units tried to keep the column as short as possible. In the above example of a soldier taking up a one meter square area, this means that you could fit approximately 1,000 men in a file across a 1,000 meter long road. Units tended to march in three to four files so this would mean that you could fit 3,000-4,000 men along a 1,000 meter stretch of road. For the sake of generosity and the fact that companies often marched with a slight interval between them, this has been lowered to a road stacking limit of ~2,600 men.

In both cases, care should be taken so as not to provide too dense of a target to the enemy. Only stack more than one infantry battalion in a hex if there is a low threat level to that hex, or only if it is absolutely necessary to do so.63 In most cases it is advisable to have one infantry battalion deployed adjacent to the enemy to disrupt them and two behind it in order to execute an assault if need be.

63 It may be beneficial to stack several infantry battalions or cavalry regiments in a single hex when conducting an assault, but overstacking will cause high losses to opportunity fire or on the enemy.s next turn.
64 Wireless telegraphs of the period were utlitized at the strategic level of almost every army in Europe at the time. The Russian army of 1914 extensively used wireless telegraphs during the 1914 campaign in East Prussia. The Germans intercepted these strategic transmissions which, to the German.s delight, were broadcasted in the clear, and were able to anticipate Russian movements and determine unit locations.
65 It was not until World War II that modern wireless radios were introduced, thereby rectifying the tactical level command and control difficulties.

Night operations

Wireless radios of the Great War were known as "wireless telegraphs" or "radiotelegraphs", and were large, primitive, fixed stations where the transmission tower either had to be constructed or already in place.64 Wireless telegraphs provided brief text based communication and were usually employed at army, corps, division and brigade headquarters. Text messaging on a modern cell phone could be considered a form of radiotelegraphy so, needless to say, even though the radiotelegraph was a technological advancement for the day, strategic level orders were slow to transmit, receive, and disseminate.

During the Great War, units lacked tactical man portable wireless radios, henceforth referred to as “modern wireless radios”. This lack of modern wireless radios meant that company and platoon level units could not effectively communicate “on demand” with their sister companies or battalion HQ. This meant that tactical level command and control was extremely difficult at best and completely non existent at worst.65 Anyone with military experience knows that tactical level command and control is absolutely necessary during night operations, and even with the aid of modern light amplification equipment, night operations can be a difficult and clumsy affair. In a period where effective command and control at the tactical level was nonexistent, “efficient” night movement and night combat operations was practically impossible. Night operations had not yet matured, and effective night movement was limited to following roads and rail lines in column formation.66 This translates into game play that, unless you are moving strategically in Rail Mode or in Travel Mode along roads, your units will become disrupted any time they move during a night turn.67

66 During darkness, it is much easier to follow in a file, one behind the other, in a column formation, along a known road, that it would be to move tactically or in a column across open terrain.
67 In other words, if you are not utilizing the road movement rate of the unit then the unit will disrupt when it moves during night turns. See the User Manual for more information about movement and night operations.

Several realistic situations and tendencies occur because of this rule. The first is to make it more obvious that, unless you absolutely need to move your units, you should be resting them during night turns. Doing so is not only a good decision to prevent disruptions from tactical movement, but it also keeps units from gaining more fatigue during night turns. If you do need to move your units then you should only be moving them strategically to break contact, put more distance between you and a pursuer, or to move units up to the front line from rear areas. You can also choose to drive the advance forward along roads, but doing so is quite a risky proposition. The second tendency that occurs is that, during night operations, it is often wise to cover road junctions to protect against a forced night advance by the enemy. If you are conducting a rearward night march, then it can be more effective to temporarily leave some units along major roads to act as a rear guard to stop any night pursuits. Cavalry work particularly well in this regard role, and you can recall any units used as rear guards on the morning turn.

Siege Gun Units

Some artillery of the period, such as the massive German 42cm howitzer "Big Bertha" and the Austro-Hungarian 30.5cm howitzer “Schlanke Emma”, was designed with the sole intent of penetrating and destroying fortresses. These units are designated as Siege Guns in the order of battle and are primarily effective against fortresses, redoubts, and pillboxes. The more capable the fort or redoubt is, the more resistant it is against the siege artillery. The smallest pillboxes, such as citadels and obsolete forts, were veritable graves to these guns.

In the First World War Campaigns series, there are a number of other heavy artillery units that are not considered Siege Guns in the same sense as the heaviest ones were, but these non Siege Gun units were still intended to be used against smaller forts and bunkers, such as the German 21cm howitzer and the German 28cm mortar. In game play terms, obviously neither of these non Siege Gun units are as effective at reducing fortresses as the “true” Siege Guns are, but these non Siege Guns are more effective at targeting bunkers and enemy units located in non fortified areas.68

68 Siege Gun units are not effective against bunkers or lesser fortified hexes, they do not receive their Siege Gun benefit in these cases. See the User Manual for more information about Siege Gun units.
69 “Rail capacity” refers to the amount of units that both sides can transport, on demand, with rail movement.

Rail capacity

Getting the rail capacity level correct was a tricky issue.69 Both sides largely transported their supplies and heavy artillery by rail when the situation permitted, but neither side had the capability to transport massive amounts of troops on a whim: it required careful planning of rolling stock movements and time tables. With that in mind, the rail capacity level was determined by first determining the largest sized corps unit on both sides; this was then determined to be the optimal rail capacity amount. The optimal rail capacity level was then reduced by three quarters to provide the final, less than optimal level. This approach was taken for several reasons.

Firstly, the rolling stock of both sides were gainfully employed transporting various units, supplies, and replacements between different sectors and were not available to draw upon at will. It was not as if hundreds of locomotives and train cars were just standing by to be summoned to a certain area on a moments notice. French corps from the Alsace region did arrive in the early campaign by rail, as well as various German units, and these transports are considered to be of the carefully planned and coordinated variety, where the rolling stock was gathered for the effort and then dispersed to continue its other tasks. If a full corps or division were allowed to be rail headed on demand, then it would create an a-historical rail transport capability since arriving reinforcement corps and supplies would exceed the practical capacity; this would allow far too much mobility.

In other words, a corps or two could arrive by scheduled reinforcement on rail, before which the user embarked a corps of choice by rail, thus ending up with far too much rail heading capacity than was historically available.

The second reason for the reduction is to prevent rapid “on demand” rail transit. If a corps must be broken in small pieces to rail head to an area then it would encourage short movements and quick debarkations in order to move the other half of the corps, essentially discouraging wholesale troop readjustments, thus minimizing “gamey” levels of mobility.

Thirdly, as more supply units and reinforcements arrive by rail, and as the Germans move their siege artillery by rail, the capacity will be intentionally exhausted and it will prevent any further rail movement until existing units are debarked.70 This means that when a reinforcement does arrive by rail it should encourage the user to quickly move and unload the troops where needed, rather than leaving them on the rail as a rapid deployment force of sorts. The user should also make sure that they unload the reinforcements exactly where they are needed because chances are they will not have the rail capacity to embark the entire force again, since the trains are considered to be sticking to their planned schedules and have moved on to other tasks. If a reinforcement corps is unloaded in a location that is deemed incorrect, then the user will have to march from there, or transport the corps piece meal by rail to a new area. From a game design point of view, it is better to have less rail capacity than is fully needed in order to create a dilemma for the user, rather than having an abundance of rail heading capacity which does not encourage careful management and planning.

70 Supply units are only available when the Explicit Supply rule is selected in the Optional Rules Dialog at the start of a new scenario. See the User Manual for more information about Explicit Supply.

It is worth noting that the “late” campaign, the period known as the “Race to the Sea” and beyond, rail capacity is at minimal levels. This is done because the rolling stock of both sides was exceptionally busy during this period, transferring many corps around France and Belgium and this left little “on demand” rail head capability to either side.

Artillery setup parameter

In First World War Campaigns, especially in the early years of the war, the artillery setup parameter is set to an intentionally low parameter.71 This was done because setting up guns for indirect fire, getting the ammo in place and establishing communication with their HQ could become an extremely time consuming process in a period before portable radios. The position of the guns had to be determined by terrain association and map reading, and this position had to be relayed to the HQ and, in many cases, wire had to be run between the artillery unit and the HQ for the use of field phones if the situation permitted. If field phones were not used, such as in the case of a period of high mobility, then someone had to physically travel from the higher HQ.s position to the artillery unit.s position (or vice versa) in order to establish a communication link, and thus had to travel between the two to relay messages. It was not the most effective system to say the least, and the only way to model this is to have varying degrees of probability for setting up indirect fire artillery. It may take only several turns to setup an artillery unit or it may take many turns, so you should the location that you want your artillery to setup very carefully.

71 See the User Manual for more information about the artillery setup rule.

Multiplayer

As with every other game in existence, France '14 is definitely more enjoyable when played against a human opponent. In World War I, and especially during the early period of 1914, army commanders seldom cooperated with each other in the optimal sense, and often had conflicts of interest, rivalries, or competing ambitions (think of von Kluck.s and von Bülow.s relationship during the German invasion of France in early 1914, or Rennenkampf.s and Samsonov.s relationship in the Russian invasion of East Prussia in 1914). This facet more than once influenced how the two sides advanced and, at various points of the campaign, directly influenced the front line situation. With enough users available, France '14 becomes more historical when there are multiple players per side, particularly for the allies. While this can be accomplished either through PBEM or through TCP/IP, I will concentrate on PBEM here because this method is usually the most practical.72

72 PBEM team based play is accomplished by forming a chain of players that mail the turn to each other, with the last player on that side ending the turn and emailing it to the other side where the process is then repeated.

The most enjoyable situation is a balance of having the most players involved, without detracting from the length of the turn from the time it takes to email it to the participants in the chain. This problem does not exist in TCP/IP games since the general rule is that the more players involved, the faster the turn will be. In PBEM team games, having one player per available army produces the most exciting results, provided that the turns could be passed along the chain of players quickly enough. At the very least, France '14 is most enjoyable with four human players assigned to the following positions: the BEF commander, the Belgian Army commander, the French Army commander and the German Army commander. If only three players are available then the BEF and Belgian Army should be combined under the same player. The BEF and French should never fall
under the same player if possible. Any inclusion of further players should be used to divide up the German armies.

During the early half of the campaign, before the Race to the Sea period, emphasis should be placed on isolating the German 1, 4, and 6.Armee into one player, with the other player having the 2, 3, and 5.Armee as well as overall command. Division of German forces should primarily stress separation of the 1.Armee and 2.Armee into separate users, since the historical coordination between these two armies was lacking, with the overall command not falling under the player that has control of the 1.Armee. Three German players should see the forces divided up further, into one player having the 1.Armee, the second player having the 2 and 3.Armee, and the third player having the 4, 5, and 6.Armee and so on. The result of this is to better simulate the often general lack of cohesion and stress the amount of communication that was required to coordinate actions, which often resulted in failure.

While splitting the campaigns into multiple players creates the most excitement, smaller scenarios are also very enjoyable with multiple users per side as well.

As mentioned, TCP/IP team play of France '14 is particularly entertaining with the same force divisions already described and are usually faster with the more people that participate, thus making it practical to have one user per army or an even greater division of forces if enough users are available.

Listening Music

I found that my gaming experience was greatly enhanced when I listened to Napoleonic period music using Windows Media Player, with the Media Player's volume at 20% so I could still clearly hear the game. The early period of the Great War was both struggling to find its own identity as well as seemingly mimicking the tactics, élan, and appearance that characterized the Napoleonic period or, at the very least, the Franco-Prussian War period. As a result, I think that this type of music fits the early years of The Great War quite well. Some affordable and excellent CDs you might want to consider picking up and adding to your media player play list are:

. Bagpipe Marches and Music of Scotland, Legacy International.
. French Military Marches, Legacy International.
. Famous German and Austrian Marches, Premium Music Collection.
. German Military Marches, Legacy International.
. Highland Pipes and Drums, Legacy International.
. Regimental Marches of the British Army Vol. 1, Chandos Collect.
. Regimental Marches of the British Army Vol. 2, Chandos Collect.
. Tchaikovsky: 1812 Overture - Marche Slave, Deutsche Grammophon.

Obviously, these CDs also provide great listening music for HPS' Napoleonic Campaigns series.

Conclusion

I hope you enjoy playing this game as much as I have enjoyed creating it. I can only hope that the years of toil spent will help inspire further reading and study, and revitalize interest in the history of The Great War. This work is my feeble attempt to contribute to the memory of The Great War, and to honor the millions that gave their lives during this conflict. Perhaps it is not until you play First World War Campaigns that you realize the full awe inspiring scope of the conflict, and the tragic loss of humanity.

The four years spent creating this work is dedicated to all brave soldiers of the world both past and present, who have fought and died in battle. Most of all, I want to dedicate this to a personal friend, SSG Christopher L. Everett. May his memory, and others like him, never be forgotten.

Courage Conquers!
31 March 2010

Edward L. Williams
volcano@esimgames.com

The German Army

Organization

German jäger battalions were an item of frustration. Some sources place jäger battalions as a corps level asset, however, other sources and historical accounts place the same jäger units in various German cavalry divisions. Thus, in 1914, it was decided to place most of these active jäger battalions in the cavalry divisions since it is indisputable that they were indeed attached to some of these divisions at some point. However, it may be noticed that the jäger assignments are in no way uniform. Historically, some German cavalry divisions had several jäger battalions and others had none at all, and this is represented in the order of battle. German reserve jäger battalions also were a bit of a headache. Conflicting sources placed the reserve jäger battalions in specific reserve divisions, and some had them as Reservekorps level assets. Again, a decision was made which placed these formations in specific reserve divisions. However, all jäger battalions that are located in an infantry division are at division level, regardless of the fact that
some sources place them in specific infantry brigades within that division. This was done because the jäger would be used where needed by the division commander and putting them in a brigade restricts their use too severely. It may also be noticed that the jäger battalions which are assigned to cavalry formations are truck borne, but they should not be referred to as "motorized". These troops were not "motorized" in any modern sense of the word, they were simply crammed onto slow moving and unreliable trucks so they could keep up with the cavalry; true motorized infantry did not come into existence until the 1930s.
Although the jäger battalions were frustrating, nothing was more frustrating than trying to determine the organization and structure of the 1.Marine-Division. Every source consulted, in both German and English, seems to have a different answer to what structure this division had in 1914 and anyone who has ever had interest in researching this has probably ran across the same issue. The two aspects of the division that have the most inconsistency are in regards to attached brigades, artillery, and machine guns assigned to the unit. Some sources place the Landwehr-Brigade.37 and 38 in the 1.Marine-Division, and later the Reserve-Ersatz-Brigade.2.15 The same sources that list these brigades as part of the division also place Landwehr artillery in the division itself along with Landwehr cavalry squadrons. However, Die Schlachten und Gefechte des Grossen Krieges 1914-1918 (S und G) specifically lists these two Landwehr and Ersatz Brigades separately when listing the units which participated in the same battles that the 1.Marine-Division participated in. In the end, a judgment call had to be made. The end decision is that both S und G and Hermann Cron.s Geschichte des Deutschen Heers im Weltkriege 1914-1918 was used as the final source for the division structure which basically represents the division in its “bare bones” status. This means that the two Landwehr-Brigade.37 and 38 and Res.Ersatz-Brigade.2 (later) are represented as separate independent entities that really only acted in close support of the 1.Marine-Division. The two landwehr brigades were mixed combined arms formations16 which contained their own artillery, cavalry and pionier units and these are the same units that some sources list as being attached to the 1.Marine-Division. The S und G and Cron approach implies that the two mixed landwehr brigades operated in close support of the 1.Marine-Division and, as such, lent its cavalry, artillery and pionier services to the division but were never formally assigned to the division itself. The actual amount of organic artillery assigned to the division only consisted of a single battery of guns,17 which should not be confused with the naval artillery brigade that was assigned to the division as infantry.18 The one naval artillery battery approach seems to be consistent with how the 2.Marine-Division

15 A mistake that has been perpetuated over time is that this brigade was called “Ersatz-Brigade.2”. There was never an independent 1st or 2nd Ersatz Brigade in existence in the German army; these two units were both reserve ersatz brigades.
16 These mixed landwehr brigades were referred to as “gemischt” landwehr brigades.

17 Hermann Cron, Imperial German Army 1914-18, 100.

18 The “naval artillery brigade” which was assigned to the division was used as infantry which made up the two matrosen regiments and these troops were utilized as infantry, not as artilleryman. was established at the end of November and provides a nice uniformity to the two division.s structure. So in the end, the flexibility is left up to the user to choose whether to use the two mixed landwehr brigades in a supporting role to the 1.Marine-Division or to send them elsewhere.
Pionier battalions within the pionier regiment might seem like they have the incorrect number of companies at first glance. It is true that pionier battalions had four companies before mobilization, however, after mobilization the 4th company of a pionier battalion was split off and used as the foundation of a reserve pionier battalion. The first three companies of a pionier battalion that did not form pionier regiment was divided up amongst the regular infantry divisions, and the fourth company and first and second reserve pionier companies were divided up amongst the reserve divisions. During mobilization, ten pionier battalions were pre selected to form pionier regiments for the purpose of siege warfare. These pionier battalions were the 18-20, 23-25, 29-31 and Bavarian. When mobilization began, these select pionier battalions took on the regimental number of their original battalion designation and the first three companies in the battalion formed the I. Battalion of the regiment. The fourth company was combined with the first and second reserve companies assigned to it and formed the II. Battalion, thus making a regiment of two battalions, each of three companies and a siege train and allotted minenwerfers. For simplicity, the II. Battalion of the regiment is a matching quality of its fourth company so that the battalion can combine into one unit. It is arguable that the fifth and sixth companies of this battalion should be of lesser quality because they were in fact formed from the reserve component but this would cause unnecessary clutter. Also, just as it can be argued that these two companies should be lower quality, it could also be argued that the diluted battalion would take on the quality of its senior company once the units are combined.

Somewhat related to Pioniers, minenwerfers units deserve special mention. In 1915, the Germans began organizing minenwerfers into battalions of 30 mixed light and medium minenwerfers. In September 1915, company sized formations of 12 mixed heavy, medium, and light minenwerfers were established, and these company sized units were attached to each division. These are the most commonly known minenwerfers. In 1914, the Germans did indeed have minenwerfers, but they did not have many. At the start of the war, the minenwerfer was held in the greatest secrecy, similar to the 42cm howitzers, and these secret minenwerfers were specifically designed to be used against field works and light fortifications. The German Army was the only army that took to the field with such a weapon on the western front, but in late 1914 the French soon followed with antiquated but longer ranged 220mm de Bange 1880/91 mortar. In the early period, the German minenwerfers were not organized into any official units and, because of their level of secrecy; it is difficult to find concrete data about them in the early months. However, German sources indicate that the minenwerfers they did have in 1914 were organized with army level pionier units, specifically assigned to what they referred to as the regiment's siege train. In that regard, the early minenwerfers have been grouped in a siege train battery for each pionier regiment.

There is a common misconception on what an “ersatz” formation was composed of in the German Army of 1914. Firstly, it is important to note that the "ersatz" formations did not draw men from the Ersatz Reserve. The Ersatz Reserve was a pool of men who could not make it into the army because of their physical condition. The ersatz formations drew its soldiers from excess soldiers who were supernumerary to active army units, after the initial reserve formations had been formed. In this regard they intended to act as a replacement pool where the trained troops flowed in and awaited to be assigned to other units so they are essentially rated the same as regular units. Ersatz divisions were often used as a stopgap force to reinforce a sector and were even used in frontline combat. Where they were at a disadvantage was in the fact that these Ersatz units lacked a full cadre of officers and NCOs (leadership) and lacked much of the "logistical necessities" needed for a field unit to operate effectively and supply itself effectively. For this reason, Ersatz formation HQ units are rated very low in order to represent these shortcomings and deficiencies which made them less effective as a front line force when employed as a stopgap fighting formation.

When the German Army took to the field in 1914 they were lacking many of their machine guns. The equipping of the German Army with machine guns was done just prior to the start of the conflict and many reserve formations suffered from a shortage. Some reserve infantry brigades and reserve jäger battalions went to war without their machine gun companies. As the campaign progressed, these units would eventually regain their missing companies, primarily from the machine gun sections that were scattered amongst German fortress garrisons. Once the threat to the fortified areas was removed, these units were pulled from their garrison and organized into companies to bring the machine gun compliment of the army up to full strength.19 Thus, after August, there was a sharp influx of machine gun units. However, it is almost impossible to determine exactly when each missing machine gun company was regained on a unit by unit basis.20 It is important to mention that two assumptions were made in game design in regards to German machine gun troops. First, it can be reasonably assumed that any second draft reserve division or jäger battalion formed between October and December were likely given their full compliment of machine guns since reequipping was a constant and ongoing process, and it is unlikely that a new unit would have been created with the same shortage that was currently being addressed. Second, as for the original units that were not at full compliment at the start of the campaign, it is known that the process of stripping the machine guns from the least threatened fortress garrisons began at the end of August. It can be assumed that these units started forming and redeploying shortly after this, therefore the "late" order of battle contains these missing machine gun units. As a side note, under the reign of von Falkenhayn, and after the full compliment of machine gun units had been established, German machine gun troops began to drastically expand during 1915. This expansion was Germany's long cherished plan of having one machine gun company of six guns for each infantry battalion,21 and to equip every jäger battalion with an addition company of machine guns. This was only possible after stripping virtually all machinegun companies from their fortress garrisons. In addition to the 19 Eventually the machine gun compliment would surpass “full strength” in 1915 and 1916.

20 It is important to represent that this happened, rather than leave these units missing from the order of battle during the period in which they were being replaced.

21 This is referring to all types of infantry battalions; regular, reserve, ersatz, landwehr and landsturm. shortage of machine gun companies for reserve units, there was also a similar shortage for cyclist companies for the reserve jäger battalions. While the reserve jäger battalions gained their missing machinegun companies, they never would gain the missing cyclist companies.

One unique aspect of the German Army in 1914 was its well throughout reserve system. The German Army of the period without a doubt had the most extensive, well organized and effective system of reserves out of all the armies in Europe. Unlike other armies, the Germans strictly classified and kept track of their reserves by each year in which they passed from the active army and into the reserves.22 This resulted in a grouping of reservists into classes by year where each class was of similar composition in readiness, physical condition and overall quality. This method allowed the German Army to organize them in such as way as to maximize their effectiveness and dramatically swell the armies ranks with highly trained reservists at mobilization time, while keeping the older reservists separated. Service in the German Army was divided into two years in the Active Army (three years for cavalry); five years in the Reserve (four years for cavalry); eleven years in the Landwehr. The Landsturm included youths between the ages of 17 and 20, too young for Active Army service, and trained and untrained men between the ages of 39 and 45, who were over ordinary military age.23 The reserves conducted strict annual training in order to retain their level or readiness. At mobilization, reservists in the first two year classes were utilized to fill out the ranks of Active Army units to bring them up to full strength, used as replacements and, most importantly, used to form the

22 As mention in the French Army section, , this was the direct opposite of the French system of reserves which kept track of the first two years and then put all other reservists in a huge pool of troops which diluted their effectiveness.

23 Edmonds, Sir James E. Military Operations: France and Belgium 1914, Vol. I.,

21. original Reservekorps and divisions. These initial reserve formations were comprised of the newly made reservists who were still fresh in their training, albeit many were a little out of shape physically, and who were supernumerary to the requirements of the Active Army (in excess to the reservists used to fill out the Active Army's ranks). The remaining reservists (third to fifth year classes) were then mobilized second and used to form the "first wave" (also called "second draft") of Reservekorps which began entering the German Order of Battle in October. In France '14, the "initial reserves", which are the reserves that make up the initial Reservekorps and Reserve-Divisions, are for the most part all rated as equal quality (C) to active army units.24 The difference between active army and reserve infantry battalions is that the reserve infantry battalion assault ratings are slightly lower since there was indeed a real world qualitative difference between the two entities.25 The "second draft" follow on reserve formations which began to show up in the late "Race to the Sea" period had a slightly different divisional organization and their quality ratings are less than the "initial reserve" formations. The shock to the world in early 1914 was that the German "initial reserve" formations were almost equal in effectiveness to that of the Active Army formations because of the German's strict reservists classification system and annual training. In many cases the German initial reserve formations were the tactical equals of the French Active Army divisions.26 The initial German reserve formations could certainly handle any threat they were met with, but despite all of their qualitative similarities to active army divisions, reserve divisions
24 An exception to this is with the divisional pionier units. The 1st and 2nd company of a reserve pionier battalion was composed of reservists, and the 4th company was composed of active personnel. To represent this difference, the division that contains the two reserve component pionier companies has those pionier units rated as D quality, and the division that has the 4th company has this pionier company rated at C.

25 The lower assault rating for these units helps represent the fact that even reservists who had only been in the Reserve for one or two years were still not as in shape as active army troops.

26 Zuber, 85. were equipped with less artillery and the Reservekorps lacked heavy artillery and supporting troops. This shortcoming is what often relegated the German Army to use these reserve formations as follow on forces, or utilized in less critical areas (since the active formations had more combat power).

The Landwehr formations in France '14 are rated as D quality units. These formations were highly trained as they were veterans of anywhere from eight to eleven years in the army. Quality wise this means that it would not be justifiable to rate them lower or higher than D quality, but these formations were equipped with obsolete equipment and rifles (since all the up to date equipment had to be sent to the massive reserve formations), and the Landsturm combat ratings reflect this.
In late 1914, the Germans raised a second draft of reserve divisions (also known as "first wave") under the XXII to XXVII.Reservekorps and the 6.bayer.Reserve-Division. Each reserve infantry battalion in these second draft formations received a cadre company of an Ersatz battalion numbering 300 men. These men were trained reservists and they were split up between the four companies in each of the four reserve infantry regiments in the battalion.27 The remaining 75% of infantry came from a mixture of untrained men which were over and under the military age, as well as landwehr and landsturm infantry. The artillery in these divisions was also led by “officer substitutes” but the artillerymen were of traditional reservist quality. In France .14, the decision was made to make the artillery units in these "second draft" divisions at D quality and the reserve infantry battalions are also rated at D quality. This creates a big difference in effectiveness between the second draft reserve formations and the initial reserve units.

27 In other words, each company received 75 of the 300 men.

Only one of the four "Big Bertha" batteries was actually "motorized". The other three were rail transportable only. However, for game play concerns it was discovered that a cunning allied player could destroy a few key rail junctions which would completely stop the siege guns. Since there is no way to repair rail lines within the course of the scenario, a compromise of sorts was required. The rail transported batteries are of the horse class, with a speed of 1. This means that these batteries should primarily be transported by rail but, if need be, they can also be off loaded and transported very slowly in disassembled pieces to the next available rail line.

BAK28 units, which were designated as FLAK29 units in May 1916, are not present in either the early or late period order of battle. When the war began, Germany was still developing a true air defense organization. The Germans had a few individual BAK guns which were mounted on motorized transport. These individual guns were assigned to the I, VIII, XXI.Armeekorps and two BAK guns were assigned to the XV.Armeekorps. These guns were virtually useless when it quickly became apparent that the real threat was not from balloons, but from aero planes due to the growing enterprising spirit of enemy airmen. It was not until the "reorganization period" of late 1914 when BAK units began to effectively form, and true BAK batteries of guns were not used in a sizable force until the middle of 1915 to 1916. Therefore, in France '14, the German order of battle does not contain any BAK units because they were not yet formed into an effective force.30

28 Ballonabwerkannone – balloon defense gun, or anti-balloon gun.
29 Fliegerabwehrkannone – airplane defense gun, or anti-aircraft gun.
30 One or two guns at each AOK adds useless and wasteful counters to the game.

Equipment and Training

Countless books have been written about the quality of the German Army in World War One, so the subject will not be covered in any great detail here. It is undeniable that the German Army was one of the best all around armies in Europe at the time, second to the small professional British Army of course. The German Army was a well trained, well equipped, and well oiled machine that could accomplish almost any task assigned to it and it was operating on the pride and many past victories since Frederick the Great. The individual soldier was not necessarily better than that of the French Army, Russian Army or any other army in Europe, but it was a collection of advantages like an abundance of high trajectory artillery and machine guns, an extremely efficient reserve system, and good quality equipment and training, that made the German army a horde to be feared and respected.

Miscellanea

The HQ insignia for the German Army are insignia based on traditional military map symbols that denoted the size of unit. The colors are based on traditional colors used for the various Germanic states that made up the German Empire. The colors are mostly for artistic purposes, but they are for identification purposes and historical flavor.

Color codes:
Kingdom of Prussia: grey and black with white numerals
Kingdom of Bavaria: blue and light blue with white numerals
Kingdom of Saxony: green and white with grey numerals
Kingdom of Württemburg: red and black with grey numerals
Kingdom of Hessen: red and white with white numerals (black border)
Kingdom of Baden: red and yellow with yellow numerals (black border)
German Empire (multi): black and white with red numerals (grey border)
Minor kingdoms: black and white with gold numerals (grey border)

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The British Army

Organization

The British cavalry have been classified as one makeup regardless of if they are dragoons or lancers. This was done because the differences between them were not as great as the still specialized cavalry of the German and French armies. Instead, regardless of whether the British cavalry had a lance or a saber, they were very effective in assaults and were also highly trained marksmen; they were also uniformly well skilled in dragoon type warfare from their Boer War experiences. From this experience, the British began a total "modernization" of cavalry where the principle weapon would now be the carbine and the pistol, instead of the lance and saber. The result is that the British cavalry differ from the German and French in that they are good all around troops, effective at reconnaissance, marksmanship, and shock. Generally speaking, they are everything that the German and French cavalry were, rolled into one package, but were not as effective at shock as some specialized German and French cavalry were. At this point, the British cavalry was mostly a homogeneous force with only their historical names remaining intact.

Overall BEF organization was a bit of a headache when creating the order of battle for France '14, given several reorganizations they made throughout the conflict. Because the scope of the campaign scenarios can span many months, and because the forces on both sides had a tendency to change their organization throughout the war, an approach was made to make BEF organization as simple as possible. For example, the BEF's Cavalry Division was split up around September 1914 and was to become one of the divisions in the new "Cavalry Corps". However, 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades became "Gough's Command" from 6 September to 13 September where it was known as the 2nd Cavalry Division. Somewhere between this point and 14 October, the Cavalry Corps was formed. For the sake of simplicity, and to eliminate unnecessary confusion, reformation will not take place during a scenario. Instead it will occur in following scenarios. For example, the BEF underwent a few minor structure changes during the period of the Battle of the Aisne. These changes to the BEF organization will be in place in the scenarios following that battle, in the Race to the Sea phase. It is impractical in the game to have units removed from the game then return under a different designation or organization given that casualty level and fatigue levels would be lost and it would be impossible to determine where to place the unit as reinforcement on the map.

Equipment and Training

The short barrel, magazine fed, Lee Enfield rifle (SMLE) was arguably one of the better rifles in the world at the time. The SMLE had one of the smoothest actions when compared to its contemporaries, could be reloaded quickly and easily, and was light due to its compact design. The SMLE was not without its flaws, but most of its flaws can be attributed to early war ammunition. Where the SMLE stood out was when it was in the hands of a capable and highly trained British regular. In the pre-war years, the British school of musketry sought to increase the number of machine guns assigned to each infantry battalion from two to six but this was denied. When war broke out in 1914, the British Army was severely lacking an effective and unified machine gun force since the guns were divided up into two gun sections to support each infantry battalion.31 To compensate for this lack of firepower, the school of musketry trained the soldiers in special rapid fire marksmanship drills and the British Army offered pay incentives to regular soldiers who demonstrated good marksmanship skill. Years of pre-war training increased their proficiency with the SMLE, thus enabling the BEF regular soldier to execute accurate and intense rapid rifle fire which would later compel many German soldiers to believe that they were under machine gun fire. All of this combined to create an almost mythical legend for the SMLE and the 1914 British professional soldier that wielded it. In game play terms, something was needed beyond a simple quality level increase in order to properly represent the doctrinal and proficiency differences with the BEF professional force. It was decided that in addition to high troop quality levels, the BEF professional infantry and cavalry would also have a higher soft attack rating, which is attributed to a combination of the SMLE's advantages as well as the BEF regular soldier's proficiency and specialized training in its use. The BEF regular infantry also have a higher defense factor but this comes at the expense of a lower assault rating, since they generally had a much greater reliance on firepower and marksmanship skill rather than brute force cold steel, unlike the other infantry of Europe. These special traits combine to create a realistic advantage for the small BEF which was an extremely effective force, and this advantage is offset by the fact that the BEF generally had little to no replacements and slowly dwindled away by the end of 1914. These "special traits" are only present in the BEF "professional" regular infantry; guard infantry; and cavalry units of 1914, and are not present in non regular infantry units, such as the British naval and 31 This two gun section per infantry battalion organization was similar to the French Army's approach. marine infantry,32 Commonwealth infantry,33 territorial and yeoman units,34 nor any of Kitchner's "New Army" units that followed in 1915.35 In other words, following the demise of the core BEF professional force at the end of 1914 and the subsequent dilution of replacements in 1915, British units became comparable to other European armies in terms of combat factors.

32 Naval infantry were ill equipped and composed of raw recruits, and marine infantry were composed of reservists and recruits.
33 Commonwealth troops were mostly non professional in comparison to the “professional” sense of the BEF regular, or they did not stress the same level marksmanship, or, in the case of the Indian units, were only freshly equipped with SMLEs.
34 Yeoman and territorial formations were made up of citizen soldiers.
35 Kitchner.s “New Army” was comprised of hastily trained and poorly led troops and was an emergency stop gap measure to get more troops to the front.

Another issue involved the stop gap heavy artillery the British began to employ in the latter months of 1914. Due to a lack of 60 pounder guns, in October the 7th and 8th Infantry Divisions arrived in Flanders fielding the awkward 4.7 inch naval guns which were mounted on Percy Scott carriages. Initially these guns were an improvisation for the Second Boer War. In that conflict, the British had no answer to the French made 155mm Cruesot “Long Tom” field gun that the Boer.s employed. The solution was to dismount the 4.7 inch naval gun from some ships and coastal batteries and mount it on a carriage designed by Captain Percy Scott of the Royal Navy. The gun lacked any mechanism for recoil and it had very limited elevation. The 60 pounder gun was created specifically to address the stop gap and replace the 4.7 inch naval gun improvisation. In 1914, the 60 pounder was initially in very short supply, and this required the British to bring the 4.7 inch naval gun back into service. However, in France .14, the ratings for these ground based guns differ from the true naval mounted 4.7 inch guns for a couple of reasons. The naval mounted 4.7 inch guns have a longer range and higher combat factor than the Percy Scott carriage mounted guns because of the latter.s limited elevation capability and the fact that the naval mounted gun could utilize more powerful charges.

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General Notes

Attachments

Veterans of either the Panzer Campaigns or Modern Campaigns series may notice that attachments are handled differently in France „14. In France .14, attachments are made an army level, therefore, corps can be attached to different armies, and independent divisions and brigades can also be attached to different armies, but divisions cannot be attached to different corps. The decision to go with this type of attachment scheme was not an easy one to make. Evidence has shown that divisions were indeed transferred between corps and corps transferred between armies, however there was overwhelming evidence pointing to the fact that corps were reassigned amongst armies much more often than divisions were reassigned amongst corps. The fact is, most division parings remained the same amongst a corps, and when troops were needed elsewhere the entire corps was reassigned to another sector of the front, under another army.s command. During early alpha tests, it was also discovered that when division to corps attachments were allowed it often influenced the reassignment of supporting units to create an a-historical "breakthrough corps" of sorts, by combining all heavy artillery from several different corps. Clearly this type of flexibility was not available during the early part of World War I, so from a design point of view this was another reason for choosing an army level attachment scheme in France „14. It was eventually decided that army level attachments of corps was the best choice given both the grand scale of the game, the potential abuse of divisional attachments thus producing unpredictable results, and, most importantly, the evidence that it was the most likely and most frequent reorganization method that occurred. While this approach is not perfect, it works well and allows moderate flexibility and reorganization to occur, but not complete flexibility.

The exception to this intentional limited flexibility is that, in many cases, some armies allowed cavalry divisions and reserve divisions to be reassigned amongst armies and this has been modeled. In fact, special mention must be made of the French Army's organization. The French Army in 1914 reorganized itself more than any other. Corps were sent from the army formations in the east to army formation in the west as needed, and reserve and territorial divisions were committed to different armies in crucial areas as well. In the early part of 1914, there are a couple of unique aspects of the French reserves. As a French player, you will have more flexibility to transfer units around but at the same time you may end up with a completely disorganized force if it is not managed properly. The second distinctive characteristic about the French Army and its attachment capabilities are its reserve and territorial divisions. The GQG Reserve and Territorial Reserve contain individual divisions allowing the French to attach these divisions as needed, directly to various armies if necessary. Actually, any division that may have been independently transferred between armies has been represented as a direct army level attachment, as a kind of independent division. Some French infantry divisions fit this description as well. Of special mention is the French 37th and 38th Infantry Divisions which were sent from North Africa at the outbreak of the war. These two divisions bounced around many different French corps during the conflict so it was decided to allow these units to attach directly to armies as well, creating a capable fire brigade or sorts.

Cavalry Units, cavalry tactics, and cavalry types

Cavalry units in First World War Campaigns of 1914 represent the twilight period of cavalry in the traditional sense of the word. Most cavalry during this period still had its roots in Napoleonic warfare and were still training in the tactics of arme blanch.36 While cavalry met with some success on the more mobile eastern front, cavalry units on the western front had little usefulness other than dismounted infantry after 1914. However, during the fluid battles that were characteristic of 1914, cavalry were still used in their traditional role until the point in which the west front developed into a static line, devoid of any flanks.

36 Arme blanche is a French term which literally means cold steel. In this literal sense it refers to the use of thrusting or cutting weapons in battle. In regards to cavalry, it describes their sole traditional role: to be held back until the right moment as a decisive tactical striking force. In modern times this is often referred to as “shock”.

Cavalry units in this series differ from anything available in the Panzer Campaigns series in that when they are in Travel Mode they are not classified as being in "travel mode" per se, rather they are just simply considered to be "mounted". From there it is assumed that when these units are "mounted" they would be able to move into charge formation or column formation rather quickly, and they do not need to be micromanaged on when to do this. While this might seem like a rather abstract approach, it works nicely given the scale of the game. Cavalry can move rapidly and conduct charges while in their mounted Travel Mode state, or they can dismount and perform as if they were infantry.

Some cavalry units have specializations while others do not. However, this is said with reservation and depends on the nation in question, and the experiences they had at the time, and not necessarily related to the armament of the individual cavalryman.

During the First and Second Boer War in South Africa, the British were matched up against an opponent to which they were initially unprepared. The Boers, essentially Dutch farmers in South Africa, utilized fast mobile hit and run cavalry tactics where they relied exclusively on the carbine. Initially, Britain.s traditional cavalry were unable to deal with this threat until they switched exclusively to dragoon type tactics to match their foes. Following the war, several British military studies were conducted on lessons learned and how cavalry should evolve. Some advocated for no change in cavalry from its Napoleonic style because the Boers were hardly considered to be a similar threat that another European army would be. Others argued that with the modernization of weapons, the lance and saber needed to be discarded and that a single unified mounted infantryman type cavalry force needed to be made.

One of the first British tacticians to argue for a complete change in cavalry tactics and composition was Colonel F. R. Henderson. Colonel Henderson spent a considerable time studying the American Civil War and came to the conclusion that the Americans had "stuck the true balance between shock and dismounted tactics." Henderson pointed out that by 1861 firepower had become the dominant factor in battle, and the Americans had adopted alterations to traditional cavalry tactics that were necessary to both counter and maximize firepower. Henderson believed that the true balance lay in the American's choice of mixing both fire and shock. The result was that by 1907 the British began modernizing their cavalry into a single homogenous force that was well rounded in dismounted warfare, marksmanship and shock tactics.

General Francois de Négrier was a Frenchman who had been an observer in the Russo-Japanese War. He believed that lessons learned in that struggle demonstrated the need for a change in the methods of cavalry as well. Similar to Henderson, Négrier was convinced from what he observed that cavalry needed to abolish the traditional distinctions among lancers, dragoons, hussars and the like in favor of a single robust cavalry force trained in both shock and fire tactics. However, he failed to reckon that the French would be the most reluctant of all to change. Despite his studies, France went into battle in 1914 with almost no change to the cavalry over their Napoleonic ancestors.

In Germany, one of the leading military writers of the pre-Great War period was General Frederick von Bernhardi and he had much to say about cavalry tactics of the future. Although he had strong faith in the value of dismounted action, he maintained that cold steel remained the chief cavalry threat on the battlefield. However, Bernhardi pointed out that modern cavalry should not rely exclusively on shock tactics, but instead should consider various methods of fighting to create a single homogenous force capable of both cold steel and dismounted accurate rifle fire. Like Négrier of France, he was to be a voice in the darkness. Other nations, such as the United States and Britain, seemed to pay more attention to their studies than their own armies did.

In the First World War Campaigns, specialized cavalry of the period were very similar to, and in some cases exact, Napoleonic period formations and were trained, or sometimes specifically equipped, for a certain style of combat. Lighter cavalry units such as Uhlans and Chasseurs specialized in reconnaissance, and were somewhat weaker in their shock capability than other types. Some cavalry of the period were classified as "heavy" and consist of large men, sometimes wearing obsolete armor,37 and were mounted on large powerful horses. These heavy cavalry units were the Napoleonic equivalent of modern main battle tanks, and at the time of the First World War this was expected to still be the case. All of this translates into the cavalry unit ratings in First World War Campaigns; man cavalry units in the game have inherent advantages and disadvantages which determine when they should and should not be used.

37 The French Cuirassiers of 1914 went into battle wearing their armored breastplates for traditional purposes and not for actual protection. The polished, shiny, breastplate was quickly covered with a brown cloth, and the breastplate was completely discarded by French cuirassiers by the end of 1914. At the start of the Great War, German and Russian cuirassier cavalry only wore their breastplates in full dress uniform for cerimonal or parade purposes.

The primary advantages of all cavalry is their mobility and, due to their mobility, their inherent strength in reconnaissance operations. Some cavalry have the ability to conduct the recon spotting ability, which is a unit command menu order that instructs the selected unit to expend movement points in an attempt to spot enemy units within their line of sight. This is useful when cavalry units are moved forward into areas that were not spotted at the beginning of the turn and helps you to avoid a blundering move into enemy forces. In game play terms, cavalry that have this recon spotting ability are the light cavalry units. These include, but are not limited to Uhlans, Lancers, Chasseurs, Cossacks, and the “modern” classless British cavalry units. These light cavalry units should be utilized in screening and reconnaissance, and should rarely be used in a full blown charge unless the situation is extremely beneficial to do so. Another advantage of cavalry units is their ability to evade the enemy when mounted.38 When a mounted cavalry unit is assaulted, it will retreat (if possible) and avoid high combat losses. However, this is only true if all the defending units in a hex consist of mounted cavalry.39 These two advantages, mobility and evasion, combine to make cavalry extremely useful in a role of rear guard, covering a friendly infantry force.s retreat long enough to put a substantial distance between it and its pursuers, and then repeating this process as necessary. Perhaps the greatest advantage of mounted cavalry units is their ability to conduct a cavalry charge. Unlike other units, mounted cavalry only require 1/3 of their movement to conduct an assault, allowing them to make repeated assaults and to move almost to their full extent before assaulting. When mounted cavalry units conduct a charge, their assault rating is multiplied by four times its normal value, which, in the case of a charge en masse or in the case of a heavy cavalry charge, can result in an absolutely overwhelming result for the defender. As with every other assault, the end result is of course due to the condition, size and type of the defending unit(s), and the terrain they are situated in.40

38 “Mounted cavalry” are cavalry units which are in Travel Mode. See the User Manual for more information.
39 See the User Manual for more information.
40 For the class based cavalry of the early war, it is intentional that only the dragoon cavalry type has as hard attack rating. This was done because the dragoon is essentially mounted infantry, which have comparable ratings to standard infantry formations. This means that cavalry units of other classes in 1914 cannot assault fortresses, redoubts, bunkers nor armored cars. These cavalry units can push such enemies out of a hex if they are disrupted, but they are intentionally not sufficiently powerful enough to cause any other effect.
The greatest disadvantage of cavalry units is their vulnerability when mounted. As with all other units in Travel Mode, mounted cavalry are more vulnerable to enemy fire than a deployed unit. As mentioned, Travel Mode for cavalry units is not representing that they are in column formation like standard units, instead it is an abstraction to represent that they are mounted on horseback and, because of this, a larger, much more vulnerable target. A poorly executed cavalry charge can have the opposite result that the attacker intends, and can leave the cavalry unit vulnerable to retaliatory fire on the enemy.s turn. Use cavalry charges with caution, the ability should only be used in a situation of either desperation or extreme advantage, not as norm; cavalry units should be husbanded and not wasted in futile cavalry charges. Part of the reason for this is their next weakness. Cavalry was an expensive branch of service to equip, maintain, and train; it took roughly three years to turn a man on a horse into an effective cavalry trooper. Because of this, regular (non elite) cavalry units received very little replacements, and elite cavalry units received even less. Strategically, cavalry of the period generally regarded itself as a one shot weapon, something that would only be used en masse and in force "when the time was right". The cavalry arm of all sides generally viewed itself as a force that would battle enemy cavalry on the flanks in sweeping battles where they would trade loss for loss, similar to trading knights in a game of chess, as they cover the flanks of the armies. Cautiously utilized cavalry as a reconnaissance force would obviously be around longer than a mass used as an offensive striking force, and this is partly why both sides shied away from committing massed cavalry in one huge decisive action. When a cavalry unit is decimated in the early period of First World War Campaigns, it will essentially be gone forever if it is an elite unit, or it will take a very long time for it to regain its strength if it is a regular unit.41 Also, the expense to equip and maintain them 41 This is due to the fact that in the "early" period all regular cavalry units have a 1% replacement rate, elite cavalry units have a 0% replacement rate. In the "late" period (Race to the Sea and beyond), no cavalry units receive replacements, however at that point all units (cavalry and otherwise) begin to receive recovery. In the early period, the cavalry replacements represent the finite pool of troopers that were being trained but who had not yet completed training, or those who were being processed from the ersatz units. Recovery is set to 0% in this early period to represent the fact that both sides were on the move and had not yet established permanent rear area facilities to process stragglers and the treated wounded. The pool of treated wounded soldiers who could return to duty had also not accumulated yet. In the late period, the lack of cavalry replacements represent the "drying up" of the pool of replacements, and the start of recovery represents the fact that units began processing strength from losses at the start of the war (it represents a transitional period). See the user manual for the different between replacements and recovery.

These units, as well as the high cost of potentially losing both the mount and rider, means that cavalry units are worth two times as many Victory Points as infantry formations. A successful cavalry commander of the period must always keep in mind that a cavalry charge which might cause a massive proportion of enemy infantry loss may carry with it a substantial loss of irreplaceable cavalry in the charge, possibly making the charge itself an exercise in futility. The infantry formation can usually, depending on the nationality and supply situation, recover and replace its losses with ease where as the cavalry unit cannot. In addition, the point value of friendly cavalry may actually turn out to be equal to, or higher than the loss inflicted on the enemy. The higher victory point value for cavalry loss makes the proposition of their use as stand in, dismounted infantry cannon fodder an expensive proposition; this option should only be reserved when combating and standing up against enemy cavalry formations that are employed in a similar manner, such as the case in the First Battle of Ypres, 1914. All of these advantages and disadvantages create a dilemma where knowing when and how to utilize cavalry efficiently and effectively is a challenge, and a great deal of fun!

Designer Notes: France ‘14

With the end to diplomacy in the summer of 1914, Germany marched into Belgium in the first week of August to win a crushing victory with their finely tuned, but heavily modified, Schlieffen Plan. Germany saw many initial successes in France and Belgium in August and early September, and victory seemed like a forgone conclusion. However, defying all odds, the weary French and British made an about face and counter attacked along the Marne, crushing the Schlieffen Plan, and halting the German advance.

The 1914 conflict in France would be the opening act of a gruesome war that would not end until 1918, a war which would forever remove many of the monarchs in Europe, and consume the lives of over eighteen million people. This "Great War" would mark the end of the Napoleonic old world order, and would be the catalyst for an even greater struggle known as World War II.

Introduction

What now seems like a lifetime ago, I approached John Tiller with a proposal; a new game series should be created covering the Great War.1 The Great War is a conflict that is generally well known about, but is little understood, and any knowledge of it is usually filled with stereotypes and generalizations. For many people, the first thing that may come to mind is a conflict of nothing other than trench warfare, stagnation, and attrition. While it is true that the Great War had an ample amount of these traits, in actuality most of the campaigns were fluid, and it was only the periods of 1915-1916 on the Western Front that characterizes what most people come to think of as the entire conflict.

1 In this document, “the Great War” may be referred to as “the First World War” or “World War I” interchangeably. War gaming interest in the Great War has been nearly non existent in comparison to gaming interest in World War II. One contributing factor is due to the almost total lack of war games available about the former, in comparison to the complete saturation of content about the latter.
In the proposal to Mr. Tiller, the first title in this bold new series would be based upon the Western Front, and it would cover the entire year of 1914. To compound matters, I decided to go a step further and attempt to represent the campaign using a similar system to the popular Panzer Campaigns series, meaning that the conflict would be represented at a scale of one kilometer per hex, at the battalion and company level. It was a truly ambitious and equally insane undertaking, and, to my knowledge, the scale and detail of which was something that has never been attempted before in the history of war gaming. The end result is what I hope will be the most accurate and detailed representation of this great conflict, and a hope to spark greater interest in the study of World War I in general for further research and understanding, which in turn helps form a greater understanding of World War II and modern world problems and situations. An example of this would be the outcome of the French campaign of 1940, and the undeserved post World War II criticism placed upon the French Army by armchair historians.

2 If people learned through a war game, or through further reading inspired by playing a war game, exactly how much the French people suffered during the Great War by experiencing or reading about the campaigns themselves, then perhaps they would exhibit a broader understanding of the "complete picture" and be less quick to criticize French performance in 1940.3 This is just one example of how the Great War contributed to the events, origin, and outcome of World War II but it certainly goes much further than this. The Great War was the genesis of modern warfare, seeing the birth of many modern weapon systems and tactics, all of which deserve their own study in order to better understand modern warfare. There is an excellent Panzer Campaigns series title available, France .40, if you would like to wargame the 1940 German invasion of France.

3 France suffered roughly 25% of all casualties on the Allied Powers during the Great War, with over 5.6 million soldiers dead or wounded, second only to the Russian Empire, which suffered 30% of Allied Power casualties at over 6.7 million soldiers dead or wounded. However, French military casualties amounted to 14% of the total French population at the time (~40 million people), compared to Russian military casualties which amounted to 4% of Russian national population at the time (~159 million people). This percentage of national sacrifice is unparalled in history. War weariness in 1940, needless to say, was a contributing factor to French performance, and rightly so. The sheer scope and depth of the data that needed to be gathered to create this work is mind boggling to say the least and, to complicate things, almost every source available covers a small piece of the puzzle, or conflicts with one another in some regard. The most difficult task was wading through the data and sorting out facts from bias, and the avoidance of making too many speculations in areas which had little information available. Cross referencing several sources was absolutely necessary so that an accurate result, free of most bias from the period, could be obtained. Every effort was made to make this as accurate a representation of the Great War as possible, given the limitation of both human abilities and sanity. However, given these complications, realities and over ambitions, there is no doubt that unintentional errors have been made in the creation of this work. I alone am responsible for any such errors.

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Campaign background

The following question must be addressed immediately: why was the decision made to split the 1914 conflict on the Western Front into three separate campaigns, and not represent it with one huge campaign? The answer is that 1914 was actually the scene of three different stages of the battle as both sides switched to completely different strategies throughout the year. These shifts in strategies were broken down into phases, of which the three campaigns represent. You may notice that there is actually more than three campaign scenarios present in this title, this is because the campaign in Flanders4 was broken up into smaller campaigns of Yser, Ypres, and La Bassée in order to provide a smaller sector if the desire is not to play the entire Flanders Campaign.

4 The Flanders campaign was during the period of mid October to mid November 1914.

5 The original Schlieffen plan was designed to weakly defend the Franco-German frontier and to give ground to a French attack. By giving ground to the French, von Schlieffen calculated that the French army would be walking into a trap, leaving Paris undefended, and allowing the French army to be flanked. The initial conflict from August to mid September was an attempt by the Germans to win a quick victory over the allies by out flanking them and capturing Paris. This was foiled by a series of events. The most notable of these events was the German 1st Army turning south too early, the skillful BEF withdrawal and harassment, and the counter attack by the French 5e Armee at Guise, all helping to force this early turn. However, perhaps the biggest issue that foiled the plan was von Moltke.s revision of the original Schlieffen Plan just prior to the war. Von Motke.s revision put more German corps along the Franco-German frontier, and on the Eastern Front, rather than one massive wheeling force towards Paris. Von Motlke felt that the original Schlieffen plan was too bold and he could not accept a plan that would ultimately surrender German soil to the French.5 He opted for a more conservative approach which, ultimately meant that the flanking German armies were too thinly spread in their wheeling movement to effectively swing around and isolate Paris. To further complicate matters, a new decision by von Moltke, just prior to the Battle of the Marne, to outflank and destroy the then weakened French 5th Army, had the effect of causing the German 1st Army to swing further southeast which placed it in a situation where the German right wing was vulnerable to a massed counter attack. This counter attack by the BEF and French 6th Army, resulted in a decisive turn of events for the seemingly invincible German Army. What followed was the German retreat, and the Battle of the Aisne, as the line was stabilized and then a new phase of battle began. It is difficult to imagine, when all hope seemed lost, how the allied armies managed to counter attack and completely turn the balance of power in the conflict. Indeed it was a miracle.

From this point, a new phase of the campaign began and consisted of a race where both the Central Powers and Allied Powers attempted to outflank each other. From the Aisne to Switzerland, the battle line was continuous, but in the west the battlefield was wide open all the way to the English Channel. Thus, the period known as "the Race to the Sea" ensued in which both sides stretched the battlefield further and further northwest. Neither side gave up hope that they could still force a quick victory before the end of 1914. The German strategy was both to outflank the allies and to seize as much territory as possible, with the whole of Calais as the grand prize. The Allies desired to turn the German flank, as they did at the Marne, and force a German withdrawal from Belgium and France.

Once the Race to the Sea phase ended, and the battle line was now continuous from the English Channel to Switzerland, a third phase began with the Germans trying desperately to break through the allied line in the vicinity of the BEF held salient at Ypres. The reduction of the Ypres salient would shorten German lines, and eliminate a bridgehead across the Yser that the allies could use for a future counter offensive. The Germans were also aware of how thinly spread the BEF was becoming. All of this made the Ypres salient a perfect opportunity for German breakthrough in an otherwise now static front.

With all of this in mind, not only were the objectives in all three major phases completely different, unit composition between the first and second phases were also different and, more importantly, the French had dropped the “cult of the offensive” mentality, so their infantry ratings had to change.6 Therefore, given France .14.s scale, it is impractical to effectively represent the whole entire 1914 conflict in one all encompassing scenario. That is not to say that it is impossible, but any attempt to do so would create an unmanageable experience and any semblance of a historical outcome is doubtful.

6 See the notes about the French Army for more information.

The early campaign covers most of the front line area across France, but it does not cover the relatively static areas in the German 7.Armee and French 1er Armée sector. This area covered the region from Épinal to the Swiss border. Although the front remained relatively static in this area during 1914-18 given the nature of the terrain, it is important to remember the brutal fighting did occur here and that it too was part of the "Western Front".

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The Beligerants
The Belgian Army

Organization
Obtaining correct order of battle information on the Belgian Army of 1914 is a very difficult endeavor. The sources that are available are often conflicting or inaccurate. However, through lengthy research, accurate and reliable sources were discovered. To understand the events of the German invasion of Belgium, there must be a brief mention of the Belgian Army's situation at the outbreak of the conflict.

At the start of 1914, the Belgian Army was in a state of total reorganization and this reorganization was not scheduled to be complete until 1918. Indeed, at first glance the Belgian order of battle will appear odd and even incorrect. Divisions are specified as corps and brigades are specified as divisions. This is indeed intentional and historical. During this period of reorganization, Belgium was looking to expand their army. However, to avoid scaring parliament, who was afraid of all military expenses, it was decided that army corps would temporarily be called “divisions”; the divisions would be called “mixed brigades”. Therefore, in essence, the brigades were an incomplete division in the process of reorganization, and divisions were really the start of the formation of army corps. This also explains why elements of the "divisions" were so scattered across Belgium at the start of the conflict. Having this awkward organization in transition does have its weaknesses as well as its strengths. "Brigades" have difficulty in cooperation with other brigades, however brigades have the command radius of divisional HQs, and divisions have the command radius of Corps HQs.

In time of peace, the Brigade Mixte was comprised of only one infantry regiment. When the regiment was mobilized it would receive the eight youngest draft classes and divide itself to form a second infantry regiment. This would then become the corner stone of the Brigade Mixte. Then, seven of the oldest draft classes7 would form another regiment; a Régiment de Forteresse. The split of the regiments was supposed to occur in 1915 during the middle of the reorganization period; however, it was decided to carry out this split when the army was mobilized. The Belgian Army was already short of officers and equipment, so the result of this split was an influx of inexperienced personnel and an even greater shortage of cadre and equipment. This resulted in a much diluted army that was in no way prepared to face the onslaught of the German war machine. However, no one can deny the tenacity of "brave little Belgium" and even though their mobilization system was flawed, a good part of the Belgian Army is rated as "C" quality with their infantry regiments rated as "D" quality to represent this tenacity.
7 The “oldest draft classes” consisted of men over the age of 30.

The Garde Civique deserves special mention. This unit was a governmental institution that was charged with maintaining law and order and was not related to the regular Belgian Army. The Garde Civique has been omitted from the order of battle for several reasons. The first being that they were in fact only used in maintaining law and order and the second being that they posed no real military threat to the German Army. At the start of the war, the Belgian government decided to withdraw all Garde Civique units to Bruxelles where they were ordered to dig trenches and prepare the city for defense. However, the Germans did not recognize the Garde Civique as part of the Belgian Army and so the Garde Civique decided to surrender their weapons so as not to be classified as combatants.
Miscellanea

The HQ insignia for the Belgian Army are insignia based on traditional military map symbols that denoted the size of unit and the colors are based on national colors.

* * *

The French Army

Organization
The French Army throughout 1914 was an organizational nightmare. Divisions and Corps were uprooted and transplanted where needed, and it quickly became disorganized. Creating the French Army in the order of battle was extremely difficult and took over a year of researching different pieces of the puzzle, as well as countless late night frustration. In the end, the primary source of information was, naturally, Les armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre (AFGG), Thome X, Volumes 1 and 2.

Some might notice that a few corps formations which, at various times had a third "attached" division, may not necessarily have that attachment in their "correct" places in the order of battle.8 Or, in the case of the Groupe de Divisions de Réserve (GDR) formations, some reserve divisions do not appear in their peace time "on paper" organizations, rather they instead appear outside of the GDR. This was only done in cases 8 An example of this is the 3e CA's 38e DI and 10e CA's 37e DI, which was also attached to the 18e CA at some point. where units may have moved around in the organization between armies and various corps which the game cannot otherwise allow. Instead, with these formations as lose entities, it intentionally allows them to be attached to different armies to allow for this historical level of flexibility. It is arguable whether or not these "attached" divisions were actually assigned to a specific corps' organization in game play terms; rather, it is more likely that these divisions were simply temporarily placed under the authority of the corps commander, but not in the actual organization itself. One notable example is the 7e CA. Historically, the 7e CA began the war with the 14e DI and 44e DI. However, around the time of the Battle of the Marne, the 7e CA was transferred to the VIe Armée. When it made this move, the 7e CA's 44e DI remained with the Ier Armée, and the 63e DI, which was previously in the 1er GDR, took its place. This type of restructuring is what caused an immense amount of grief to the point where certain adjustments had to be made, whilst keeping the historical events and possibilities in mind. The end result is that a few units may appear out of place when, in reality, they are located in such a manner to allow them to be attached to different armies, or to allow them to be in historical "war time" organizations.

The late 1914 order of battle9 was the most frustrating of the three orders of battles to research and create. This period, as well as 1915, is what I refer to as the "reorganization and improvisation period", where both sides were evolving to the nature of the conflict and, in many cases, restructuring and rearming their forces as they went. During the Race to the Sea, both sides reorganized themselves as needed to meet the demands of the constantly lengthening front. For the Germans, this primarily meant that corps were reassigned to different armies as the Germans generally kept their order of battle extremely tidy. In contrast, the French made a host of restructuring and reorganization changes which again test the capabilities of the game. The choice was made that the starting organization for the late order of battle is setup to represent the force structure at the start of October, when the late period was generally established from the early 1914 structures. In the late September scenarios, these units are attached to their parent army HQs, to which they originally resided. The intent is that late war scenarios "play out" with some of the organizational changes already in effect in order to help ensure that the battles flow more historically. The user still has the freedom to make their reorganizations, but the historical guideline is in place. Also, any brigade or division that may have been briefly and temporarily attached to a specific corps may not be represented that way in the order of battle. It is rationalized that in these cases of brief attachments, in game play terms it simply means that the units were independent at the army HQ level, capable of working with other corps and divisions within the command. This solution is not perfect, as no solution to this complex issue could be without allowing a complete restructuring freedom of the order of battle from top to bottom, but it does provide a common ground in a period were there was constant change. This could 9 The late order of battle coveres the “Race to the Sea” period, and the Battle of Ypres. have been handled a multitude of other ways but unless there was a different order of battle for every week of the war, this approach is as well as any other when attempting to create a definitive order of battle structure at this level during a period when nothing was definite.

Another late period order of battle issue was with the army level Artillerie Lourde. In October, the French began to realize their shortcoming of indirect-fire-capable artillery, and began to rectify it by bringing old guns out of retirement from forts and stockpiles across the country. Obsolete guns like the 120mm de Bange 1877, and 155mm de Bange 1877, began to see front line use until France could produce enough modern guns to replace them. These guns are presented in the late order of battle, albeit the Artillerie Lourde organization has shifted to a more abstract representation of groupings of guns at the appropriate level that AFGG specifies. During this ad hoc period, the French also had trouble replacing the early losses of 75mm M97 field guns and were also experiencing trouble supplying them with enough ammunition. For this reason they briefly brought two obsolete field guns out of retirement as a stop gap: the 95mm Lahitolle 1875, and the 90mm de Bange 1877. These guns mostly acted as replacements to the RAC field artillery units and, for the sake of practicality, these guns are not represented in the order of battle. All of these guns were relatively quickly replaced as 75mm M97 field gun replacements became available, and as ammunition production began to increase.

Equipment and Training

The French Army in any game, from the Napoleonic Era to the Second World War, is a hot button issue. In France '14, there is no exception. The quality of the French Army and its equipment is taken from several considerations, as is the quality of their attack ratings. It is important to note that it seems to be rather popular to be labeled as "anti French" when describing French weaponry, doctrine, or military capability of the First World War. The following observations are not based upon any bias for or against the French military, they are based solely on research from various sources, and from first hand experience with the weapons they employed. Being a collector of firearms and having over ten years of military experience, it is easy to come to the conclusion of what the different unit ratings should be.

In 1914, the French infantry and machine gun soft attack ratings are the lowest between German and British forces, with the Germans coming in second, and the British being the best of the three. The French are the lowest rated because of their rather poor quality weapons they fielded, and has nothing to do with the individual wielding it. The machine gun used by the French in 1914 was primarily the water cooled 1907 St.Etienne machine gun, which had serious defects. This weapon was highly susceptible to misfeeding because it had an overly complex mechanism. Since the weapon was extremely unreliable and prone to stoppages, French regulations stated that, unless in cases of emergency, only one of the two machine guns in each section was allowed to fire at any one given time. This was done in order to limit the possibility of both weapons being down from a malfunction at the same time, while the crews performed immediate or remedial action. The St.Etienne 1907 was quickly replaced by the Hotchkiss 1914 machine gun, however most sources indicate that the Hotchkiss 1914's adoption was never really complete until early or middle 1915, while other sources indicate that it did not occur until as late as 1916. Because of this, and the general uncertainty of what the vast number of units were equipped with, machine gun ratings for the French are that of the St.Etienne 1907. It is worth mentioning that another machine gun already in service, the Hotchkiss 1900, was far better than the St.Etienne 1907 but at the time the Hotchkiss 1900 was too expensive given that the St.Etienne was a government made weapon at government owned and operated factories. The Hotchkiss 1900 was produced by a privately owned company and, because of this, the cost per unit was much higher than that of the St.Etienne, so the St.Etienne received the nod.


The standard French Army rifle in 1914 was the Lebel Model 1886. The rifle was extremely advanced when it was introduced in 1886, being the first to incorporate a small caliber bullet and smokeless powder, but by 1914 it was obsolete and clumsy. The Lebel M1886 was almost six feet long with bayonet attached and weighted nearly ten pounds unloaded. It had an awkwardly designed eight round magazine, consisting of a longitudinal tube underneath the barrel. The magazine was difficult and extremely time consuming to load, taking over one minute to replenish under ideal circumstances. After the eight round magazine was emptied, practicality forced the soldier to manually insert single rounds into the breach to fire, since the amount of time to reload the magazine was unfeasible when subjected to enemy fire. This greatly reduced the rate of fire of a French infantryman to as much as one half the level of his rivals, the latter employing rifles equipped with box magazines with quick loading stripper clips. As if this were not enough, as the rifle's oddly designed longitudinal magazine was depleted, the center of gravity of the weapon would shift dramatically. In modern rifles, it is now known that having a perfectly balanced weapon with a constant center of gravity is critical to maintaining accuracy. The shift in the Lebel's center of gravity as the magazine was
depleted would cause the weapon to become off balance and disrupt the firer's aim point. All of these problems were not fully rectified until 1915 when the Lebel-Berthier M1907/15 rifle was adopted, which featured a box magazine and a Mannlicher-type clip for rapid reloading. However, the Lebel M1886 would still remain in service with second line French units throughout The Great War, although these second line units began to supplement it with other weapons later on. Taken by itself, the Lebel Model 1886 rifle was bad enough on influencing a low soft attack rating for French infantry, however this is not the only cause. The French infantry in 1914 frequently employed a tactic where they would quickly pop up from cover and conduct rapid fire until their magazine was depleted, then they would take cover and reload (rafale). This tactic resulted in a poor distribution of fire, massive expense of ammunition, and extremely poor accuracy.

The French Army was almost totally lacking in indirect artillery support at the time of 1914. However, the French Army employed the best field gun in the world: the 75mm Model 1897. This gun was a marvel of technology at the time; the Mle 1897 utilized a French copy of a German designed10 long recoil hydraulic brake, which allowed for a stable firing platform during rapid fire. This allowed the gun to be fired rapidly and with great precision since the gun did not require frequent relaying. It is certainly true that the German and British field guns featured similar characteristics; however the real strength of the French 75mm Field Gun was in its rate of fire. The German Field Kannone 96 fired approximately five rounds a minute, and the British 18 pounder fired nine rounds a minute. The French Mle 1897 field gun fired a remarkable fifteen rounds a minute, and even up to thirty rounds a minute in emergencies and when sufficient ammo was available.
10 Konrad Haussner. 11 The pre “Race to the Sea” period.

The French infantry in the early order of battle11 are blessed with the highest assault rating of all infantry, but are cursed with having the lowest defense rating. This is formulated from several conditions, but the largest factors have to do with the "cult of the offensive" doctrine of the early period of 1914. Following the French capitulation after in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, the officers at the École de Guerre came up with the opinion that they had been defeated because they had surrendered tactical, moral, and strategic initiative to the Germans before the battle even began. Their answer to this was that in the next conflict the French would launch immediate attacks on all fronts, theoretically causing the enemy to stretch their resources and force them to constantly be on the defensive. A vocal French officer that supported this view, Colonel de Grandmaison, has been quoted as saying, "In an attack only two things are necessary: to know where the enemy is, and to decide what to do. What the enemy intends to do is of no consequence." This type of mentality, combined with the doctrine of all out attack, nearly led to complete disaster. With indifference to the enemy's intentions, the French of the early 1914 campaign approached tactical situations with the surgical precision of a sledgehammer. Doctrinally, the French answer to most tactical dilemmas was to mass into dense formation with bayonets fixed, and surge forward to deliver cold steel to the enemy. It was thought that the massed attack delivered with unflinching determination would prevail in any situation. To represent this severe vulnerability created by their “cult of the offensive” doctrine, French infantry have the lowest defense rating out of the other belligerents. In the late order of battle, the French had abandoned the flawed "cult of the offensive" doctrine, and this is reflected in the game by French infantry assault and defense values fluctuating back to a more standard level in comparison to the other belligerents, thus making French infantry less effective in assaults but more effective in the defense.
The French system of reserves was very different from that of the strict and highly organized system used by the German Army. Upon completion of active service in the French Army, soldiers passed into the Reserve for eleven years of additional service. At mobilization, the first two reserve classes (soldiers who were on their first of second year of being in the Reserve) where used to fill out the ranks of the Active Army formations to bring them up to war strength, and were utilized as replacements from depots. The remaining nine classes of reservists were used to form reserve units. This meant that the actual reserve formations contained a mixture of personnel who were anywhere from three to eleven years out of active service. To make matters worse, there were very few experienced NCOs and officers in the reserve and exceptions for annual training for reservists was granted liberally so that it is estimated that only 25% of those called back
for training actually appeared. This meant that the French reservist quickly became "demilitarized" once he exited the Active Army. This "system" of reserves was the polar opposite of the German system which was filled with high quality cadres and excellent discipline.12 Terence Zuber, The Battle of the Frontiers: Ardennes 1914, 85. See the German Army section of the notes for information on the German system of reserves. 13 ie. RM 2e Zouaves. 14 ie. 2e RMZ.

Miscellanea

With interest in keeping historical accuracy, you may notice that the Zouaves and Tirailleurs Regiments and Battalions adopt a new naming system in the late 1914 order of battle. In the early 1914 order of battle "RM" appeared before the regimental number13 where as in late 1914 the naming system changed to include "RM" in a full abbreviation following the regimental number.14

The HQ insignia for the French Army are insignia based on traditional military map symbols that denoted the size of unit and the colors are based on national colors.

For maximum chrome, the numbering system of French armies and corps are in accordance with AFGG, the official French history of the war. This means that French armies are numbered with roman numerals and French corps are numbered with Arabic numerals, which is basically the opposite of other armies of the period. This keeps it consistent with official French documents and adds a more historical flavor and uniqueness to the order of battle.

046.Lipovac – 29 May 1944 – 18 turns
“Help From The Skies”
Near Lipovac, 15 KM West of Mitrovica, Croatia

Although "Operation Rösselsprung" is largely known for the daring airborne assault on Drvar; there were many small battles in different parts of Bosnia and Croatia. In most of these battles, Tito's partisans desperately tried to slow the axis forces and gain time for their comrades trying to disengage and seek shelter
in the mountains. As another interesting note, allied air forces assisted the partisan forces during these hard times. The assistance was generally limited with supply of food and ammunition but it had significant effect on the morale of the partisans.

One such event occurred near the village of Lipovac located at the Crotaia - Serbia Border. On 29 May, four days after the raid on Drvar, a partisan company from the 1st Proletarian Brigade was protecting the area near Lipovac in order to provide cover for the general headquarters’ withdrawal. On 14:00hrs, a combat group from the 7.SS Mountain Division "Prinz Eugen" attacked the partisan positions. Running out of ammunition, partisans had strict orders to hold fire until the last moment.

The partisan group resisted fiercely against the superior German fire power; until their ammunition dried. At the very moment the partisan commander prepared for a final hand to hand fight, allied aircraft appeared on the sky dropping canisters full of ammunition. There started another struggle for reaching the canisters before SS troops overrun their positions.

047.Chernyavka – 23 June 1944 – 20 turns
“Paving the Way to Bobruisk”
Berezina River, 40 KM Southeast of Bobruisk

Operation Bagration's purpose was the envelopment of the German Army Group Center in Belorussia by two attacking Soviet forces: a northern force comprised of two fronts and commanded by Marshal Alexander
Vasilevsky, and a southern force, also containing two fronts, commanded by Marshal Georgi Zhukov. The battle for Bobruisk was the first phase of the southern force's mission, and would form the penetration that would allow Zhukov to pursue and envelop German forces from the south. The city of Bobruisk site astride
important crossing sites on the Berezina River, and was key to Zhukov's success in the operation.

14th Rifle Division, part of the 65th Army, was given the mission to seize one of the key crossing sites south of Bobruisk to allow the First Guards Tank Corps to pass to the west. Opposing the division on the west side of the Berezina was a regiment from the 35th Infantry Division, supported by batteries of 105mm howitzers.

The 14th Division commander General Mitka Biryokov developed a tactical plan based on concentration of forces and artillery into a single point in the German lines. Biryokov lacked overwhelming force ratio required for a river crossing. He did, however, have heavy artillery concentration behind his lines. Therefore the key, surmised Biryokov was to gain overwhelming advantage at the decisive point. With the first lights of the attack day, Russian artillery began pounding the German positions across the river. Under cover of smoke, troops from the 242nd Rifle Regiment led the attack.

048.Volkovo – 23 June 1944 – 20 turns
“Hammer Falls Over Sturm”
Near Volkovo, 12 KM Northeast of Dubrovno

While the 39th Army was trying to envelop Vitebsk on its right wing, General Galitskii's 11th Guards Army attacked through the Orsha axis on the first day of the Operation Bagration, the great summer offensive on the German Army Group Center. On 23 June, the 36th Guards Rifle Corps launched its attack to open the way for the waiting armor of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps. The Russian troops had difficulties in advancing on the marshy terrain between Volkovo and Dubrovno.

The German line facing the 39th Guards Rifle Corps was defended by a powerful unit, the 78th Sturm Division an elite formation with special equipment and more firepower. However the unit has the unenviable task of standing directly on the way of the 3rd Belorussian Front. The Soviet attack started with a heavy artillery barrage that shook the ground in all sectors for miles. At 07:00 supported closely by heavy assault guns and flamethrower tanks, the leading 16th Guards Rifle Division sent waves of infantry on the well entrenched positions of the 14. Sturm Regiment.

049.Makarova – 24 June 1944 – 16 turns
“A Gaping Hole”
Makarova, 17 KM Northeast of Orsha

At the initial phase, Operation Bagration aimed to encircle key defensive points like Vitebsk, Mogilev and Bobruisk by coordinated pincer moves. While those pincer moves were pinning the German defenses Stavka
planned another breakthrough at Orsha, the very center of the defenses of the Army Group Center. The task of capturing Orsha was given to General Cherniakovskii's 3rd Byelorussian front. Orsha sector was defended by the strong 78th Sturm Division which had additional heavy weapons and armor.

On 23 June the heavy Russian hammer fell on the German lines. 8th Guards Rifle Corps supported by hundreds of aircrafts and artillery hit the German lines hard. 78th Sturm Division resisted fiercely. However at the end of the first day German defenses were stretched too far. On 24 June, Russian attack intensified at the area between Dubrovno and Orsha. Russian troops were trying to force a breakthrough at the road and rail line leading Orsha. German command frantically gathered troops to support the creaking line. However Russian pressure was too much to handle. General Chernov's 26th Guards Rifle Division, supported by armor including the fearful flamethrower tanks renewed their efforts to punch a hole in the German line. By noon, Russian attack was clearly threatening the communications of the Sturm Division. General Traut sent his only reserve, the Aufklarung Abteilung to block the Russian advance at the town of Makarova.

050.Senno – 25 June 1944 – 20 turns
“Standing Against the Red Tide”
Senno, 60 KM Southwest of Vitebsk

During the planning for Operation Bagration the Oslikovskiy Cavalry-Mechanized Group was assigned the role of leading the drive through the gap created by the 3rd Byelorussian Front at Bogushevsk. Smashing or bypassing the German resistance pockets, the mobile group was ordered to reach their initial objectives at Berezina near Borisov in two days. As the spearhead of the mobile group, 3rd Mechanized Corps' drive towards Berezina began on 23 June after wide gaps had been opened in the German lines by the initial Soviet assault north of Orsha. By the end of the day Bogushevsk was in Russian hands. Soviet armor lost no time and continued their advance westwards.

German command hopelessly tried to plug the gap between Vitebsk and Orsha. The German counterattack by Panzergruppe Hoppe was beaten by the Russian AT gun screen deployed on the Bogushevsk-Senno road. On 25 June, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps overran the 299th Infantry Division. By 0700 the 3rd Mechanized Corps captured Senno. Cavalry and tanks continued their attack in the direction of Smolyany. The German 2nd Security Regiment was deployed between Senno and Smolyany to delay the Soviet advance so the shattered front could recover behind Berezina.

051.Simanovichi – 27 June 1944 – 22 turns
“The Escape Door”
Simanovichi, Bobruysk-Slutsk Road

On the third anniversary of the invasion of Russia, Josef Stalin launched a massive onslaught of Red Army forces against Army Group Centre on June 23, 1944. Waves of troops crashed the thin German lines, first in the north, and then progressively farther south until Marshal Rokossovsky's 1st Byelorussian Front attacked the German Ninth Army, just north of the Pripyat marshes.

As the German defenses began to crumble, Rokossovsky committed his southernmost breakthrough group, a cavalry-mechanized unit commanded by General Lieutenant Pliyev. Slipping between the Soviet 28th and 65th Armies, Pliev Cavalry Group raced for the heavy bridge over the Ptich River, which would be the most likely escape route for the tens of thousands of German soldiers fleeing the front from Bobruysk, to the next
city further west, Slutsk. German ad-hoc units formed mainly from security regiments tried to block the Russian cavalry in a swampy terrain just to gain more time for the retreating 9th Army.

052.Slutsk – 28 June 1944 – 18 turns
“Tank Cavalry at Slutsk”
Near Slutsk, Bobruisk-Baranovichi Road

After shattering 9th Army's lines near Bobruisk, Konstantin Rokossovsky, commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, committed his exploitation force, the powerful Pliyev Cavalry Group, into action. Pliyev's tanks and cavalry stormed the German defenses behind the Berezina River and kept their momentum in the marshlands of Pripyat.

On 27 June, the 1st Mechanized Corps moved into Glusk, sweeping aside the remnants of the German 35. Infantry Division. By 1700, Soviet armor was pouring through a gap at Glusk in the direction of Slutsk. A very important railway junction, Slutsk was vital for the Soviets maintaining momentum towards Baranovichi and later, Minsk. Frantically gathering reserves from other sectors, German command committed a newly arrived paratrooper unit, Kampfgruppe Schirmer to block the seemingly unstoppable Russian spearhead before Slutsk.

053.Vidzy – 15 July 1944 – 14 turns
“Roadblock to Dvinsk”
Vidzy-Girejsy-Dvinsk Road, Western Belsrus

The Russian Summer offensive shattered the Army Group Center and virtually destroyed two German Armies in two weeks. The success was so overwhelming that Russian spearheads have found their way to Eastern Poland and Baltic Coast open. German High Command sent its scarce reserves to delay the Russian advance while the Red Army's armored columns were exploiting the huge holes on the German Front.

On 15 July, 89th Tank Brigade, the leading unit of the 1st Tank Corps of General Butkov were reconing on
the axis of Dvinsk in the Northernwestern Belarus. The swampy and wooded topography was ideal for ambushes and rearguard actions. Although Soviet tankers were fully alert of the German presence, they had little chance to spot a roadblock before Germans open fire. At noon, leading T34s were cautiously approaching towards a village which looked to be a very suitable position for an ambush.

054.Wolomin – 03 August 1944 – 18 turns
“Holding to Vistula”
Wolomin-Okuniew Road, 20 KM East of Warsaw

The lightening summer campaign brought the Russian armies to the Vistula River at the end of July 1944. Although most of the infantry armies were bogging down with logistical problems and exhaustion from continuous action, the mechanized spearheads pushed one more time to gain footholds at the Vistula. On 28 July 1994, Maj. Gen. A. I. Radzievsky's 2nd Tank Army, which had been turned north from the Magnuszew region to strike at Warsaw, engaged German 73rd Infantry Division and the Hermann Goering Panzer Division 40 kilometers southeast of Warsaw. Unaware of the presence of strong armored forces on their right flank, 3rd Tank Corps pushed aside the resistance and attacked towards the key towns of Wolomin and Radzymin.

Beginning on 30 July, Field Marshal W. Model, the commander of Army Group Center, organized counterattacks on the Russian armored spearheads that were forcing their way towards Warsaw. On 3 August, Germans committed the 4th Panzer Division and the 5th SS Panzer Division "Viking" into the fight.
Both formations struck at the critical Okuniew - Wolomin axis to disrupt enemy movement and isolate the forward units.

On 3 August; Oberscharführer Gerhard Fischer, a decorated tank ace from the Jagdpanzer Abteilung "Viking", moved his Jagdpanzer IV to a road junction near Wolomin. His orders were to intercept the Russian armor moving to his direction and gain time for the entire division which was still on the move. Fischer was supported by a company of panzergrenadiers from the regiment "Germania". With the rising sun, the SS troopers defending the road junction were alerted by the tank engine sounds from the 50th Tank Brigade, the leading unit of the 3rd Tank Corps.

055.Basinow – 06 August 1944 – 16 turns
“Stalins to the Rescue”
Basinow, Magnuzsew Bridgehead

The Soviet attack on Lublin-Brest axis has caught the German command, which was preoccupied with the disaster in Belarussia, off-guard. On July, 1st Belorussian front’s attack from Pripet marshes achieved a quick penetration and Russian spearheads reached the Vistula River in 6 days. While overstretched lines started to slow down the Russian advance, Chuikov’s 8th Guards Army managed to capture a bridgehead at Magnuzsew south of Warsaw on 2 August.

As expected, German response to the Russian presence on the Western side of the Vistula river was violent. 1132nd Volksgrenadier Brigade and 19th Panzer Division launched strong counterattacks from Warka on the eastern side of the Magnuzsew Bridgehead. 45th Volksgrenadier and 17th Infantry Divisions hit the southern flank of the Russian lines. On 5 August, Herman Goering Panzer Division joined the attack on the South. Germans captured Mariampol and Grabnowola and threatened the fragile bridgehead. 4th Guards Rifle Corps
desperately organized new defense lines to delay the enemy advance. Chuikov's main problem was getting his armor on the Western side of the Vistula. 8th Guards Army's pontoon bridges have been under constant air attacks.

On 6 August, Herman Goering's spearheads reached the Russian lines at Basinow and Celinow, 6 km south
of Magnuzsew, where elements of the 35th Guards Rifle Division were deployed. German infantry launched the assault with support from the Panzer Regiment. The same day Russians managed to pass two heavy JSII tanks over the Vistula under heavy bombardment. Chuikov immediately sent the giants to support the hard pressed infantry.

056.Kielce – 16 August 1944 – 18 turns
“Panthers Forward!”
Kielce-Opatow Road, Southern Poland

During the nights of 13 and 14 August 1944 the 3rd Panzer Division detrained at Kielce in southern Poland. The division's mission was to stop the advance of the Russian forces that had broken through the German lines during the collapse of Army Group Center and to assist the withdrawing German formations building up a new defense line near the upper Vistula. The force was to be led by the 2nd Panzer Battalion consisting of two panzer companies, equipped with Panther tanks, one armored infantry company mounted in armored personnel carriers, and one battery equipped with self-propelled 105mm howitzers.

On 16 August, the leading panzer company under the command of Hauptman Zobel deployed on the Kielce Opatow Road near a heavy bridge. After losing one Panther with the first Russian antitank fire Hauptman
Zobel sent one column southwards for a diversion around a hill dominating the bridge and the village. Unknown to the German commander, the hill was occupied and the Russian troops spotted the diversion early.

057.Jassy – 21 August 1944 – 20 turns
“A Shattering Alliance”
Mare Ridge, 20 KM Southwest of Jassy, Northeastern Romania

The Second Jassy-Kishinev Offensive which aimed the capitulation of Romania and penetration to the Balkan Flank was led off with a massive artillery barrage and air strikes on the axis positions at the Moldovia-Romania Border. General Trofimenko's 27th Army tore a huge gap by destroying the majority of the Romanian 4th Army west of Jassy and started pushing the German 6th Army towards Southeast into a pocket. Early as 10:00, 2nd Ukrainian Front Commander, Gen. Malinovsky committed Kravchenko's 6th Tank Army into the breach.

5th Guards Tank Corps and 5th Mechanized Corps drove south in full speed to gain operational freedom behind the enemy lines. By nightfall, the Russian spearheads reached the third line of the enemy defenses. The wooded "Mare Ridge" was a focal point in the axis defense system in this sector. The ridge was defended by the elements of the German 76th Infantry Division supported by a Rumanian mountain brigade. On 21 August, Colonel Shutov's 20th Guards Tank Brigade launched its attack on this tough enemy position and last line of resistance.

058.Domasin – 31 August 1944 – 25 turns
“A Determined French Lot”
Domasin Heights, Strecno Gap, Slovakia

In 29 August 1944, Slovakian resistance groups launched a national uprising against the German control and the collaborationist government of Jozef Tiso. Based at Banská Bystrica, the rebel army captured two airfields and key road junctions to disrupt the German moves. Heinrich Himmler has sent Obergruppenfuhrer
Gottlob Berger with the task of suppressing the uprising. Berger hastily gathered troops from different parts of Germany and launched immediate attacks on the partisan held cities and passes.

As part of the German countermoves, Kampfgruppe von Ohlen advanced towards Zilina Garrison in order to penetrate the rebel base at Vrutky. Facing, a superior enemy, Slovak Partisans retreated to a favorable position on the hills dominating the meanders of the Vah River. One of the key points in the Slovakian lines was a wooded ridge known as the Domasin Heights. Controlling the roads and the railway tunnel leading into the rebel held valley, Domasin Heights was the primary objective for Colonel von Ohlen.

Interestingly, the hill line was defended not by the Slovaks but French troops under the command of Captain Lannurien. French troops were composed of ex-POWs and labor camp workers; determined to stand against anything the hated Germans send against them. On 31 August, after a brief artillery barrage, German infantry, followed by panzers and assault guns started their advance into the pass. Far away from their country, French soldiers were waiting for them.

059.Radzymin – 10 October 1944 – 16 turns
“Gates of Warsaw”
Radzymin, 20 KM East of Warsaw

The Russian successes in the summer battles brought the Red Army spearheads to the gates of Warsaw on the Eastern side of the Vistula. On 29 July, the 5th Guards Tank Army took Siedlce. The 3rd Guards Tank Corps fought its way to Okunie and Volokin. German command sent the IV.SS Panzer Korps in order to restore the shattered front. SS divisions "Totenkopf" and "Wiking" launched counterattacks towards Radzymin and temporarily halted the Russian advance. Totenkopf immediately organized a defense around the city of Radzymin. The area remained silent until October. On 10 October, Russian troops renewed their offensive to take the key road junction at Radzymin.

060.Cegled – 03 November 1944 – 20 turns
“Bitter Lesson at Cegled”
Halasztelep, Cegled-Orkeny Road, 70 KM South of Budapest

The 1944 Balkan summer offensive has brought the Red Army to the outskirts of the Hungarian capital in October. Soviet armies have destroyed most of the Hungarian Army and mauled the few German panzer divisions that tried to plug every gap on the front. Eager to capture the Hungarian capital and force the Hungarians out of the war, Stalin has ordered one more push towards the capital. Malinovsky, the commander of the 2nd Ukrainian Front replied that his troops needed at least 5 days to prepare which was declined by Stalin, however, who insisted for an immediate attack.

The Russian attack began on October 29th. The mechanized spearheads opened several large holes in the frontline held by the demoralized Hungarian divisions on the first day. However, the Russian push turned out to be a sluggish advance due to a deep autumn mud and logistical problems. The Soviet spearheads' advance towards Budapest created a narrow bulge which was dangerously thin on the flanks since the rifle divisions were unable to keep up the pace. The situation provided a good opportunity for the axis mobile reserves who had learned the art of counterattack after 4 years on the East Front.

On November 3rd, a combined kampfgruppe from the Hungarian 1st Armored Division supported by the elements of the 24th Panzer Division, attacked to penetrate the Russian left flank near the Orkeny - Cegled road. The advance outposts of the 14th Guards Mechanized Brigade have found themselves in a vicious fight to hold the lines against their old foes.

061.Goldap – 03 November 1944 – 20 turns
“Sturmpioneers at Goldap”
Mount Goldap, Eastern Prussia

During the autumn of 1944 the German Fourth Army was engaged in defensive fighting around Gumbinnen in East Prussia. After the Russian 88th Guards Division had succeeded in occupying the town of Goldap on 21 October, the Russian front line formed a salient skirting Goldap. Approximately 2 miles south of Goldap the Russians had occupied an advance position on Mount Goldap which had a commanding view of the surrounding territory. Toward the end of October the commander of the Fourth Army was ordered to retake Goldap.

The plan the German Command drew up called for an envelopment to be launched early on 3 November with the 50th Infantry Division advancing from the southeast while the Fuehrer Escort Brigade was simultaneously driving down from the northwest. To eliminate any threat to the flank of the 50th Infantry Division from the direction of Mount Goldap, the assault engineer battalion directly subordinate to Fourth Army was given the mission of attacking and seizing the forward Russian position from the south.

The Russian advance position on Mount Goldap consisted of a continuous fortified line situated halfway up the southern slope between the two roads leading from Goldap to Angerburg and Szczuczyn, respectively. The summit had been transformed into a strong point with all-around defenses. The main position on the southern slope was protected by wire entanglements, while the approaches to the hill were heavily mined. To achieve maximum surprise, the engineers were to attack Mount Goldap on 3 November, without the usual artillery preparation at daybreak.

During the preceding night the battalion assembled directly south of the hill. During the last hours before
dawn mine-clearing teams succeeded in clearing several lanes through the mine field. Promptly at 0700 the battalion launched its attack in a misty and cold day break. It soon became obvious that the Russians had observed the activities of the mine-clearing teams and redeployed their machine guns to cover the German axis of advance.

062.Polgardi – 23 December 1944 – 18 turns
“Fire Brigade at the Margit Line”
Polgardi, 16 KM Southwest of Szekesfehervar, Hungary

The Soviet offensive aiming the encirclement of Budapest was started on 20 December 1944. Despite the bad weather, the northern pincer, Malinovsky's 7th Guards Army broke through towards Esztergom on the first day, and the 6th Guards Tank Army, under General Kravchenko, took Leva and crossed the Gran river on the second day. The southern pincer, Tolbukhin's 3rd Ukrainian Front launched its assault on the Margit Line East of Lake Balaton after a heavy artillery barrage. On the same day, Tolbukhin's forces achieved a penetration 5 km wide. 7th Mechanized Corps slipped through the narrow penetration and captured the important road junction at Szekesfehervar.

Despite the success, southern pincer's penetration was narrow and vulnerable on the flanks. Colonel-General Maximilian Fretter-Pico, commander of the German 6th Army, organized counterattacks on the flanks of the Russian penetration. Breith's III. Panzer Korps launched furious attacks on the left flank of Tolbukhin's forces that were trying to advance northwards toward Budapest.

Polgardi, a small farming town 16 km southwest of Szekesfehervar had been saved from the destruction of the war. On December 1944, it suddenly became a frontline. As a key position guarding the left flank of the Soviet advance, the town witnessed heavy fighting. In three days, Polgardi changed hands seven times. This scenario depicts the German counterattack led by the elements of the 503rd Heavy Panzer Detachment on 23 December.

1945

063.Biejkov – 16 January 1945 – 20 turns
“No Time for Excuses”
Biejkov, Pilica River, 18 KM Southwest of Warka

With the first lights of 14 January, two days after Koniev's attack at Sandomierz, 1st Belorussian Front commenced its assault from the Magnuszew Bridgehead south of Warsaw. On the left, 8th Guards Army stormed through the shattering German front. Despite German counterattacks by the two reserve Panzer divisions (25th and 19th) Soviet forces achieved a clean breakthrough by noon. At this point, the front commander Zhukov released Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army which slipped through the hole in the enemy
lines and advanced westwards towards Lodz.

The leading unit of the 1st Guards Tank Army was Colonel Gusakovskii's 44th Guards Tank Brigade. The dashing colonel reached the Pilica River on the night of 15-16 January. Having immediate orders to secure
passings on the River Pilica, Gusakovskii sent his mechanized infantry over the frozen river on foot. Engineers found a ford and blew a lane through the ice for the tanks. Meanwhile, the Soviet infantry formed a perimeter near Biejkov on the other side of the river. Without heavy weapons and armor they waited for the German counterattack. On 16 January, 25th Panzer Division launched a heavy assault from the direction of Bialobrzegi.

064.Mniszek – 16 January 1945 – 20 turns
“Get the Ball Rolling”
Mniszek, 20 KM West of Radom, Poland

Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front opened its attack on the German Ninth Army from the Magnuszew and Pulawy bridgeheads at 08:30 on January 14 after a heavy bombardment. At Pulawy, The 33rd and 69th Armies gained a 30 km breakthrough in the direction of Radom. 69th Army's attack was particularly successful and the defending LVI Panzer Korps disintegrated under heavy pressure on its flanks. Limited
counterattacks by the 19th Panzer Division were repulsed and by the end of the day Soviet infantry captured Radom. At this point, Zhukov released the 11th Tank Corps, the exploitation force of the 69th Army, which rolled on towards the Radomka and Pilica Rivers.

On 16 January, spearheading tanks from the 65th Tank Brigade reached the Radomka River and engaged in a fight against the elements of the 19th Panzer Division. At noon, an armored probe aimed at the bridge at Mniszek was stopped by a German anti-tank screen. The Soviet commander sent a detachment of tanks southwards to outflank the German positions. At 13:00, with the help of some sappers, an armored detachment managed to cross the river and outflanked the German garrison Mniszek. The local German command reacted by sending elements of the 27th Panzer Regiment to counter this threat.
065.Pilica – 20 January 1945 – 18 turns
“Nehring's Roving Cauldron”
Pilica River, 6 KM South of Tomaszow, Central Poland

In January 1945, General Walther Nehring was commanding the XXIV Panzer Korps which was built around the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions. The Korps was deployed to the south of Kielce as an operational reserve of the 4th Panzer Army facing Koniev's forces in the massive Sandomierz Bridgehead on the Vistula. When the 1st Ukrainian Front burst out from the bridgehead on January 12th, both panzer divisions engaged in heavy fighting in order to hold the front together near Kielce. However, on 15 January, Soviet pressure on both sides of Kielce started to isolate the German armored units. Nehring continued the fighting at Kielce until 17 January to gain time for the retreating infantry divisions. On 17 January, after joining with the elements of the LXII Army Korps, Nehring turned northeast to escape the Russian pincer.

For the next 3 days Nehring's cauldron fought its way to reach the friendly positions behind the Pilica River. Using mainly secondary roads and avoiding contact with large enemy concentrations, Nehring's isolated army reached Pilica River at the night of 19 January and located a wooden bridge between the towns of Sulechow and Tomaszow. Most of the German infantry crossed the bridge while engineers were improving its structure to support heavy vehicles and armor. A couple of kilometers to the east, Nehring's rearguard
consisting of the 342nd Infantry Division and 16th Panzer Division occupied high ground to block or delay any Russian probe. On 20 January, after a snowy night, forward units of the 11th Tank Corps advancing from Pulawy Bridgehead towards Lodz caught the German column.

066.Kortau – 21 January 1945 – 18 turns
“A Shocking Parade”
Kortau, Allenstein Suburbs, East Prussia

During the Soviet offensive into East Prussia, Konstantin Rokossosvky's 2nd Belorussian Front shifted north from the bridgehead at Narew. The change of direction caught the 3rd Panzer Army unprepared. On 21 January, Rokossovsky's right wing spearhead, the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps reached the outskirts of Allenstein without much opposition.

As a result of Goebbels' propaganda, native population had no idea that Red Army was so near and civilians were shocked when the leading elements of the crack 5th Guards Cavalry Division entered the suburb district of Kortau.

The cavalry stormed the town and brushed aside the weak volksturm resistance. A breakthrough to the North on the direction of Konigsberg seemed inevitable. At this vital moment, a recon detachment from the GrossDeutschland Division counterattacked the Russian cavalry.

067.Liebenow – 17 February 1945 – 20 turns
“The Last Offensive”
Liebenow, 20 KM East of Arnswalde

After defeating the German Army at Vistula and conquering Poland and Pomerania, Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front stopped to regroup at Stargard. Due to slow advance of Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front on its right; Zhukov's forces had to deploy in a bulge shape with a vulnerable flank near Stettin. General Heinz Guderian sought the opportunity to hit Zhukov's forces there. Operation
Sonnenwende (Solstice) consisted of a limited counter-attack by the three corps of the 11th SS Panzer Army (Felix Steiner), which was being assembled in Pomerania, against the spearheads of the 1st Belorussian Front. The German forces would initially attack along a fifty km front around Stargard south-eastwards towards Arnswalde, destroying the spearheads of the 61st Army and the 2nd Guards Tank Army, and reaching their ultimate objective at Kustrin.

As part of the 3rd (Germanic) SS Panzer Corps, Führer Begleit Division launched its attack on 17 February and captured Reetz after intense fighting and heavy losses. Led by the 102nd Panzer Regiment, Führer Begleit pushed southwards to capture the town of Liebenow and secure the eastern flank of the entire operation. At noon, the German spearheads approaching Liebenow reported enemy tanks in the town. Those units were part of the 47th Guards Tank Brigade which was sent to delay the German advance on this axis. Having lost the element of surprise, the German command had no choice but attack and hope for the best.

068.Oder – 28 February 1945 – 18 turns
“Oder Bridgehead”
Oder River, 20 KM South of Frankfurt an der Oder

In early February 1945, after the collapse of the German front in Poland in January, the Russian advance ground to a temporary halt east of the Oder River. During February, Russians attempted several breakthroughs near Frankfurt. All of them were repulsed by the stiff German resistance and difficult topography. However, Russians continued their efforts to establish a bridgehead that was going to support the upcoming spring offensive for Berlin; where German command brought ad-hoc units in order to plug the
gaps on the long Oder front.

The 32.SS Grenadier Division, an improvised infantry formation was deployed on the west bank south of Frankfurt an der Oder. Composed of diverse formations such as security guards, SS units, Volkssturm battalions, training classes and children from the Hitlerjugend organization, the 32.SS Grenadier Division was assigned to a 6 km sector along a river bend that formed a salient approximately 15 km south of Frankfurt.

The night of 27-28 February was marked by poor visibility, rain, and strong winds. At 0300 a strong Russian
patrol crossed the river at the north end of the salient on rafts without being observed by the Germans and broke into the positions of the German left flank. The Germans were unaware of the existence of the bridgehead until 0400, when they suddenly heard the engine sounds of Russian tanks that crossed the river on ferries. To block any further enemy advance, the German regimental commander ordered two companies to assemble near the woods blocking the northern approaches. At 0530 the German infantry near the woods
were attacked by a force driving from the north.

069.Golzow – 22 March 1945 – 22 turns
“Encounter of the Beasts”
Golzow, 12 KM NW of Kustrin

While the battle inside the fortress Kustrin was still raging, the 5th Shock Army and the 8th Guards Army began their operations along the autobahn linking Kustrin to Seelow. On the western side of Oder, the 56th Panzer Korps were standing on their way. The most powerful unit in the German OOB was a kampfgruppe from the "Brandenburg" Panzergrenadier Division. The armored kampfgruppe equipped with Panthers and
King Tigers, engaged in a heavy and costly battle against the Soviet spearheads forcing their way towards Neu Tucheband and Seelow. The counterattack by the panzer group stopped the Russian armor on both side of the autobahn. Stopped dead on their tracks, the Russians tried their chances on the Northern flank.

General Berzarin, the commander of the 5th Shock Army, sent the 47th Guards Rifle Division to outflank the German formations around the Kustrin - Seelow autobahn. The guardsmen were closely supported by the tanks from the 50th Heavy Tank Regiment. The Soviet attack focused on the town of Golzow which was defended by a thin line of infantry from the headquarters company. Four Panthers from the Kampfgruppe "Brandenburg" were providing support for the grenadiers. The heavy artillery and katyusha barrage surprised
the German troops in Golzow. A line of T34s started their advance under the artillery barrage. Russian infantry and heavy armor were following them closely.

070.Kleschkau – 22 March 1945 – 16 turns
“Claw of the Panther”
Kleschkau, Near Danzig, Pomerania

At the end of 1944, the 4th Panzer Division was transferred from Courland to Danzig. The division was deployed in the area between Danzig and Stargard where it involved in heavy defensive fighting. The unit no longer existed as a cohesive entity; rather, elements from the 35th Panzer Regiment were sent to different sectors to help the grenadiers that were struggling under the heavy attacks by General Vlasov's 2nd Shock Army. On March, one panzer company led by Leutnant Tautorus, had been split up into small fire brigades and placed under the command of various grenadier units south of Danzig.

Oberfeldwebel Herman Bix, one of the top aces of the Panzerwaffe, was commanding a platoon under Tautorus command. The company had no battle ready tanks left but they were given six new Jagdpanthers that had been originally destined for an assault gun company. Bix who had achieved ace status in a Panther,
has found another deadly weapon with an excellent gun.

On 22 March 1945, near Kleschkau, Bix had taken up a position with his Jagdpanther at the edge of the village overlooking the positions grenadiers recently abandoned. He had orders for covering the infantry's withdrawal and stopping a possible enemy probe into the town. Other two Jagdpanthers of his command were deployed at the rear due to supply problems. All cover Bix enjoyed was a small platoon of panzer crews who had no tanks to use. At 08:00, Bix's patience paid off. A column of lend lease Sherman tanks
appeared down the road. It was time for Herman Bix to show his skills behind an even deadlier gun.

071.Seelow – 17 April 1945 – 28 turns
“Brauer's Hardest Hour”
Seelow Heights, Kustrin-Berlin Autobahn

9. Fallschirmjäger Division was formed in December 1944 in Stettin under the command of General Bruno Bräuer who was a veteran of the Crete Campaign. Most of the high and middle rank officers of the unit were veterans of the operations in Holland, Italy and Balkans. However, despite its grand name, the 9. Fallschirmjäger Division was composed of Luftwaffe ground personnel with no combat experience. This fact proved to be decisive in the upcoming battles.

In January 1945, division sent two battalions to reinforce fortress Breslau. Rest of the division was deployed in the Seelow Heights to counter the inevitable Soviet attack on Berlin. The 9. Fallschirmjäger Division was positioned between Seelow and Neuhardenberg. On 16 April, the day the Russian attack started, they received the full force of the artillery bombardment by Marshal Georgi Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front. Most of the forward elements of the division routed under the heavy barrage. 27th Parachute Regiment's commander Oberst Menke's and General Brauer's frantic efforts barely managed to rally the troops. On 17 April, the division was holding the area east of Seelow near the train station. The attack of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps (8th Guards Army) started with another heavy artillery and katyusha barrage. Russian infantry, supported by assault troops and dozens of tanks, cautiously advanced towards the German forward positions. Once again, veteran officers of the Fallschirmjäger had the desperate task of maintaining order among the inexperienced troops.

072.Klosterdorf – 19 April 1945 – 20 turns
“The Last Glory”
Klosterdorf, 20 KM East of Berlin

In April of 1945, SS-Hauptscharführer Karl Körner, one of the platoon commanders of the sSSPzAbt 503 was supporting an infantry counterattack in the Bollersdorf area east of Berlin. As part of the III SS
Panzer Corps under Obergruppenführer Felix Steiner, sSSPzAbt 503 was attached to the 11th Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division "Nordland". Four King Tigers of the 503rd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion were positioned to interdict the main axis of advance of the Soviet 2nd Guard Tank Army's thrust towards Strausberg on April 19, 1945. Körner's group was deployed to engage the enemy on a Hill near the town of Klosterdorf. Meanwhile, Russian 11th Tank Corps was heading on the road linking Grünow to Klosterdorf.
King Tigers opened fire to take advantage of their 88mm guns.

073.Muncheberg – 19 April 1945 – 15 turns
“Rearguard at Müncheberg”
Müncheberg, 30 KM East of Berlin

Tenacious German defense at the Seelow Heights effectively blocked Zhukov's 1st Belarussian Front's advance for a week. However, after continuous heavy fighting, Russian numerical superiority in soldiers and
equipment overwhelmed the German lines. Making things worse, Koniev's 1st Ukrainian Front's penetration to the south at Neisse created a huge gap on the German right wing. German 9th Army started a fighting withdrawal towards Berlin suburbs on 18 April. Zhukov's spearhead, Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army was aggressively pursuing the German troops in order to cut the retreat route on Kustrin-Berlin autobahn.

On 19 April, remnants of the "Müncheberg" Panzer Division was ordered to the city the division was born
and got its name. Müncheberg was an important objective located between Berlin and Seelow Heights on the Kustrin-Berlin autobahn. Germans hastily organized a rearguard defense around the city. Jagdtigers from the Panzerabteilung 682 were sent to provide the much needed antitank punch against the Russian spearhead
which was just on the heels of the Germans.

074.Baruth – 25 April 1945 – 20 turns
“End of the Road at Baruth”
Baruth, 11 KM West of Halbe

On April 16 the Soviets started the Battle of Berlin with a three Front attack across the Oder-Neisse line. By April 21 they broke through the German front line in two places and started to surround Berlin. The high speed of the advance of Koniev's 1st Ukrainian Front threatened Ninth Army with envelopment by the two massive Soviet pincers that were heading for Berlin from the south and east. The area (known as Halbe Pocket) into which the Ninth Army had been pushed by troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts was a region of lakes and forests south-east of Fürstenwalde.

On April 25th, after receiving Hitler's orders which permitted a breakout in a westerly direction to link up with Wenck's 12th Army, 9th Army's commander Theodor Busse formed two battlegroups to lead the attack. Kampfgruppe von Luck, consisting of the 21st Panzer Division and Kampfgruppe Pipkorn, containing the 35th SS and Police Grenadier Divisions, both named after their commanders, attempted a break-out in the direction of the road centre of Baruth to obtain the use of roads to Luckenwalde and Jüterbog. Initially Colonel Hans von Luck made good progress across the Berlin-Dresden autobahn and paved the way for the huge infantry column behind him in the heavily wooded area around Halbe.

Russian reaction to the breakout attempt was quick. Gordov's 3rd Guards Army was rushed into positions close to the Berlin-Dresden autobahn to block all the forest roads leading from east to west. By the night of 25 April, Kampfgruppe von Luck reached the road center at Baruth and hit the defenses of the 50th Guards Rifle Division which had been reinforced by dug-in Stalin tanks. The upcoming night battle was to decide the fate of the 80.000 German soldiers trapped in the Halbe Pocket.

075.Moltke Bridge – 29 April 1945 – 20 turns
“Gateway to Reichstag”
Moltke Bridge, Spree Canal, Berlin City Center

After the unsuccessful attack to capture the Moltke Bridge which was the only intact structure on the Spree Canal in order to enter the Reichstag area, on 28 April, General Kuznetsov, the commander of the 3rd Shock Army designed another assault on the next day. On 29 April, 756th Rifle Regiment (General Shatilov's 150th Rifle Division) deployed at the Alt Moabit, near the Moltke Bridge. Contrary to the failed 28 April attack, Russian troops managed to move artillery and katyushas which provided much needed indirect firepower for the advancing formations. The Russian troops were also supported by the heavy tanks from Kirichenko's 9th Tank Corps.

The approaches to the Moltke Bridge was defended by an ad-hoc force which was formed around the remnants of the SS Anhalt Regiment, 9th Fallschirmjager Division and Kriegsmarine soldiers organized into several Kampfgruppes under Hauptsturmführer Babic's command. The German defenses in the area were centered on the Ministry of Interior and Diplomatic Quarter Buildings, all massive concrete structures German troops turned into powerful strongholds. German troops also had armor and flak support from the direction of the Konigsplatz. With all the heavy guns zeroed to the Bridge and the fanatical defenders dug-in in massive government buildings, Shatilov's men had a daunting mission to secure the area for the upcoming attack on the big prize, the Reichstag.

076.Potsdammer Platz – 30 April 1945 – 16 turns
“Close Quarters”
Potsdammer Platz, Berlin

By the end of April 1945, German defenders of "Festung Berlin" found themselves trapped in a shrinking pocket under an overwhelming pressure from three Soviet armies. On 30 April, spearheads of General Barzarin's 5th Shock Army reached Potsdammer Platz a couple of blocks away from the Brandenburg Gate.

In order to stop the Russian advance German Festung command sent urgent messages to the tactical reserve,
the 503rd SS Heavy Panzer Detachment which had only two operational Tigers. Unterscharführer Karl-Heinz Turk, commanding one of the remaining King Tigers, received orders to drive towards Potzdamer Platz and engage the Russian armor threatening the grenadiers in that sector.

077.Tiergarten – 02 May 1945 – 18 turns
“Out of the Cauldron”
Tiergarten, Berlin City Center

With the coming of May, the bloody fight for Germany's capital started to ease off. Hitler was dead and General Krebs was working on cease fire negotiations with Chuikov. Red Army soldiers' fighting attitude
too changed as they were aware end was near and nobody wanted to get killed in the last hours of the war.

Around Tiergarten and Reichstag, isolated German resistance continued. However on 2 May the surviving soldiers gathered in larger parties for breakthrough attempts to the west and northwest. One of such attempts was undertaken by a battlegroup consisting remnants of 9th Parachute Division and Panzer Division "Müncheberg". German breakout attempt was supported by a handful of armored vehicles including an IR device equipped Panther from the 29th Panzer Regiment. Bogdanov's 2nd Guards Tank Army was standing between them and freedom.
078.Prague – 07 May 1945 – 18 turns
“Der Führer's Last Battle”
Troja Bridge, Prague City Center

After the heavy fighting in Vienna, 2nd SS Panzer Division "Das Reich’s various units were sent to different parts of the frontline. One group remained in Austria; another battlegroup was deployed near Dresden.
Ostubaf Otto Weidinger's "Der Führer" Panzergrenadier Regiment, which was combined with the armored recon battalion and one battalion from the artillery regiment, was reformed as a kampfgruppe. On 5 May 1945, "Der Führer" was ordered to advance Prague where an uprising controlled the city. "Der Führer" was to attack towards Prague's city center; suppress the rebellion and relieve the surrounded German garrison.

Regiment's advance started on 6 May. In the past 2-3 days Czech resistance fighters had placed dozens of road blocks to delay the German advance and "Der Führer" had to stop several times to remove those roadblocks. Czech resistance stiffened in the suburbs. However SS troopers got the upper hand with superior firepower and experience. On 7 May, "Der Führer" was one step away from the city center. The Troja Bridge over the Vltava River remained as the only obstacle between the surrounded garrison and the "Der Führer". Hstuf. Johann Schulzer’s II. Battalion which was supported by armored recon vehicles launched its assault on the bridge. That day was to be the last battle of "Der Führer"s long war.

Campaign Scenarios

079.Battle of Tali-Ihantala_1 – 25 June 1944 – 16 turns
“Counterattack at Portinhoikka”
Portinhoikka, 2 KM Northwest of Tali

Historical Background: The Soviet objective in the massive Karelian summer offensive of 1944 was to destroy the Finnish Army, penetrate deep into Finnish territory, and force Finland into capitulation.
After a heavy artillery barrage by the Leningrad Front, the main offensive started on June 10, focusing on the key Finnish stronghold at Valkeasaari. Colonel General Dmitrii N. Gusev's 21st Army achieved a quick penetration on the initial Finnish defenses and pressed forward to the second Finnish Line. The second Finnish line known as VT-line (Vammelsuu-Taipale) was breached in Sahakylä and Kuuterselkä on June 14. After a failed counterattack in Kuuterselkä by the Finnish armored division "Lagus", the Finnish defense
had to be pulled back to the VKT-line (Viipuri - Kuparsaari - Taipale). On June 20, the Soviet juggernaut captured the historic city of Viipuri. Despite the Red army's great success in smashing two Finnish defense lines and capturing Karelian Isthmus in ten days, it had failed to destroy the Finnish IV Army Corps (Gen. Laatikainen) which managed to withdraw to the VKT-line. The Finnish Army was determined to hold the VKT-Line at all costs since it was the only obstacle between Red Army and their homeland. After the fall of Viipuri Soviet forces launched their attack on the VKT-Line on 24 June. They especially focused on the Tali-Portinhoikka axis where they expected the decisive breakthrough. The following battle of attrition known as the Battle of Tali-Ihantala was one of the heaviest engagements of the Second World War.

Tactical Situation: Main Soviet attack on the Tali position started at 07:30 on the 25th of June. 30th Guards Rifle Corps reinforced the Russian units in this sector. The Russian attack sought a breakthrough on the Eastern and Western shores of the Lake Leitimojärvi. The attack on the eastern side of the lake was stopped by the Finnish 4th Division. However, on the western shore Soviet tanks from the 27th Tank Regiment were able to force their way to the Portinhoikka crossroads. Possession of Portinhoikka was vital for the Finns whose units were at risk of being cut off and surrounded. At 12:00 hours; Finnish command managed to organize a counterattack led by the Armored Division "Lagus". The spearhead of the Finnish attack was the elite 3rd Jaeger Battalion supported by an assault gun detachment.

080.Battle of Tali-Ihantala_2 – 27 June 1944 – 18 turns
“Return to Motti Tactics”
Talinmylly, Portinhoikka-Tali Road

Tactical Situation: Counterattack of the Armored Division "Lagus" effectively stopped the Russian advance on Portinhoikka and badly mauled the 27th Tank Regiment which fell back in disorder. Finnish forces
continued their attack southward towards Tali to trap the Soviet units near Lake Leitimojärvi. 46th Guards Rifle Division joined by the 30th Guards Tank Brigade formed a hedgehog defensive position near the village of Talinmylly. At 17:00, 27 June 1944, leading elements of the "Lagus" Armored Division launched their attack on Talinmylly.

081.Battle of Tali-Ihantala_3 – 29 June 1944 – 18 turns
“Crisis at the Portinhoikka Junction”
Portinhoikka Junction, 3 KM Southeast of Ihantala

Tactical Situation: The unsuccessful attack on Talinmylly was a missed opportunity for the Finnish command. After repulsing the attack, the Russians consolidated their positions on the both sides of the Tali - Portinhoikka road. The Red Army resumed its advance on 29 June on two axes. Led by the 46th Guards Rifle Division, one axis attacked the vital Portinhoikka junction; the other one pointed towards the Ihantala village on the Finnish left flank. Threatened by Russian advance on both flanks, Finnish 4th Army Korps was retreating to form new positions North of Portinhoikka. The 3rd Jaeger Battalion was ordered to defend the road junction and gain time for the retreating comrades.

082.Battle of Tali-Ihantala_4 – 02 July 1944 – 20 turns
“The Final Act at Ihantala”
Ihantala Village

Tactical Situation: Between 29 June and 02 July, Russians tried to achieve a clear breakthrough at and around Portinhoikka crossroads. Despite suffering heavy losses the Finnish 4th Army Corps managed to maintain a continuous line and retreated to new defensive positions further north. On 02 July, Russian pressure switched to the Northeast. 63rd Guards Rifle Division, supported by the 30th Tank Brigade, was
searching a weak spot to outflank the Portinhoikka position. Finnish 12th Infantry Regiment (6th Division) was defending a tiny village named Ihantala on the way of the Russian onslaught. The Finnish command had successfully deployed its limited artillery assets in the sector. At the dawn of 02 July, forward elements of the 63rd Guards reached Ihantala. The Battle for Ihantala village was the climax of the monumental battle of attrition. Near this remote Karelian village the Finns gave one of their crucial fights to resist capitulation and postwar Soviet domination.

083.Operation Sudwind_1 – 17 February 1945 – 18 turns
“Breaching the Line”
Hill 190, Near Svodin, Slovakia

Historical Background: After the failure of the Ardennes Offensive, the bulk of the 6th SS Panzer Army were sent to Hungary to block the Red Army's advance into Austria and southeast Europe. This move was part of a broader plan Hitler designed; a counterattack against the Russian troops near Lake Balaton which was to relieve the Hungarian capital. However, before the attack, German command must have secured their left flank. In order to secure the flank of the Balaton Offensive, German command planned an operation to eliminate a strong Russian bridgehead west of Danube River near Gran (Esztergom). Codenamed "Operation Sudwind" (South Wind), the attack against the Russian bridgehead was led by the newly arrived forces of the 1st SS Panzer Korps (Gruppenführer H. Priess) which were supported by Wehrmacht infantry divisions. 1st SS Panzer Division "LSSAH" was deployed as the schwerpunkt of the attack. Divisional commander, Brigadeführer Otto Kumm assigned Jochen Peiper as the spearhead of the advance. This campaign portraits actions of a combat group belongs to Kampfruppe Peiper on their road to Danube.

Tactical Situation: The German attack on the Gran bridgehead started with the first lights of 17 February with an artillery barrage on the Soviet positions holding northern part of the bridgehead. 46th Infantry Division led the attack on Svodin in order to pave the way for the panzers of Kampfgruppe Peiper. However their attack was bogged down under a strong Russian artillery fire. An hour later, Kamfgruppe Peiper was committed to gain the momentum. German armored column specifically avoided towns and attacked the countryside. Hill 190, located a couple of kms east of Svodin was the first obstacle on their way. Hstuf
Erich Grätz' panzergrenadiers supported by armor including the King Tigers, launched the attack on Hill 190.

084.Operation Sudwind_2 – 17 February 1945 – 20 turns
“Bridge for the Tigers”
Pariszky Canal, 12 KM North of Danube River

Tactical Situation: After defeating the Soviet strongpoint at Hill 190, Kampfgruppe Peiper continued its rapid advance southwards to the Danube River. At the end of the day, German column reached Pariszky Canal, one of the natural obstacles Soviets can form a defensive line. Peiper's grenadiers lost no time and launched an attack in order to capture a bridgehead across the canal. Unable to cross the light canal bridges, panzers provided close support.

085.Operation Sudwind_3 – 18 February 1945 – 18 turns
“Night Watch at Pariszky”
Pariszky Canal, Gran Bridgehead, Slovakia

Tactical Situation: By the end of 17 February, panzergrenadiers defeated the Russian defenses and managed to secure a narrow bridgehead on the other side of the Pariszky Canal. Since the two bridges KG Peiper captured could not support heavy vehicles, pioneers started building a pontoon bridge in order to move tanks and continue the advance towards Danube. Until then, panzergrenadiers were alone on the Soviet side of the Canal. They dug-in and waited for the Russian counterattack. At 01:00 Russians came with tanks.

086.Operation Sudwind_4 – 19 February 1945 – 20 turns
“Closing the Door at Parkany”
Parkany, Southeastern Corner of the Gran Bridgehead, Slovakia

Tactical Situation: After securing the bridges over the Pariszky Canal, Kampfgruppe Peiper resumed its advance southwards. By the end of 18 February, German column reached Muzla which was captured by a spearhead from the 12.SS Panzer Division "Hitlerjugend". Bypassing Muzla, Peiper advanced towards Nana and Parkany in order to reach Danube and isolate the Russian troops fighting in the north. At 13:00 leading companies of the KG Peiper launched their attack on Parkany. Kampfgruppe Krause from the "Hitlerjugend"
was also racing from south. Soviet infantry and armor from the 14th Guards Mechanized Brigade had formed a perimeter around the town, especially strong near the railway station at the northern outskirts of Parkany.

087.Battle for Tempelhof_1 – 23 April 1945 – 16 turns
“Into the Heart of the Reich”
Teltow Canal, Neukoln, Southeastern Suburbs of Berlin

Historical Background: General Vassily Chuikov's 8th Guard Army was born in the ashes of Stalingrad as the 62nd Army. After the victory at Stalingrad, they participated in nearly every important battle in the massive clash known as the East Front. The tides of war brought the guardsmen to Russia, Ukraine, Poland and Germany. 8th Guards Army was Zhukov's spearhead in the hard and costly battles of Küstrin and Seelow Heights. On 23 April 1945, after 4 years of hardship, the guardsmen were at the outskirts of Berlin, the capital of their nemesis. The 8th Guards Army, along with Katukov's 1st Guards Tank Army, entered the German capital from the southeast; advancing towards Neuköln and Kreuzberg. Zhukov ordered Chuikov the capture of the Tempelhof Airport, the largest airport the Nazi leaders could use to escape the Soviet grip. The campaign portrays an assault group's actions during the battle for the Tempelhof Airport.

Tactical Situation: The first considerable obstacle on 8th Guards Army's path was the Teltow Canal southeast of the NeuKöln district. Russians organized special assault groups for the operation. Relatively small, those assault groups included heavily armed crack soldiers that were experienced in street fighting. On the evening of 23 April; Leitenant Dmitri Nesterenko's assault group took their positions on the eastern shore of the Teltow Canal. Germans seemed to blow all bridges in this sector. However Nesterenko noticed that one of the destroyed bridges still provided movement over the debris. Under the low visibility created by the burning houses he ordered his man to grasp the opportunity and surprise the SS defenders at the other side of Canal. Carrying some rubber boats, the guardsmen leaped forward despite the heavy odds.

088.Battle for Tempelhof_2 – 25 April 1945 – 16 turns
“A Wagnerian Night”
Evangelist Cemetery, Kreuzberg, Near Tempelhof

Tactical Situation: After securing the Neuköln District, the 8th Guards Army launched its attack on the Tempelhof Airport. Rather than assaulting directly, General Chuikov sent two pincers in order to isolate the area to deny the use of the aircrafts by the Nazi leadership for an escape attempt. The right hand of the pincer was 39th Rifle Division which advanced towards Kreuzberg and tried to cut the S-Bahn and isolate Tempelhof from North. In 25 April, heavy fighting continued near the S-Bahn that linked the Neuköln area to the city center. Especially road junctions were heavily contested. Remnants of the SS Division “Nordland", supported by a handful of armored vehicles, had setup ambush points in the area. One particularly dangerous point was a road junction that linked Kreuzberg with Wilmersdorf near an old Evangelist Cemetery. Nesterenko's assault group led the way for the riflemen and heavy tanks of the 34th Heavy Tank Regiment in a night assault. The sounds of battle, the light from the burning houses and the scene of an 18th Century Cemetery were yet to draw another gothic imagery in the last days of the Reich.

089.Battle for Tempelhof_3 – 26 April 1945 – 16 turns
“Next Stop Tempelhof”
Tempelhof Airport, Berlin

Tactical Situation: After isolating their objectives, the 39th Guards Rifle Division turned south for the final assault on the Tempelhof Airport. With the first lights of 26 April, Soviet riflemen and tanks launched multiple attacks. Leitenant Nesterenko's group spearheaded one of those assaults in order to capture the administrative buildings of the airport. German defenses had been bolstered by the arrival of the Panzer Division "Müncheberg". Panzergrenadiers, dug-in tanks, elements of the volksturm and Tempelhof's anti-aircraft batteries put up a fierce but desperate resistance against the Soviet onslaught.

090.Battle for Tempelhof_4 – 27 April 1945 – 16 turns
“The Chapel at the Corner”
Kurfurstenstrasse, 3 KM Southeast of Reichstag

Tactical Situation: On 26 April 1945, Tempelhof Airport was firmly in Russian hands. After securing the runway and eliminating last resistance pockets 8th Guards Army resumed its advance towards the city center. At Kurfürstenstrasse, a couple of blocks northwest of Tempelhof a heavy tank was immobilized by a booby-trap. Leitenant Nesterenko's group advanced forward and formed a perimeter centered on a chapel located in an intersection and waited for the rest of the Battalion. At 03:00AM, a heavy armored attack was launched by the remnants of the SS Division "Nordland".

Moved during June and had very little pc time, so just getting around to this...

Red Victory Operations

This document is designed to be used with the Scenario_Map.pdf file located in the main game directory, which provides a representation of the eastern front and the general locations of the actions listed here.

The first 5 scenarios are not listed on the map as they are training scenarios.

000.Getting Started - 28 June 1944 – 18 turns
“Tank Cavalry at Slutsk”
Near Slutsk, Bobruisk - Baranovichi Road

After shattering 9th Army's lines near Bobruisk, Konstantin Rokossovsky, commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, committed his exploitation force, the powerful Pliyev Cavalry Group, into action. Pliyev's tanks and cavalry stormed the German defenses behind Berezina River and kept the momentum in the marshlands of Pripyat.

On 27 June, the 1st Mechanized Corps move into Glusk, sweeping aside the remnants of the German 35. Infantry Division. By 1700 Soviet armor were pouring through a gap at Glusk in the direction of Slutsk. A very important railway junction, Slutsk was vital for the Soviets for keeping the momentum onwards Baranovichi and later, Minsk. Frantically gathering reserves from other sectors, German command committed a newly arrived paratrooper unit, Kampfgruppe Schirmer to block the seemingly unstoppable Russian spearhead before Slutsk.

001.Bootcamp_1 – 16 turns
“Assault on a Fortified Position”

Commander; today our battalion will capture a ridgeline which is vital for the enemy defense system. Your rifle company will assault a fortified hill to the north. Recon tells us that the position is defended by heavy machine gun emplacements covered by at least a platoon of infantry. Your infantry will be supported by a sapper platoon and an artillery battery. Good Luck.

Tactical Tips:
• Staying away from the enemy killing zones is vital especially in assaults. It is likely that one or two setup machineguns or mortars are waiting for you. Do not use apparent and easy routes as they are most probably killing zones.
• Try to gather maximum info on the enemy strength in the first turns. Fix enemy troops with diverting attacks and hit them on the flanks.
• Study the map. The LOS angles, covered approach routes and use them but do not forget the covered routes are generally mined.
• Use your specialized units such as engineers at the right time. Do not commit them prematurely. Placing an engineer unit on a wrong hex can cost you a battle in scenarios with limited time.
• The timing for artillery strike and smoke is vital in assaults. Use them to support your troops or reduce casualties at the crucial moment.
• Try to lure the enemy out with diverting moves and attacks. It is high probability that a setup artillery observer is there and a premature enemy barrage will be much better than one hit you just before your assault.


002.Bootcamp_2 – 16 turns
“Combined Arms Tactics”

Commander; your motorized column has stopped near a village where enemy movement has been detected. The leading infantry has dismounted and is ready for the attack. Unfortunately we don't have much information on the enemy forces located in the village so a close cooperation between the infantry and the supporting armor is crucial.

Tactical Tips:
• Do not commit your armor early and never use them as recon vehicles into the unknown. That's the

infantry's job.
• Do not bunch up infantry and tanks closely as they will be very inviting targets. Do not place them too far either. Try to maintain a distance ideal for tank-infantry cooperation.
• Never isolate your tanks on terrains with low LOS.
• As a leader try your best to spot enemy positions with your binoculars.
• Suppress the enemy defenses and use your mobility to outflank them. Do not use apparent approach angles as they are likely to turn out killing zones designed by the enemy.
• Do not use roads close to the enemy. They might be mined.
• Do not deploy smoke prematurely. The timing of smoke is very crucial in maneuvers.
• Sometimes moving fast is a better option than returning fire; sometimes not. There are no simple answers on the battlefield.
• Always load AP rounds before ending your turn if there is a risk of encountering enemy armor; so your tanks will opportunity fire the correct shell on the highest risk target. Do not forget to switch to HE rounds against soft targets.


003.Bootcamp_3 – 16 turns
“Defending Against An Armored Attack”

Commander; we are expecting a probing attack on your sector. As our right flank you must hold your lines and prevent an envelopment. Recon reports indicate enemy tanks so expect armor accompanying the infantry. Regiment will send you a self propelled gun to bolster your defenses. Good Luck.

Tactical Tips:
• It is vital to hold your fire until the right time. Don’t reveal your infantry positions by opening fire prematurely. This will give enemy armor a chance to suppress your units to protect its infantry's advance.
• Protect your anti-tank assets. Those are the most valuable items in your arsenal.
• Don't commit yourself propelled gun early. Find good ambush angles behind the infantry screen and wait for opportunities.
• Don’t enter into a direct fire duel with enemy armor in the open. They have more firepower and you have thin armor plate. If possible spare action points to hide behind cover after firing one or two shots.
• Be flexible. Try to predict enemy moves and take necessary actions early.


004.Bootcamp_4 – 16 turns
“Defending Night Attacks”

Commander, reports indicate that enemy will try a breakout to avoid encirclement. They will likely launch an attack tonight, utilizing low visibility. Your unit lies on their shortest path for a possible breakout so be ready for a heavy night attack. It is imperative to defeat the enemy's breakout attempt at this point. Our regiment is spread out thinly so don't expect much reinforcement. You are on your own comrade. Good luck.

Tactical Tips:
• In night battles spotting the enemy is vital for learning their intentions and the biggest asset is your illumination rounds. Use them carefully.
• Check out the illumination ammo allocated to your forces and don't exhaust them prematurely.
• Be wise in using flares; do your best to illuminate enemy forces without illuminating your positions. Check out the flare ranges and do not deploy them too close to your positions.
• Always hold your fire as triggered opportunity fire might reveal your positions too early. This will give you ability to open concentrated fire on enemy troops and give them little chance to recover.
• It is imperative to follow a flexible deployment and preserve a tactical reserve to seal enemy penetrations that cannot be spotted in low visibility.

1943

005.Ozereika - 04 February 1943 – 18 turns
“The Dieppe of the Blacksea”
Ozereika Bay, 12KM Southwest of Novorossiisk

After surrounding the German forces at Stalingrad, STAVKA planned another smaller operation codenamed "Operation Sea". The aim of the operation was to capture the Black Sea harbor town of Novorossiisk and block the 17th Army's path of retreat from the Caucasus into the Crimea. The assault was to be a combined one that included amphibious and airborne landings. The amphibious operation was directed against Novorossiisk while airborne troops delayed the reinforcements. The location of the beach landings was the bay of Ozereika which is a couple of kilometers southwest of Novorossiisk. The Ozereika Bay provided a suitable landscape for landings and advance inland.

The Axis defenses in the area consisted of the 38th Rumanian Infantry Regiment which was defending the beaches and the German 789th Coastal Artillery Battalion with its 105mm howitzers emplaced in the heights dominating the bay and the village of Yuzhnaye Ozereika.

The Soviet plan was to push through the defense in order to reach a line between Yuzhnaye Ozereika and Stanichka; then turn right and envelop Novorossiisk from the West. The mission was undertaken by the elements of the 255th Naval Brigade, a stubborn and crack unit which was supported by lend lease Stuart tanks from the 563rd Tank Battalion. Soviet command used every vessel for naval transportation; patrol boats, rubber boats, fishing boats and barges. The destroyer "Minsk" provided artillery support on pre-assigned targets. At 02:00 hours the first wave of the assault force closed in on the beach. The landing forces found trenches, mines and obstacles intact after the artillery preparation and engaged in a heavy fight with the Rumanian infantry.

006.Krasny Bor - 10 February 1943 – 20 turns
“Viva La Muerte!”
October Station, Krasny Bor, 30KM South of Leningrad

In January 1943 the Red Army managed to breakthrough the bottle-neck near the shore of Lake Ladoga and created a land-connection to Leningrad first time since September 1941. In order to defeat the siege decisively, the Soviet command planned a much larger operation named Operation Polar Star. It was based on coordinated blows from three directions to encircle the enemy forces south of Leningrad. The plan gave the main attack to the 55th Army. The 55th army's orders were to break open the vital Leningrad-Moscow
Highway, starting from its jump-off position in Kolpino towards Tosno, to join with a northbound attack pincer of 54th Army of Volkhov Front, thereby encircling German formations near Leningrad. The vital point for the highway was the town named Krasny Bor which was defended by the 250th Infantry Division, or the "Azul" Division which was formed by the Spanish phalangist volunteers.
On Wednesday, 10 February 1943, a massive artillery bombardment of 1,000 Soviet guns and mortars opened on the Spanish lines at precisely 6:45. Shells, mortars and Katyusha rockets pounded the trenches, bunkers and dugouts. At approximately 8:40, the 45th and 63rd Guards and the 72nd Rifle Divisions, followed by armor started their advance.

Inside Krasny Bor, a company of the 250th Infantry Division was holding the October Railway station. Company commander Captain de Huidrobo had dispersed his troops along the railway embankment directly on the way of the 63rd Guards Rifle Division. That day, along the railway embankment, the Spaniards gave their toughest fight with heaviest casualties. That day would be remembered in veterans' memories as "The Black Wednesday".

007.Chernichevo – 11 February 1943 – 18 turns
“Fire Brigade Meyer”
Chernichevo, Krasny Bor - Mishkino Road

After their success in defeating the German bridgehead at Schlüsselburg, south of Leningrad, STAVKA planned a bolder operation at the junction of Mga. The Russians aimed to isolate a large part of the German 18th Army. The main axis of the Russian penetration was the town of Krasny Bor which was defended by the Spanish "Azul" Division. On 10 February a heavy Russian attack shattered the German Front at Krasny Bor. Pushing aside the defenders and bypassing pockets of resistance, the Russian armor poured westwards in the direction of Mga. Outflanked with the fall of Krasny Bor, the neighboring 4th SS Polizei Division was facing a dangerous envelopment. German command sent their only mobile reserve, one company from the 502nd Heavy Panzer Detachment which was ordered to stop the Russian advance on Krasny Bor - Mishkino axis.

At the dawn of 11 February a Tiger platoon under the command of Leutnant Meyer arrived at the battlefield. From his position Meyer could see that Russian tanks had already occupied the village of Chernichevo. At 07:00, the Russian column consisting of KV1 heavy tanks resumed their advance towards Mishkino. Meyer quickly deployed his panzers to ambush the Russian armored spearhead at a road junction near Chernichevo.

008.Jeremejewka – 18 February 1943 – 20 turns
“Peiper at Jeremejewka”
Jeremejewka, 30 KM East of Krasnograd

After the failure of the German attempt to re-join the encircled Sixth Army in Stalingrad, a Russian offensive on 2,000 Km long line followed in January 1943. The entire front between the Orel River and the Black Sea was active, while the critical sector was the Stalingrad corridor and the Caucasian German Armies. Strong Russian formations attempted to cut the key city of Kharkov and disrupt the German communications between Army Group Center and South. Although being in crisis against irresistible enemy waves, von
Manstein started to prepare a counteroffensive based on the principles of mobile warfare.

On February 16th, Vatutin took Kharkov and sent two armies towards Krasnograd with a left hook; unaware
of the powerful forces ready to envelope him. On February 17th, von Manstein was able to say that his preparations had finished and he was ready to begin the operation. The SS Panzerkorps was sent to Krasnograd to assault Vatutin's flank. Sepp Dietrich divided the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Division "Leibstandarte Adolph Hitler" into three powerful Kampfgruppe: KG Wunsche under Major Max Wunsche; KG Meyer under Major Kurt Meyer and KG Peiper under Major Jochen Peiper. LSSAH's initial task was to capture certain villages to be used as observation & jumping points for the upcoming counterattack. The village of Jeremejewka located 30 km East of Krasnograd, was one of the key objectives overlooking the
flanks of the advancing Soviet 3rd Tank Army. On 18 February 1943; flanked by Meyer's Aufklarung Abteilung; Kampfgruppe Peiper left Ziglerowka for Jeremejewka . Peiper encountered an enemy recon element in the village. Always a daring and aggressive commander; he launched an immediate attack to capture the positions before Russians find time to react.

009.Barvenvoko – 25 February 1943 – 18 turns
“Against All Odds”
Barvenkovo, 30 KM Southeast of Kharkov

After the fall of Kharkov the Russian high command concluded, wrongly, that such an important junction would only have been abandoned under Hitler's express order and that Army Group South must therefore
be in full retreat. Based on this assumption STAVKA ordered Voronezh Front to continue its pursuit towards the Dnyepr River. Despite frantic efforts to stabilize the frontline there was still a huge gap between 1st Panzer Army and Army Detachment Hollidt along the Mius River. Mobile Group Popov thrust into this gap
and advanced south through Krasnoarmeyskoye towards Stalino.

German command blocked Popov's path with the battle weary 40th Panzer Korps. On 18 February, Manstein ordered the first moves of his counteroffensive, orchestrated attacks on Mobile Group Popov's flanks by the 7th and 11th Panzer Divisions, slowly bottlenecking the red armor. As late as the 21st of February, Russians still believed that German Army was in full retreat. By the 23rd, the last resistance of Popov's forces trapped in the Krasnoarmeyskoye area had been broken and remnants of the Mobile Group started a retreat northwards. At this point Manstein committed the 5th SS Panzergrenadier Division "Wiking" on Barvenkovo axis to pursuit and isolate the retreating enemy. Exhausted from continuous fighting in the Caucasus and having only a couple of PzIII and Marders, "Wiking" continued its push towards Barvenkovo.

010.Taranovka – 05 March 1943 – 18 turns
“For the Comrades”
Near Taranovka, 40 KM South of Kharkov

By the first days of March 1943, Mobile Group Popov was isolated and destroyed south of Kharkov with a brilliant counterattack designed by von Manstein. After destroying the powerful enemy spearhead, General Manstein turned his eyes on Kharkov. He sent two pincer columns; the SS Panzer Korps attacked Kharkov from the northwest where the 48th Panzer Korps moved north to isolate the city from the east.

Now its infantry armies were threatened by envelopment, Russian command desperately tried to slow down the German advance towards Kharkov. The 25th Guards Rifle Division was ordered to hold a long line from Taranovka to Merefa. Taranovka, a key position on the eastern flank of the defensive line, was defended by the 78th Guards Rifle Regiment which was supported by a handful of tanks from the 195th Tank Brigade. The high ground to the southeast of the town was particularly important for the defense of the city. On March 5th, the 6th Panzer Division, spearhead of the 48th Panzer Korps started its assault on this key position. Having no illusions for defending the position for a long period, Russian soldiers resisted fiercely to gain time for the retreating comrades.

011.Kharkov – 12 March 1943 – 18 turns
“To The Red Square”
Near Dzerzhinsky Square, Kharkov

After destroying "Mobile Group Popov" in a brilliant counterattack south of Kharkov, von Manstein turned his eyes to the north and the city itself. Elements of the 4th Panzer Army raced northeast to cut the Kharkov-Belgorod road to trap more Russian units. On March 10, 2nd SS Panzer Korps reached the outskirts of the city. Manstein ordered the SS korps to capture the city of Kharkov. "Totenkopf" was ordered to make an enveloping move from North to cut the escape route to Belgorod. "Das Reich" entered the city from southeast and attempted to capture the eastern industrial district. "Leibstandarte Adolph Hitler" attacked the city from northeast aiming the city center.

Early morning 11 March, the Leibstandarte division launched a two-prong attack into northern Kharkov. Kampfgruppe Witt, consisting elements from the 1st SS Panzergrenadier Regiment and 1st SS Panzer Regiment, attacked down the main road from Belgorod and captured Kharkov Airfield. Rybalko's 3rd Tank Army was defending the city center and its' approaches. Fierce Soviet counterattacks were defeated by the SS troopers.

On 12 March, Kampfgruppe Witt made progress into the city's center, breaking through the strong Soviet defenses in the northern suburbs and began a house to house fight towards the center. By afternoon, German spearheads reached a position a couple of blocks north of the Dzerzhinsky Square, the city center of Kharkov. Standartenführer Fritz Witt, the commanding officer of the Kampfgruppe ordered a final push to reach the city center without further delay.

012.Zalyutino – 12 March 1943 – 18 turns
“No Time to Stop”
Zalyutino, Southern suburbs of Kharkov

SS Panzer Korps' attack on Kharkov started with the first lights of 11 March. Leibstandarte entered the city from the northwest and attacked the city center. Totenkopf advanced further north to block the escape route of the Russian forces at the Belgorod road. Das Reich joined the attack from the south, advancing on the Poltava - Merefa axis.

Das Reich's spearhead, Kampfgruppe Harmel, fought its way along the road, and at 16:00 they reached the Kharkov suburb of Zalyutino where their path was blocked by an anti-tank ditch defended by the remnants of the 40th Army.

During the night of March 11-12, Sturmbannführer Heinz Harmel sent a company of pioneers across the anti-tank ditch to secure the houses on the other side. Panzers and assault guns followed the pioneers closely to pin down the dug-in enemy. Russian forces counterattacked and a fierce night battle erupted for the control of the town.

013.Kharkov – 15 March 1943 – 20 turns
“Last Act at the Tractor Works”
Tractor Works District, Eastern suburbs of Kharkov

After 4 days of continuous combat SS Panzer Korps captured most of Kharkov. The "Leibstandarte" secured the area around the city center and the airport west part of the city. The 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Das Reich" was deployed near the northeastern suburbs dominated by the industrial facilities. The Russians still holding the massive Tractor Works district were directing accurate artillery fire over the Das Reich's positions. Divisional command designed an assault on the Tractor Works on 15 March. 2nd Battalion from
the "Der Führer" Panzergrenadier Regiment infiltrated the southern flank of the Russian position and deployed for the attack near the worker settlements. At that point majority of the Russian troops were facing westwards and the SS attack disrupted their defensive plans.

With the first lights of 15 March, Hauptsturmführer Sylvester Stadler's 2nd Battalion launched its attack after a brief artillery preparation. A dozen of panzers and pioneers were supporting the assault. Russian command reacted and shifted troops to support their relatively open southern flank. Remaining armor from the 179th Tank Brigade engaged the German panzers to gain the much needed time for the riflemen. The heavy fighting for the possession of the massive industrial structures was to continue all day.
014.Staraja Russa – 15 March 1943 – 18 turns
“A Moment of Respite”
Staraja Russa, Near Lake Ilmen, Novgorod

After the evacuation of the Demjansk Pocket Army Group North sought ways to create more operational reserves for the expected Russian spring offensive. Battle weary troops were deployed behind the lines to refit, and divisions that saw little action in the winter battles hold the line.

One of these units, the 21st Luftwaffe Field Division formed with the elements of the 21st Jaeger Division and Luftwaffe ground personnel, had been defending the important town and rail station of Staraja Russa near Lake Ilmen. With the coming of March, STAVKA ordered a series of offensives in the region, aiming at better operational deployment for the upcoming spring offensive on the Leningrad Front. Marshall Timoshenko, the commander of the Northwestern Front launched a two pronged attack on the German defenses south of Lake Ilmen.

Pavel Kurochkin's 11th Army advanced along the Moscow-Leningrad Railway and hit the German defenses on Staraja Russa. Lacking firepower to counter the Russian armor, elements of the 21st Luftlande Division had to rely on the bunkers and trenches they had built in the winter.

015.Badayev – 19 March 1943 – 18 turns
“Tigers on the Prowl”
Near Badayev, South of Lake Ladoga, Leningrad Front

On 12 January 1943, the Soviets opened the Second Battle of Lake Ladoga with a tremendous bombardment of more than 4000 guns. When the artillery barrage stopped, the divisions of the 2nd Shock Army under Lt. Gen. W. S. Romanovski launched its attack. The combined assault by the 2nd Shock and the 67th Armies broke the German ring south of Lake Ladoga. At the beginning of March the fighting around Leningrad died down and it appeared that the Second Battle of Lake Ladoga had ended. However, on 19 March the fighting flared up as the battle entered its third phase.

Holding the Leningrad Front were the divisions of L Army Korps bolstered by the Latvian and Flemish volunteers from the Waffen SS. Four Tigers led by Oberleutnant Hans Bölter of the s.Pz Abt.502, were deployed as tactical reserve behind the front line near the village of Badayev. The lines in front of them were defended by the infantry from the SS Volunteer Legion Flandern. On 19 March, 06:00hrs, Russian infantry supported by T34s launched a sudden assault on the direction of Badayev. Flemish volunteers, paralyzed under heavy artillery fire, sent frantic calls for help. Hans Bölter, one of the best tank commanders of the s.Pz Abt.502 moved his platoon towards the gun sounds.

016.Warsaw – 19 April 1943 – 16 turns
“The Bravest Battle”
Zamenhofa - Mila Junction, Warsaw Ghetto

The seeds of the ZOB (Jewish Combat Organization) were planted on 22 July 1942, when the German Nazis under SS General Jurgen Stroop began the GrossAktion Warschau -transportation of the ghetto population to the Treblinka extermination camp- sealing the fate of the Jews confined in the Warsaw Ghetto. Along with ZZW (Jewish Military League), ZOB turned the occupied ghetto buildings into bunkers; tried to gather small arms from smuggling and Polish resistance. However, despite all of the efforts, the Jewish rebels were armed only with pistols, rifles and Molotov cocktails.

On January 1943, Germans started the second phase of the "Grossaktion Warshau". The armed resistance was triggered when a 17 year old girl named Emily Landau threw a grenade into a cluster of SS men from a rooftop on Gesia Street, killing or wounding a dozen of the soldiers. For two months, ZZW and ZOB units fought off SS attacks to control the ghetto. Despite the heavy toll, Germans slowly destroyed the pockets of resistance and pushed the rebels towards Mila and Muranowska Streets.

At the night of April 19, Jürgen Stroop dispatched groups of Lithuanian and Ukrainian SS auxiliaries and Polish police into the ghetto to secure the exits of the Mila street where the headquarters of the ZOB was located. Supported by armored vehicles, SS troops advanced in single file toward the junction of Zamenhofa and Mila. Having sworn to fight to the death, the young fighters of the ZOB under the command of their leader Mordechai Anielewicz were waiting to make their last stand.

017.Cherkasskoye – 05 July 1943 – 16 turns
“The Battle for Cherkasskoye”
Cherkasskoye, 10 KM South of Berezovka

48th Panzer Korps formed the left wing of the 4th Panzer Army's attack as the southern pincer aimed at the Kursk salient. Korps' objectives were to smash the Russian defenses near Berezovka and capture Oboyan located further north. The advance was also vital for the flank protection of the 2nd SS Panzer Korps deployed to attack towards Prokhorovka. The village of Cherkasskoye was the first obstacle for the 48th Panzer Korps. Cherkasskoye, a heavily fortified village defended by the 67th Guards Rifle Division formed the cornerstone of the Russian first defensive line.

During the night of 4/5 July, German engineers prepared lanes of attack through the dense minefields. After an hour artillery preparation German assault teams launched their attack at 05:00. Grossdeutschland Panzergrenadier Division which was the spearhead of Knoblesdorf's Korps hit the heavy defensive line in front of Cherkasskoye. Russian defense was well prepared and German casualties were high. However after one hour of heavy fighting Fusilier Regiment Grossdeutschland, supported by panzers including the Tigers, overwhelmed the first defense line. Elements of the depleted 199th Rifle Regiment started a fighting withdrawal to the village in order to gain time to prepare a new line of resistance. General Chistyakov, commander of the 6th Guards Army sent fresh reinforcements to bolster the defenses at Cherkasskoye. At 09:00 Grossdeutschland's grenadiers renewed their advance and reached the southern edge of the village. At the very moment, both sides collided in a violent battle for the possession of this vital position.

018.Iakhontov – 05 July 1943 – 18 turns
“The Ultimate Sacrifice”
Iakhontov Strongpoint, 4 KM South of Berezov, Southern Sector of the Kursk Salient

At the southern flank of the Kursk salient, Colonel Nekrasov's 52nd Guards Rifle Division was deployed
between Zadelnoya and Berezov, guarding the eastern shore of the Vorskla River. The sector was on the direct path of General Hausser's powerful II.SS Panzer Korps. Colonel Nekrasov deployed most of his firepower on the first echelon. Supported by anti-tank batteries from the 6th Guards Army's arsenal, majority of the guardsmen concentrated their strength to wear SS divisions down before reinforcements arrive. Russian commander also created a security zone by placing platoon sized outposts several kilometers ahead of the main line of resistance. Those strong points were equipped with anti-tank guns, anti-tank rifles and mortars.

At 01:15, on 5 July, Waffen SS troops began recon in force to gather information on the enemy's main trench system. At 03:00, elements of the 3.SS PzG Rgt "Deutschland" (2.SS PzG Div "Das Reich") started their attack on one of the forward strongpoints located at the ruined village of Iakhontov 4km south of Berezov. The attack was spearheaded by Hauptsturmführer Helmuth Schreiber's 10. Panzergrenadier Kompanie. Having no illusions to survive the battle, the soviet guardsmen stood on their way.

019.Maloarkhangelsk – 05 July 1943 – 25 turns
“Hammer Meets Rock”
Maloarkhangelsk, Northern Sector of the Kursk Salient

At the start of Operation Citadelle, 14th Sturmregiment of the 78th "Sturm" Division, one of the best formations in Kluge's 9th Army, was attacking toward Maloarkhangelsk strongpoint which was defended
by the 410th Rifle Regiment (81st Rifle Division). German troops were assisted by the Ferdinand tank destroyers of the 654. PzJager Abteilung. In addition the remote controlled demolition tanks created gaps in the minefields and obstacles allowing an initial penetration for the 654th's armored monsters. By the end of the day, the 78th Division had advanced 4 agonizing kilometers through the well designed defensive network of the Red Army.

020.Zadelnoye – 05 July 1943 – 30 turns
“Leibstandarte at Kursk”
Zadelnoye, Tomarovka - Bykovka Axis

On the first day of the Kursk offensive, SS-Panzer-Grenadier Regiment 2 (Kraas), Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler supported by a platoon of Tigers led by Michael Wittman and a Sturmgeschutz Abteilung moved forward
toward the first day's objective, the village of Bykovka which was located on the Tomarovka-Pokrovka axis. Leibstandarte's orders were to clear a group of small towns along the axis and blocking Soviet flanking movements from the west bank of the Vorskla River.

Moving northward, LSSAH encountered elaborately designed Soviet defensive positions around the village of Zadelnoye. Troops from the determined 52nd Guards Rifle Division (Nekrasov) occupied the trenches and
bunkers reinforced by artillery, anti-tank guns, anti-tank riflemen, tanks and mortar batteries. Realizing the tenacity of the Russian defense, Wittman moved his Tigers forward to accompany the assault troops while they were opening lanes for the following grenadiers.

021.Ponyri – 07 July 1943 – 18 turns
“Little Stalingrad at Ponyri”
Ponyri Station, 60 KM North of Kursk

The Northern thrust of the German attack on the Kursk salient was undertaken by the 9th Army. The main axis of the advance was the railway linked Orel and Kursk. The village of Ponyri was a particularly important objective on this axis. Naturally, the Ponyri village and its surroundings were heavily fortified. The area was defended with the well entrenched divisions of the Soviet 13th Army under General Pukhov. The Ponyri village itself was defended by the elements of the 307th Rifle Division commanded by General Enshin. The 307th Rifle Divisions strong defense line was bolstered by well placed AT guns and dug-in T-34s from the 27th Tank Regiment.

The German spearheads reached the Ponyri line on 5 July. The German attacks of the 292nd, 86th and 78th Infantry Divisions slowly carved into the Russian defenses. On 7 July, forward elements of the 292nd Division (V.Kluge) reached the town center of Ponyri. Kluge ordered an immediate attack on the railway station which seemed to be the cornerstone of the Russian resistance. German infantry, supported by sturmpioneers and tanks including Ferdinands from the PanzerJager Abteilung 653, launched a heavy assault on the station.

022.Kliuchi – 11 July 1943 – 18 turns
“Deadend for Eicke”
Hill 266.6, Psel River, 10 KM West of Prokhorovka

Paul Hausser's II.SS Panzer Korps had been slowly carving its way before a stiff enemy resistance since the German attack on the Kursk salient was started on 5 July. Despite heavy losses, 3rd SS PzG Div. Totenkopf", the left wing of the Korps, reached Psel River on 9 July. At the dawn of 10 July, elements of the Panzergrenadier Regiment "Theodor Eicke" crossed the Psel River and attempted to capture the high ground east of the Kliuchi village, Hill 226,6. The hill was defended by the troops from the 153rd Guards Rifle Regiment. Brutal fighting continued for the rest of the day and at the midnight Waffen-SS regiment held the southern slopes of the hill and a small position east of Kliuchi.

During the night of 11-12 July, both sides finalized their preparations for the next day. According to Hausser's orders for the II SS Panzer Corps, the Totenkopf Division was to gain control of the rest of Hill 226,6 before advancing along the ridge to cut the Prokhorovka-Oboian road and provide flank protection for the "Leibstandarte" for its attack on Hill 252,2.

The German troops were finalizing their deployment for the attack at the dawn of 11 July. Panzers were moving to the assembly areas under the protection of the infantry. At 07:00 forward posts came under artillery fire which was followed by a heavy tank attack. The tanks were part of Bakharovs' 18th Tank Corps which had been sent to capture Hill 226,6 and crush the fragile bridgehead at the northern shore of the Psel River.

023.Belchinino – 12 July 1943 – 16 turns
“The Long Right Flank”
Near Belchinino, 13 KM Southwest of Prokhorovka

It was the second week of July and the armored fist of the 2nd SS Panzer Korps was maintaining its slow and costly advance on Prokhorovka. "Totenkopf" Division was bogged down on the western side of the Psel River and 3rd Panzer Korps' advance was too slow on their right. Therefore German spearheads, the 1st and 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Divisions had to concentrate their limited sources on a narrow frontage. The tough job of defending the extending right flank was given to the grenadiers of the "Der Führer" Regiment.

Elements of the motorcycle company, "Der Führer" Regiment, under the command of Ostuf. Buch was holding a wooded area near the village of Belchinino. Thanks to the skilful tactics and support from Sturmgeschütz Abteilung, SS troopers had managed to fight off continuous Russians attacks aiming to pierce the German flank. On 12 July Russian command commited fresh reinforcements -the 2nd Gds Tank Corps-
to the area. Loosing no time, Russian armor hit the German lines near Belchinino, especially focusing on the woods the SS motorcycle company was deployed.

024.Oktiabrskii – 12 July 1943 – 18 turns
“The Fateful Day”
Oktiabrskii State Farm, 3 KM Southwest of Prokhorovka

By 11 July, 6 days of heavy fighting brought the 4th Panzer Army, the main striking force of the southern pincer aiming the Kursk salient, to the outskirts of the key road junction at Prokhorovka. Von Kluge's northern attack was beaten and Breith's III. Panzer Korps was unsuccessful in providing right flank support for Hausser's II. SS Panzer Korps. However, despite the absence of a breakthrough and bad news from other sectors Hausser's divisions managed to establish strong bridgeheads at the eastern side of the Psel River and were ready for the next push.

By the closing hours of the day, Hausser ordered his spearhead, the 1st SS PzG Div "LSSAH" to advance through the rail line towards Prokhorovka. During the night, LSSAH deployed for the attack in two axes. The left prong was based on Oktiabirskii State Farm; and the right one aimed the village of Jamki to the south of the critical heights codenamed Hill 252,2. However the Russians had other ideas. The very same sector where the Germans expected the breakthrough was chosen for Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army's counterstroke. Without knowing each other's intentions, both sides' armor deployed for a major collision.

With the first lights of 12 July, the 2nd SS PzG Rgt (Kraas), led by the 11th Company, began its advance
from the trenches at Oktiabirskii State Farm they had captured the last day. The leading infantry was negotiating the ridgeline east of Hill 252,2. Obersturmführer von Ribbentrop's panzers were covering their advance from the small village. At 08:15, the leading troops started to deploy purple smokes, the warning
code for enemy tanks. In a couple of minutes the entire ridgeline was covered with purple smoke. Von Ribbentrop checked the ridgeline with his binoculars and saw a remarkable view; dozens of Russian tanks with riding infantry were advancing in full speed down the slope like medieval knights. Ribbentrop quickly deployed his panzers to slow the Russian avalanche. Michael Wittman's Tiger platoon rushed to support the sector. The carefully planned German attack turned out to be a desperate struggle for survival in a few minutes.

025.Garany – 22 July 1943 – 18 turns
“Crisis at the Mius River”
Hill 196.0, South of Garany

While entangled in a fierce struggle against the German Army in the Kursk Salient, STAVKA launched two local counter-offensives on both German flanks; one near Orel against the rear area of the 9th Army in the North; another near the Mius River against the Army Group South. The attack from the Mius Bridgehead particularly surprised von Manstein and threatened the logistical network of the Army Detachment Kempf.

On 21 July, the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps burst out from the Mius position and overwhelmed the thin infantry screen overlooking the river. The 16th Panzergrenadier Division which was deployed between Garany and Kalinowka was the only obstacle on the way of the Russian breakthrough. The German division was dangerously spread out to cover large areas on a flat, tank country. One particularly important spot, the strongpoint known as Hill 196.0 was defended by the elements of the 156th Panzergrenadier Regiment. A few panzers from the Panzer Abteilung 116 were deployed to the rear as reserves. After a brief preparation, the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps launched a heavy assault on the German held hill. The deadly 88mm Flak Guns were the first to greet them.

026.Maximova – 07 August 1943 – 18 turns
“Steel Inferno at Maximova”
Maximova, 15 KM South of Bogodukhov

Operation Rumyantsev was the third Russian attempt to capture Kharkov. It was a nasty surprise for the German command which believed that after the Battle of Kursk the Soviet mobile reserves were too damaged to launch an offensive in the short term. However, on 23 July, elements of the Voronezh and Steppe Fronts hit the Belgorod line, pushing aside the 332nd Infantry Division and 167th Infantry Division. Soviet command sent two powerful armored spearheads into the breach; Katukov's 1st Tank Army and Rotmistrov's 5th Gds Tank Army. The counterattack by the tired 19th Panzer Division could not prevent the envelopment of Tomarovka.

On 5 August the 3rd Mechanized Corps, the leading mobile element of the 1st Tank Army, was holding static lines south of the Tomarovka Pocket. On 6 August the mobile unit was relieved by the infantry from the 32nd Guards Rifle Corps and continued its advance towards Bogodukhov and Merefa to outflank Kharkov from the West. On 7 August after bypassing the German defenses at Bogodukhov, the Russian spearhead continued its advance south towards Maximova, a key rail line sector between Kharkov and Bogodukhov.

By 17:00, the leading unit of the 3rd Mechanized Corps, the 1st Guards Tank Brigade, was near Maximova where they ran into the elements of the 2nd SS Panzergrenadier Division "Das Reich" which was moving from Olshany towards Bogodukhov to plug the gap and establish contact with Army Detachment Kempf. Russian tanks reacted quickly and engaged the German column South of Maximova. With the arrival of reinforcements, the unexpected encounter developed into a chaotic tank battle which continued for two days.

027.Vorskla Valley – 08 August 1943 – 30 turns
“Back to Akhytrka”
Vorskla River Valley, Northeast of Akhytrka

After the failure at Kursk, 52nd Panzer Battalion, commanded by Major von Sivers was attached to the 19th Panzer Division, receiving refitting near Tomarovka. When Voronezh Front launched Operation Rumyantsev, the counteroffensive against the Belgorod salient on August 3, Sivers got only 27 serviceable Panthers with the rest of his vehicles were under repair and immobile. By August 4, the Soviet 6th Tank Corps started an enveloping move south of Tomarovka, threatening the 52nd Panzer Battalion and the 19th Panzer Division's rear. Locked in a fierce tank battle against the 200th Tank Brigade, von Sivers decided to disengage and retreat through the Vorskla River Valley and reach the depots at Borisovka.

On 5 August, after destroying dozens of immobilized Panthers, von Sivers's Kampfgruppe began retreating southwest with the remnants of the 19th Panzer Division. Katukov's 1st Tank Army was racing down the valley towards Borisovka, trying to cut the escape route of the retreating Germans. On 6 August, von Sivers' column reached the outskirts of Borisovka, finding the town surrounded by the Russian armor. Destroying 17 T-34s after a brief long-range duel, von Sivers turned further south to link up with the elements of the Grossdeutschland Division near Akhytrka.

The pursuit continued for 2 days. Every time Russian armor cut his path, Kampfgruppe managed to breakthrough, thanks to the long range advantage of the Panthers. On the afternoon of August 8, Kampfgruppe Sivers was only a couple of kilometers away from the friendly lines north of Akhytrka, where a probe from the 13th Guards Tank Brigade spotted the German column and attempted to block their path.
More Russian armor was on its way to destroy the evasive column before they link up with the forces at Akhytrka.

028.Nikolajewka – 12 September 1943 – 20 turns
“Duel in the Ukraine”
Nikolajewka, Northeast of Kolomak, Near Poltava Bridgehead

In September 1943, following the heavy battles for Kharkov, Das Reich Division was ordered to consolidate their positions near the Poltava bridgehead at Dnyepr River. Stubaf. Otto Weidinger's Armored Recon Battalion moved to new defensive positions at the outskirts of Nikolajewka a couple of kilometers Northeast of Kolomak. SS infantry worked for the defensive positions during the first week of September. However the effort didn’t change the fact that the German lines were thinly held.

On September 12, around 14:00, German lines were alerted by a growing noise of tank engine and tracks. Forward posts started reporting number of enemy tanks coming from the valley north of German lines: "10, 15, 25, 40!". More than 60 T34's from the 1st Mechanized Corps, closely followed by infantry launched an attack on the German lines. Weidling had so little to throw against such a strong phalanx of armor. His orders were desperate: "Let the tanks overrun your lines; engage the infantry!". The job of dealing with the Soviet armor was left to the Panthers of Hstuf. Friedrich Holzer's 1st Panzer Company. If they arrive in time.

029.Stayki – 25 September 1943 – 16 turns
“Another Blister At Dnyepr”
Near Stayki, 20 KM South of Kiev

By the autumn of 1943, Soviet Armies were at the Dnyepr River near Kiev, a major natural obstacle that would give the Germans a moment of respite. During September Russian units actively sought areas appropriate to establish bridgeheads for the upcoming Kiev offensive. The German command did not have sufficient troops to cover the entire shore of the river bend so they formed mobile units to control large areas in order to destroy any infiltration over the Dnyepr.

One such crossing consisted of 50 men from Moshalenko's 40th Army. They established a tiny foothold near the town of Stayki. Past experiences taught the Germans well that such tiny crossings could expand to a regimental strength in a couple of days, so a recon company from the nearby 34th Infantry Division was dispatched to deal with the "blister" before it goes bigger.

030.Tokmak – 11 October 1943 – 18 turns
“Holding the Wotan Line”
Wotan Line, Near Tokmak, 40 KM NE of Melitopol

The Russian Lower Dnepr Offensive that started on 24 August 1943 applied great pressure on the overextended lines of the Army Group South and German front gradually but inevitably deteriorated
under the continuous enemy attacks in different sectors. While most of the Dnepr battle concentrated around the capital of Kiev, General Tolbukhin's 4th Ukrainian Front launched a diversionary offensive on German right flank near Melitopol. Spearheaded by the 51st Army, the Soviet offensive aimed to breach the German
defensive system codenamed Wotanstellung (Wotan Line) and capture Melitopol, thus isolating the Crimean Peninsula from the Axis main frontline.

On 11 October 1943, the 51st Army launched its attack on the 6th Army defending the line between Melitopol and Zaporozhe. The heavy Rolling barrage pinned down the 294th Infantry Division which struggled to shift troops from one sector to another. The 17th Panzer Division tried to plug the gaps with armored counterattacks but struggled to concentrate its hitting power where dozens of sectors cried for help. To make things worse Hitler's "stand fast" doctrine forced the Germans into a static defense they didn't have the resources to sustain. The line cracked in many sectors but German grenadiers continued to stand against
the red tide in certain places where the Wotanstellung was better fortified.


031.Ternovka – 25 October 1943 – 20 turns
“Panzers to the Stage”
Ternovka, 24 KM South of Melitopol

In October 1943 the reconstituted 6th Army was holding the line at Lower Dnepr and the approaches of the Crimea. After pausing for rest and refitting, General Tobukhin's 4th Ukrainian Front launched another offensive on the German Lower Dnepr positions known as the Wotan Line in mid October. After two weeks of heavy fighting Melitopol, the key for the Crimea fell. Tolbukhin's armored spearhead, the 6th Guards Tank Brigade continued its advance southwards to Akimovka.

The approaches of Akimovka were defended by the weary remnants of the 226th Infantry Regiment (79th Infantry Division). Behind the infantry lines, Colonel Hake's armored group of the 13th Panzer Division was deployed as a fire brigade. On 25 October, Russian infantry attacked the town of Ternovka located at the outskirts of Akimovka on the Melitopol Road. Within an hour Russian troops entered Ternovka and the German infantry retreated to recover around the town. Armor of the 6th Guards Tank Brigade moved into the town to resume advance southwards. At 11:00hrs, when Soviet tanks hardly began their advance, Kampfgruppe Hake attacked to recapture the position of Ternovka. Encouraged by the appearance of the panzers, elements of the 226th Infantry Regiment joined the fight. For the Russians a calm operational routine suddenly turned into a chaotic struggle.

032.Kocherovo – 18 November 1943 – 18 turns
“Schneidereit's Cannon”
Kocherovo, Kiev - Zhitomir Highway

On the morning of 3 November 1943, the 4th Panzer Army defending the Dniepr line near Kiev, woke up with a massive Russian artillery barrage. 1st Ukrainian Front's two pronged attack smashed the German bridgehead and Kiev was captured in a couple of days. After Kiev secured, 1st Ukrainian Front's objectives were to drive quickly westwards to take the towns of Zhitomir, Korosten, Berdichev, and Fastov and cut the railroad between Army Group South and Center. The powerful 3rd Guards Tank Army, commanded by Pavel Rybalko launched its attack toward Zhitomir on 5 November. Von Manstein committed the newly arrived 48th Panzer Korps on the Zhitomir - Kiev axis to blunt the Russian drive and recapture Kiev. Rybalko reacted the German counterattack by releasing the 7th Guards Tank Corps.

Russian and German spearheads collided near the town of Kocherovo. 48th Panzer Korps' leading division, the powerful 1. SS Panzergrenadier Division LSSAH captured Kocherovo and started preparing defenses for a future attack that will outflank the Russian tank army. However, Russians had other plans. Rybalko immediately ordered the 7th Gds Tank Corps to counterattack and secure Kocherovo. The thinly spread lines of the LSSAH resisted heavy Russian attacks on 17 - 18 November.

Rottenfuehrer Schneidereit was a gunner in the weapons company of the 2. Battalion (1.SS PzGren Regt) who was known for his prowess with the s.PzB 41 28/20 squeezebore cannon. Remnants of his 8th company were defending the Northeastern edge of Kocherovo. The Soviets attacked with tanks and large waves of infantry. At Kocherovo, he knocked out two T-34s by perfectly placing the shots in a vision block and in the turret ring. They received help from a couple of Panthers, assault guns, and a pair of tank destroyers. He then led a counterattack to regain the town after they had been pushed back. For his actions he was awarded the Knight's Cross.

1944

033.Olshana – 30 January 1944 – 16 turns
“Building the Kessel”
Olshana, 30 KM South of Korsun

The Russian attack to encircle the German troops located in the salient at Dnyepr succeeded in 3 days and on 28th January, Vatutin's 1st Ukranian Front's spearheads met Konev's 2nd Ukrainian Front at Zvenigorodka.
This completely isolated two German Korps in an area known as Korsun Pocket.

On 28th January, German command realized that the Soviet penetration could not be contained and started preparations to build the pocket or "Kessel". The southern face of the Kessel was particularly vulnerable since Russian spearheads were very close. Indeed, Konev sent troops to take several key towns and villages and prevent the Germans from building a strong perimeter.

The town of Olshana was a particularly important objective. It was located on a junction with roads leading to key cities of Shpola, Zvenigorodka and Korsun. German XI. Korps command quickly realized the danger and ordered the units of the 5th SS Panzer Division "Wiking" to block the Russian advance until infantry divisions arrive. However "Wiking" had already engaged into a heavy fighting Southeast of Korsun around Gorodische. When the first Russian patrols arrived Olshana, only troops located in the town was the supply troops of the division. Officers hastily formed an adhoc force from clerks, drivers and mechanics. Division also sent four assault guns commanded by Ostuf. Willy Hein from Panzer Regiment "Wiking". Ostuf. Willy Hein left his Panther at Gorodische and headed for Olshana. He was given four StugIIIg which were under repair in the Divisional HQ. The "Alarmheit" troops supported by those four assault guns, managed to defeat several Russian probes on 28 and 29 January. Germans lost one assault gun in exchange.

However Russians continued their attacks. This time a stronger force, the 63rd Cavalry Division from General Selivanov's 5th Cavalry Corps resumed the offensive. Their first attempts to capture the town from south and east were fought off by the German resistance. On the morning of 30 January, Willy Hein planned
a counterattack to hit the Russian flank before the enemy find time to consolidate their forces around the town. Hein's assault guns supported by the newly arrived infantry from the SS.PzG.Btl "Narwa" attacked the Russian left flank which was protected by an AT gun screen. The Russian troops caught completely off guard since they thought the engine sounds were from their own tanks. Hein quickly grasped the initiative. His assault guns followed by the Estonians shattered the disrupted Russian flank and charged on the infantry which was already deployed for a new assault on the town.

034.Shanderovka – 11 February 1944 – 18 turns
“Ritterkreuz for Werner Meyer”
Shanderovka, 22 KM Northeast of Lisyanka

The attempt to relieve the besieged Germans in the pocket around Korsun was started by Hermann Breith's III. Panzer Korps' attack towards Lisyanka. As a necessary precaution, General Stemmerman, the commander of the "Kessel" planned a series of attacks in order to establish an area of deployment north of Lisyanka for his isolated troops. The area Group Stemmerman attempted to secure formed a triangle with key points at Komarovka, Novo-Buda and Shanderovka.

The Northern edge of the triangle was the town of Shanderovka. Shanderovka was a small Ukrainian town located near Paresowiza River 18km southwest of Korsun. A huge brick factory which lies to the south was its only significant structure. This dull Ukrainian village has become a vital point both sides desperately fought to control in the course of the Battle of Korsun.

The German attempt to control Shanderovka was undertaken by the SS. PzG Rgt "Germania" which was part of the 5th SS Panzer Div "Wiking". Sturmbannführer Hans Dorr, the commander of the 1st Battalion, ordered Ostuf. Werner Meyer's 1st Company to lead the night attack on Shanderovka.

To carry out the attack, Dorr's battalion approached the southern skirts of the town, utilizing a large gully to hide their moves. Meyer moved forward to scout out the enemy positions however his presence was spotted by the Russian sentries. Having lost the element of surprise Meyer immediately ordered his men to attack while 2nd and 3rd companies were trying to catch up. The machinegun positions and flamethrower traps manned by the 54th Fortified Region was waiting for them.

035.Novo-Buda – 13 February 1944 – 18 turns
“No Day For Rest”
Novo Buda, 3 KM East of Komarovka, Cherkassy Pocket

The small village of Novo Buda was located on a hill a couple of kilometers south of Shanderovka. It was an important objective in the zone Stemmerman's isolated army secured in order to fight their way to link up with the III. Panzer Korps fighting near Lisyanka. The fall of Novo Buda meant a serious threat on the Shanderovka - Komarovka axis as it was the dominating height facilitating an attack to cut the road.

Two days ago elements of the 105th Infantry Regiment (71st Infantry Division) had captured Novo Buda and fought off numerous Russian counterattacks. On 12 February, Oberst Kastner's grenadiers were awaiting the arrival of the Wallonien Brigade which was supposed to relieve them. After completing a long march in mud and snow, the leading elements of the Wallonien Brigade arrived Novo Buda. Hand over completed at the late hours of 12 Feb. The exhausted Wallons sought shelter in isbas. Ostubaf. Lucien Lippert and Hstuf. Leon Degrelle, the leading Wallon officers were receiving an update on the tactical situation around the village from the wehrmacht officers.

At 07:00, 13 February, Wallons woke up with the sound of incoming katyusha rounds and the approaching tank treads. The off guarded Wallons hurried to reach their positions. Meanwhile, forward elements of the 11th Guards Cavalry Division (Selivanov's 5th Guards Cavalry Corps) have already infiltrated the southern edge of the village. A day of rest turned out to be a desperate struggle for survival.

036.Shanderovka – 13 February 1944 – 20 turns
“Where Are The Panzers?”
Shanderovka, 20 KM Northeast of Lisyanka

On 11 February, Sturmbannführer Hans Dorr's 1st Battalion from the SS Panzergrenadier Regiment "Germania" had captured Shanderovka, a key position for the defense of the pocket while waiting for the relief attempt. Ostuf. Werner Meyer, the commander of the 1st Company had formed a perimeter along the southeastern edge of the town and had been waiting for the inevitable Russian counterattack. Divisional command had promised armor support two days ago. However the anxiously waiting grenadiers did not receive anything but a couple of antitank guns to bolster their defenses. On 13 February at 2100 hours the Russian infantry launched an attack that was supported by tanks and artillery. Meyer and his company were on their own.

037.Oktyabr – 16 February 1944 – 18 turns
“The Last Ditch Effort”
Oktyabr, Near Lisyanka, 2 KM Southwest of Hill 239.0

The link-up of the 20th Guards Tank Brigade with the 6th Guards Tank Army at the village of Zvenigorodka on 28 January completed the encirclement and created the Kessel that became known as the Korsun-Cherkassy Pocket. Trapped in the pocket were around 50,000 men, a total of six German divisions under the
command of General Stemmermann. Manstein, commander of Army Group South, reacted quickly, and by early February the III and XLVII Panzer Korps were assembled for a relief effort. Aware of the weakness of the XLVII Panzer Korps, Manstein ordered Hermann Breith's III Panzerkorps to lead the attempt to relieve the beleaguered Gruppe Stemmermann which was anxiously waiting the sound of friendly armor near Shanderovka. All progress began to bog down with a change in weather, resulting in the thick mud of the spring thaw that came early.

On 11 February; III Panzerkorps continued its drive east. The exhausted force reached the Gniloy Tikich
stream and established a small bridgehead on the eastern bank at Lisyanka. Despite heavy Soviet attacks on his flanks, Breith pushed forward to capture the strategically important point known as Hill 239.0 located a couple of kilometers north of Lisyanka.

The leading unit of the III Panzer Korps was the Kamfgruppe Frank under the command of Oberstleutnant Heinz Werner Frank which was formed around the elements of the 1st Panzer Regiment and the 113th Panzergrenadier Regiment; all part of the 1st Panzer Division. After the failed attacks on 14 and 15 February towards Hill 239.0, German commander planned another attack on the small village of Oktyabr which was blocking the road linking Lisyanka and Hill 239.0.
For the attack on Oktyabr, all Kampfgruppe Frank could spare was the under strength panzergrenadier company of Leutnant Fritz Leben. Most of the panzers were either destroyed or sent to flanks to fight off enemy counterattacks. Nevertheless, four Panthers under the command of Oberleutnant Dörnberg were present to give a much needed cover for the infantry. The regiment also provided Hummels for long range support. On 16 February 1944, at noon, panzergrendiers of Leutnant Leben launched their desperate attack on Oktyabr. The hamlet was defended by the tanks and men from the 20th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army.

038.Potschapinzy – 17 February 1944 – 20 turns
“The River of Freedom”
Near Potschapinzy, Cherkassy Pocket, 2 KM North of the Gniloi Tikich River

By 16 February it was clear that Breith's panzers were unable to advance further and link up with
Stemmerman's isolated army waiting at Shanderovka. General Stemmerman decided to attack towards southwest and reach the advance elements of the relief force, the III Panzer Korps. The breakout attempt
was undertaken by three battlegroups formed around the 72nd Infantry Division and the SS Panzer Division "Wiking". On 17 February, at midnight, the German breakout attack started from the direction of Shanderovka towards Lisyanka. With heavy snow and fog, weather was in favor of the Germans for the first time in three weeks. With the help of the fog, German spearheads were able to advance towards the critical heights north of Lisyanka without heavy engagement with the Soviet troops.

Ostuf. Heinz Debus' kampfgruppe which was built around the SS-Pz.Aufkl.Abt.5 "Wiking" were following
Oberst Kastner's "Grenadier Rgt. 105" closely. While powerful, Debus' unit was entirely an infantry formation. Only armored vehicles the kampfgruppe had were a forward observer PzIII with a dummy main gun and two Wespe selfpropelled artillery guns. While Kastner's battlegroup managed to slip through the Russian lines without arising much attention, Heinz Debus had to attack a fully alerted enemy. After defeating Russian outposts near Komarowka and Dshurshenzy, Debus' men reached the outskirts of the Hill 239.0. Bad news arrived at this moment as the scouts reported soviet tanks on the hill. Having their escape path blocked by a phalanx of armor, Heinz Debus shifted to the southeast.

Utilizing the low visibility and a deep ravine, SS troopers managed to enter the forest between Hill 239.0 and Potschapinzy. The leading 2nd Company reached the southern edge of the woods at 04:00 just before the dawn. They had only a couple of kilometers before reaching the Gniloy Tikisch River and freedom. However, at the edge of the forest, Debus' advance was stopped by another Russian strongpoint belonging to the 41st Guards Rifle Division. The "Wiking" men launched a fierce attack to overcome this last obstacle before the enemy tanks catch them.

039.Lembitu – 17 March 1944 – 18 turns
“Carius at the "Kinderheim"”
Lembitu, Narva Bridgehead, Estonia

In the Spring of 1944, German Army Group North was still holding a bridgehead at Narva. The bridgehead defenses linked with the front line with a narrow strip passing in an East-West direction between the marshlands of the Narva River to the south and the Gulf of Finland to the North. This narrow strip was making the German bridgehead vulnerable since a Russian breakthrough might have easily cut the lifeline of the defenses at Narva located further to the east. The railway linking Narva to Vaivara was the prime objective of the enemy.

Elements of the depleted 61st Infantry Division were holding the German line at Lembitu strongpoint which was guarding the railway and its approaches. Tigers from the 502nd Heavy Panzer Detachment were spread along the thin defense line to support the infantry. Lieutenant Otto Carius, one of the best tank commanders of the war was stationed at Lembitu with another Tiger under the command of Albert Kersher.

On 17 March, six divisions, armored vehicles and artillery of the Soviet 109th Rifle Corps and the newly brought 6th Rifle Corps attacked the railway embankment. Russian artillery barrage was so intense, Carius and Kersher was unable to find a moment to reach their panzers for 15 minutes. When they managed to get
into the Tigers, Russian troops were already overrunning the forward positions.

040.Zagrobela – 09 April 1944 – 16 turns
“Roar of the Monsters”
Zagrobela, Suburbs of Tarnopol

In the spring of 1944, two Russian fronts; Zhukov's 1st Ukrainian and Koniev's 2nd Ukrainian; was operating in the vicinity of the key junction of Tarnopol near the Polish border. On 5 March, Koniev's 2nd Ukrainian Front smashed the German lines at Uman and penetrated towards the Southern approaches of Tarnopol. This operation pushed the right flank of First Panzer Army back to the northwest away from the left flank of the Eighth Army. At the same time, Zhukov's 1st Ukrainian Front attacked along the rail line to Tarnopol, trying to isolate the city. Germans counterattacked in order to establish a cohesive line. However growing pressure from the two fronts pushed the 1st Panzer Army into a salient south of Tarnopol. While most of the Russian formations were sent to envelop the 1st Panzer Army near Kamenets-Podolskii, the 13th Army of General N.P. Pukhov turned east and attacked the city of Tarnopol.

The city was defended by Generalmajor von Neindorff's troops which were declared as "Festung Tarnopol" in accordance with Hitler's "stand fast" orders. Germans had turned most of the brick houses into pillboxes. The 13th Army's offensive started on 31 March and continued until the second week of April. On 1 April, the Russians penetrated the positions of the "Demba" Fusilier Battalion which was defending Zagrobela, a western suburb of Tarnopol. The veteran unit managed to seal off most of the Russian penetrations. However, heavy enemy pressure in other sectors forced the Battalion into the city center near the rail station. On 9 April, 117th Rifle Division attacked after a bombardment lasting several hours to take the rail-station. The Russians were unable to destroy the German strong points, so they deployed the SU-152 self propelled
guns in a direct fire role. Oberstleutnant Udo Balzer had nothing but panzerfausts to throw against the armored monsters.

041.Kozlow – 11 April 1944 – 20 turns
“The Mud Offensive”
Wosuszka River, Near Kozlow, 17 KM West of Tarnopol

After the encirclement of Tarnopol the German command sent the 8th Panzer Division for a relief attempt. The main force that led the German attack was Kampfgruppe Friebe consisting of the elements from the 10th Panzer and 8th Panzergrenadier Regiments. On 25 March Oberst Friebe started the attack from the west towards Tarnopol. The kampfgruppe advanced through mud and artillery fire, over three rows of hills, each with entrenched Russians.

By the first week of April the German spearhead was near Kozlow 17 km West of Tarnopol, facing the Wosuzka River and the entrenched 99th Rifle Division. After a brief rest and refitting Kampfgruppe Friebe set out to capture a foothold on the eastern side the river near Kubianka. At 06:00hrs 11 April, German panzergrenadiers supported closely by a Panther detachment started their attack on the bridge while two more diversionary moves were launched on both sides.

042.Pereval – 15 April 1944 – 18 turns
“The Sacrificed Battalion”
Pereval, Yaila Mountains, Southern Crimea

The Soviet attack on the Crimea started on 8 April 1944. Elements of the 2nd Guards Army and 51st Army hit the German and Rumanian divisions defending the Perekop Isthmus and Shivash Sea. After fighting two days to contain the enemy advance, the command of the 17th Army reached the conclusion that they didn't have the strength to hold the long northern front and gave the general retreat order towards Sevastopol. On 10 April, a race started between the Axis units trying to reach the Sevastopol perimeter and the Russian spearheads that tried to catch the retreating enemy on open ground.

With the fall of Simferopol on 13 April, the German 5th Korps at the Kerch Peninsula had only one route of retreat westwards; the coastal road passing through the town of Alushta. While the Axis units were in full retreat towards Alushta; the task of blocking the Russian advance was given to the Rumanian Infantry. The passes in the Yaila Mountains, north of Alushta, were defended by Rumanian detachments. A particularly
important objective, Pereval which was located on the mountain road was defended by Lt.Col. Aurel Vulcanescu's 23rd Mountain Battalion which was supported by a battery of 75mm howitzers. The battalion had the unenviable job of gaining time for the thousands of troops retreating towards Alushta and Sevastopol. During the night of 15 April, Soviet troops from the 19th Tank Corps attacked the village.

043.Lopyashna – 16 April 1944 – 18 turns
“The Hit and Run Game”
Lopyashna, 50 km SW of Kishinev

By the spring of 1944, The Russian winter offensive was losing momentum with over-extended supply lines and tiring troops. Still, Rodion Malinovsky's 3rd Ukrainian Front has conducted probing attacks to infiltrate behind the German 8th Army which was retreating behind the Siret River into Moldova. The fast moving Russian mechanized spearheads were threatening the exhausted German infantry.

However, in April, after refitting at Kishinev, the 3rd SS Panzer Division "Totenkopf" arrived in the region and started operations as a mobile rearguard formation. Following the German flexible defense doctrine, the Totenkopf Division has set up a series of strong points in the valleys and hills of Moldova. Those strong points were planned as road blocks for the Russian mechanized columns where quick armored counterattacks aimed to destroy the enemy before the main part of the column can reach and provide support. In 16 April, at Lopyashna, approximately 50 km West of Kishinev, panzergrenadiers from the "Theodor Eicke" Regiment ambushed a forward column from the 55th Mechanized Brigade.

044.Radcha – 01 May 1944 – 18 turns
“Rage of the Red Bear”
Radcha, 8 KM Southwest of Stanislav

By the end of spring, 1944, southern Russia and the Ukraine were back under Soviet control and the Red Armies were preparing the invasion of Germany's Eastern European Allies. The northern gates of Eastern
Europe was defended by the Hungarian First Army. After their unsuccessful spoiling attack against the Russian concentration at Stanislav, Hungarian forces dug-in around the town of Lisets, waiting for the inevitable attack of the Red Army. On May 1st, Russian armor started rolling again. 1st Ukrainian Front crashed the first line of defenses Southeast of Lvov and continued its advance towards the Hungarian border. Russian spearhead, 162nd Tank Brigade reached Lisets - Radcha line without much resistance from the enemy. At the outskirts of Radcha, Soviet units encountered elements of the Hungarian 2nd Armored Division.

045.Drvar – 25 May 1944 – 25 turns
“Operation Rösselsprung”
Tito’s Headquarters, Drvar, Yugoslavia

Following the fall of Mussolini, partisan activity significantly increased in Yugoslavia in the spring of 1944. To counter the threat, German command designed a large anti-partisan offensive. The offensive code named Operation Rösselsprung (Knight's Leap) aimed to destroy large concentrations of Tito's Partisan Army by a series of well coordinated blows in different areas. Although the whole operation contained separate sectors and different units such as 7.SS Mountain Division "Prinz Eugen", "Brandenburg" commandos, Croatian Jager Brigade and Chetnik Corps; the most significant operation of the entire plan was an airborne assault on Tito's headquarters located on the hills surrounding the Bosnian town of Drvar.

The assault on Drvar was given to the 500.SS Parachute Battalion commanded by Hauptsturmführer Kurt Rybka. The SS airborne unit was formed in 1943 near Sarajevo and completed its training in the first months of 1944. An unconventional unit with SS troopers partially recruited from penal companies using paratrooper equipment; 500.SS Parachute Battalion was designed to be used in high risk special operations similar to Otto Skorzeny's successful raid on Gran Sasso that rescued Mussolini.

On 25 May 1944, at 05:00, following an aerial bombardment, SS paratroopers landed on an open ground in front of the hills hosting Tito's dugout. Paratroopers secured the area for the second wave glider landing. There were fewer than 100 Partisans in the area when the operation started. Most of the Partisan troops were dispersed in the countryside. Hills were defended by a company sized unit from Tito's Escort Battalion. Disrupted by the bombardment and the paratrooper attack, partisans struggled to bring reinforcements in order to block the German advance.

Thanks to Ernie Sands for posting his pics from the event, and his travels around the area...

http://www.flickr.com/photos/erniesan1/

Just back from TillerCon III and had a very good time. Was probably the best one so far due in no small part to having NASHCON right accross the hall. Was good to have a bunch of fellow wargamers under the same roof.

The news about the two new games is out obviously, so when I get some time I'll start posting some more details on them.

The 1.01 update for Midway is on the HPS site. A fix for a slight issue with a dialog is included as well as some enhancements requested by players:

http://www.hpssims.com/Pages/updates...up_NAVCAM.html

Changes for Midway V1.01
- Fix to hang problems with Aircraft Dialog.
- Change so that Deck Operations are not possible when a carrier is in clouds.
- Added a Depth Sounding feature (under View Menu) that affects submarine operations.
- Change so that radar detection is shown using a magenta line and does not result in spotting.
- Added Range Only and Airborne radar.
- Added Critical Ship feature which when sunk results in immediate scenario termination.
- Change so that zoom changes using the mouse wheel maintain cursor position.
- Added Sea State to lower right-hand corner of Jump Chart.
- Added Collision feature.
- Added number of seconds remaining in ship picture when waiting for air operations to complete.
- Added hot key "R" for aircraft Return to Base.
- Darkened American ships on Jump Chart for better ledgibility.
- (Database) Added 5" HVAR to TBM Avenger loads.
- (Editor) Added ability to place and remove mines.
- (Editor) Added ability to specify extra loads on a ship.

Well, time is marching on and its almost time to hit the road for TillerCon. Guess I ought to throw out another hint...

Engines are involved, as in "internal combustion" type. :)

And what the heck, here's another...

Neither title takes place in North or South America. :p

Greek Wars covers the period c.500- c.360BC from the Ionian Revolt and consequent Persian Wars down to era of Theban hegemony prior to the rise of Makedonia as the dominant power. This is the era when hoplite warfare was predominant, with the various Greek city states often at war with each other rather than against their two most dangerous enemies – Persia and Carthage.

Sardis 498 BC - After failing to capture Naxos with Persian support, Aristagoras realizing that he would probably be deprived of his position as tyrant of Miletos, instigated the Ionian Revolt from Persian rule. With support from the Athenian democracy and the mercantile Greek city state of Eretria, Aristagoras raised an army and marched against the important Persian satrapal capital of Sardis. Caught by surprise, the outnumbered Persians retired to the citadel and the Greeks burnt - whether deliberately or accidentally - the unwalled lower town, and then retreated before Persian reinforcements could arrive. When the Persian king Darios heard of this outrage, he swore vengeance against the Athenians, so this act would lead to first Marathon and then Xerxes' great expedition of 480 BC.

Ephesos 498 BC - After burning Sardis, the Greeks retreated to Ephesos with the Persians in hot pursuit. Although the Greeks were probably outnumbered, the two armies must nevertheless have been fairly evenly balanced since they decided to deploy outside the city walls and risk a pitched battle rather than endure a siege. The most well-known Greek killed in the subsequent battle was the Eretrian commander Eualkides. After this battle - which was a decisive Persian victory - the Athenians refused to provide any further assistance to the Ionian Greeks in their revolt from Persian rule, but the Persian king Darios hadn't forgotten the part played by Athens and Eretria in the sack of Sardis and would send an expedition to punish these cities once the Ionian Revolt had been crushed.

The Battle of Marathon 490 BC - Athenian involvement in the failed Ionian Revolt caused King Darios to send an expeditionary force to punish Athens. After capturing Eretria, the Persians landed at Marathon, some 25 miles from Athens, but the prompt arrival of the Athenian army, assisted by a small Plataean contingent, prevented them from marching inland. However, battle was delayed for some days since the Athenians were waiting for Spartan reinforcements and the Persians were reluctant to assault the Athenian camp, fortified against a cavalry attack. Eventually, perhaps realizing that Greek reinforcements were on their way, or else wishing to break the stalemate, the Persians decided to re-embark their army and then sail round Cape Sounion to attack undefended Athens directly. However, the Athenians now seized the opportunity to attack the partially embarked Persian force, even though they needed to weaken their centre to enable their line to cover the same frontage as the Persians.

Thermopylae 480 BC – A decade after the defeat at Marathon, the Persians launch a massive overland invasion of Greece. A combined Greek force of some 5,000 to 7,000 men (the figures provided by Herodotus and Diodorus Siculus are not the same for the various Greek states, and there is also uncertainty as to the number of helots and Lokrians present) prepares to defend the narrow Thermopylae pass in conjunction with the Greek navy at Artemision. The Persians have vastly superior numbers, but these are useless in such a confined space ...

Anopaea Path 480 BC - The Greeks had successfully held the narrow pass at Thermopylae for two days, but towards the end of the second day, the traitor Ephialtes of Trachis offered to guide the Persians around Thermopylae via a mountain pass. Only a thousand Phocians had been assigned to guard the Anopaea path and when the 20,000 strong Persian force under Hydarnes suddenly appeared, instead of defending the path, the Phocians fell back onto a nearby hilltop, allowing the Persians to continue along the path unopposed. However, in this scenario, the Phocians can attempt to hold the pass.

Himera 480 BC - With the Greek city states of Greece preoccupied with repelling Xerxes' invasion, the Carthaginians launched a simultaneous assault against the Sicilian Greeks. The balance of power in Sicily at this time was complex - while Carthage dominated the eastern part of the island, Dorian Greeks controlled the west and south, while Ionian Greeks held the north. The interior was still in the hands of the indigenous Sikels and Sikans under Greek influence, and Elymians in the east under Carthaginian sway. Herodotus and Diodorus give different accounts of the battle of Himera. It appears that after a Greek raid on the Carthaginian sea camp in which Hamilcar was killed, the Greeks assaulted the land camp.

The Battle of Plataea, August 479 BC - After the naval defeat at Salamis, Persian supply problems force Xerxes to retreat with the main Persian army back to Asia. However, a large Persian force under Mardonius - assisted by the Thebans and other medizing Greeks - remains in central Greece and will have to be decisively defeated by the various Greek city states if they want to restore peace and security. The Peloponnesian plan to construct a defensive wall across the Korinthian isthmus is clearly futile if Athens, with her powerful navy, is forced to make peace with the enemy. So Sparta and her allies will have to march north and join the Athenians in an attempt to drive the Persians out of Greece for good. Herodotus provides detailed, and feasible, figures for the various Greek contingents, but his estimate of the Persian strength is clearly exaggerated. However, since he states which troops were facing each Greek force, it's possible to get a good idea of the real Persian numbers.

Battle of Mycale 479 BC - With the Persian fleet defeated at Salamis, the main Persian army was forced to retreat to Asia due to supply problems. Despite the continued presence of a large Persian force under Mardonius on Greek soil, the Greek allied fleets set sail for Samos to encourage the Ionian Greeks to revolt again. However, the Persians were reluctant to risk another naval encounter and beached their fleet near Mt. Mycale, building a wooden palisade to protect the ships. So, to destroy the Persian navy, the Greeks would need to fight a land battle against a 60,000 strong Persian army under Tigranes. The Athenians, Corinthians and other Greeks advanced across open ground directly against the Persian position, while the Spartans on the left flank marched across difficult terrain to outflank the enemy. Meanwhile, the Greek contingents in the Persian force - Milesians and Samians - were watching carefully for the opportunity to switch sides.

Battle of Tanagra 457 BC - Despite the possibility of another Persian invasion, relations between the expanding Athenian Empire and the Spartan-led Peloponnesian League had been steadily deteriorating and would lead to the Peloponnesian War, or rather two wars separated by a period of uneasy truce. While diplomatic relations were already poor and Sparta's key ally Korinth at war with Athens over a border dispute involving Megara, the immediate cause of the war was a conflict between two minor Greek city states, Phokis and Doris. Since Doris was the traditional homeland of Doric Greeks, a Peloponnesian army was sent north to force Phokis to make peace. However, the Athenians saw this as an opportunity to isolate this force in Boeotia and prevent them from returning to the Peloponnese. Outnumbered 11,500 to 14,000, the Spartans and their allies will have to defeat the Athenians in order to make their way home.

Koronea 447 BC - After a victory over the Boeotians at Oenophyta in 457 BC, Athens endeavoured to consolidate her control over the various Boeotian city states, but by 447 BC a number of towns including Orchomenos and Chaeronea were reasserting their independence, so the Athenians decided to send a punitive expedition against the Boeotians. The Athenians, led by Tolmides, captured Chaeronea, enslaving the inhabitants and establishing a garrison, but on their return march were ambushed by the Boeotians at Koronea. This defeat would end Athenian hegemony over Boeotia. Since the precise numbers involved is uncertain - Thucydides just mentioned 1,000 Athenian hoplites - I've given each side 2,500pts worth of troops.

Potidea 432 BC - Fearing that Potidea, a Korinthian colony but tributary ally of Athens, might break her allegiance and persuade other Athenian allies in the region to revolt, the city was ordered to raze her seaward wall, hand over hostages and expel her Korinthian-appointed magistrates. The Potideans, after unsuccessfully sending envoys to Athens to have these orders revoked, requested assistance from Korinth and was sent a force of 1600 hoplites and 400 psiloi under Aristeus. Meanwhile, to counter Aristeus' expedition, the Athenians sent a further 2000 hoplites under Kallias to reinforce Archestratos' initial force of 1000 hoplites. Thucydides makes no mention of how many psiloi or peltasts - if any - were present on the Athenian side, although he does state that neither side fielded any cavalry, since the Makedonian allied horse had been sent off before the battle to prevent Potidean reinforcements from arriving from nearby Olynthos.

Battle of Tanagra 426 BC - Thucydides provides few details of this battle, so the army strengths and deployment are conjectural. After failing to compel Melos to join the Athenian confederation, Nikias with 2,000 hoplites linked up with the main Athenian army under Hipponikos and Eurymedon at Tanagra, ravaging the surrounding land and then defeating the Tanagran army, despite the Tanagrans receiving assistance from Thebes.

Sphakteria 425 BC - The Spartan naval defeat at Pylos left 420 Spartan hoplites with their attendant helots isolated on the island of Sphakteria. After a negotiated truce failed to achieve anything, the Athenians under Demosthenes planned to starve the Spartans into submission, but swimmers were able to bring food and supplies across to the island, so it became clear that the Spartans would have to be forced to surrender by force of arms. The Athenian demagogue Kleon bragged that he'd either kill or capture the Spartans within twenty days, but when he arrived to take up command, he wisely appointed Demosthenes joint leader. After a dawn landing which caught the enemy unprepared, the Athenian force advanced towards the main Spartan force, but instead of just relying on superior numbers to overwhelm the Spartans, the Athenians make good use of their skirmishers to wear down the enemy.

The Battle of Delion (or Delium) 424 BC - An Athenian invasion of Boeotia went badly wrong due to the failure of the two Athenian generals Hippokrates and Demosthenes to properly coordinate their forces. Landing at Siphae, Demosthenes discovered that the enemy had learnt of the Athenian attack and so, with no sign of Hippokrates' troops, he was forced to retreat. But when Hippokrates arrived in Boeotia, instead of abandoning the expedition he constructed a fort around the sanctuary of Apollo at Delion. With the fort almost complete, the Boeotian army under Pagondas marched to attack, deploying in battle array out of sight of the Athenians on the other side of a hill. The two armies were of approximately equal hoplite strength, although the Boeotian light infantry was far more numerous, as many as 10,000 according to Thucydides. However, they don't seem to play much of a role in his account of the battle, and to make the scenario more balanced, I've only included 1,000.

Amphipolis 422 BC - The Spartan general Brasidas had captured the important Athenian colony of Amphipolis in the winter of 424/3 BC, facilitated by the tardy arrival of an Athenian relief force under Thucydides, who was consequently exiled from Athens and then wrote his history of the war. After a brief armistice, the demagogue Kleon - who had won a victory over the Spartans at Sphakteria - was sent by Athens to recover the city. Although the forces were approximately equal in strength, Brasidas was reluctant to risk an open battle as he felt that most his troops were inferior in quality. However, when Kleon decided that the enemy weren't going to fight and, unprepared for a direct assault on the city walls, he ordered his troops to march off, Brasidas seized the opportunity of launching a sortie against the retreating enemy, catching them off guard and inflicting heavy losses. Spartan losses were very light - only 7 men compared to about 600 Athenians - but both generals were killed.

Mantinea 418 BC - One of the largest and most important battles of the Peloponnesian War. An alliance of Argives, Athenians and several other minor Greek states marched against Tegea, a key town which, if falling into enemy hands, would bottle up the Spartans in Laconia (the south eastern part of the Peloponnese), and thus effectively destroy the Peloponnesian coalition. Rather than waiting in Tegea for Korinthian and Boeotian reinforcements, King Agis felt obliged to take the fight to the enemy and attacked nearby Mantinea, a city allied to Argos. The Tegean contingent on the Spartan side (which uses the Theban counter mix in this scenario) is given the place of honour on the right flank, since fighting for its homeland. Facing them, the allied army deployed with the Mantineans on the right, the Argives in the centre, and the Athenians on the left.

Anapos River 415 BC – The first main battle of Athens’ ill-fated Sicilian Expedition. Having lured the Syracusan army north to Katana, the Athenians take the opportunity to land their army south of Syracuse, but then, instead of attempting to capture the city by assault immediately, the Athenians decided to establish a fortified camp at Daskon and give the Syracusan army time to march back and fight a pitched battle against the invaders at the Anapos River. The Syracusans have a strong cavalry advantage, but their hoplites are inexperienced. (NB: The Athenian allies - Argives, Mantineans, etc - use the Theban counter mix) After the disastrous Sicilian Expedition and several crushing naval defeats, Athens was forced to sue for peace and Sparta enjoyed a brief hegemony. Nevertheless, her two key allies in the Peloponnesian War – Korinth and Thebes – would soon join forces with her enemies ... meanwhile, Carthage launched a fresh onslaught on Sicily and the Persian empire was thrown into the brief turmoil of civil war.

Himera 409 BC - After the decisive defeat of 480 BC, the Carthaginians had been reluctant to get involved in Sicily, ignoring a plea for help from the Elymian city of Segesta in 415 BC which resulted in the Athenians sending an ill-fated expeditionary force instead. But in 410 BC the Carthaginian senate decided to assist Segesta against the hostile Sicilian Greek city of Selinus. After crushing Selinus in 409 BC, the Carthaginian general Hannibal Mago receive some 20,000 Elymian and Sikel reinforcements and, despite having fulfilled the original purpose of the expedition, decided to march against Himera and avenge the 480 BC defeat. After failing to take the city by assault, the Carthaginians laid siege, permitting Greek reinforcements under Diokles of Syracuse to march to Himera's relief. Diokles decided to launch a surprise attack on the Carthaginian camp, but after initial success the Greeks were defeated and Himera evacuated. The remaining defenders only held out for a single day.

The Battle of Gela 405 BC. - A 45,000 strong Carthaginian army under Himilko is besieging the Greek town of Gela, but Dionysios of Syracuse raises an army and marches to the assistance of the Geloans. To defeat the Carthaginians, Dionysios devises a three pronged assault on their camp. First 10,000 Italiots will make an amphibious landing on the Carthaginian right flank, while another 11,000 Syracusan and Sikeliot troops will move north of the city and round to attack the Carthaginian left and Dionysios himself with the rest of the army, approximately 10,000 strong, including 1,000 Sicilian cavalry, will sortie out of Gela and advance against the Carthaginian centre. These three attacks required good timing and careful coordination to be successful. Historically, the two flanking attacks were successful against the unprepared Carthaginians, but when Dionysios' own force took too long to march through the streets of Gela, the enemy were able to rally and drive off the Greeks.

Kunaxa 401 BC - Determined to seize the Persian throne from his brother Artaxerxes II, Cyrus assembles an army and marches eastwards. His main hope of success lies in a force of around 13,000 Greek mercenaries who are expected to make mincemeat of their more numerous oriental opponents. While Xenophon provides a detailed account of the various Greek leaders and their contingents, the size of the oriental forces on both sides is largely conjectural, since the huge figures provided by both Xenophon and Diodorus are clearly wildly exaggerated. However, the fact that the frontal of the Greek troops almost corresponded to around half that of Artaxerxes' army may indicate that the Persian army was perhaps only some 40,000 strong. (NB: Cyrus' orientals use the Carthaginian counter mix.)

Battle of Nemea 394 BC - The formation of the anti-Spartan alliance of Athens, Thebes, Korinth and Argos with Persian financial support, is barely mentioned by Xenophon, but is described by Diodorus (XIV, 82). When the Korinthian War started in 395 BC, the Spartan king Agesilaos was campaigning in Ionia against the Persians, so Aristodemos led the Spartan army against the coalition forces assembled at Nemea.

Koronea 394 BC - With king Agesilaos still campaigning against the Persians in Ionia, the Spartans had failed to take advantage of their victory at Nemea earlier in the year and take the fight north of Korinth and into central Greece. However, Agesilaos had been recalled and, leading an army that included the remnants of the famous 10,000 that had fought at Kunaxa, he conducted an overland march back to the Peloponnese through a hostile Boeotia. At Koronea he came face to face with a larger coalition Greek force of Boeotians, Athenians, Argives, Korinthians, Euboeans, and Lokrians. In the ensuing battle, the Spartans on the right flank defeated their Argive opponents, while on the left the Thebans and other Boeotians defeated Sparta's allied troops. Then, in perhaps the bloodiest hoplite encounter ever, Agesilaos decided to crush the Thebans in a direct head-on frontal attack.

Lechaeon 390 BC – This small scale action demonstrated how unsupported hoplites were vulnerable to lighter troops. Observing a small force (a single mora some 600 strong) of unsupported Spartan hoplites escort a convey from Lechaeon to Sikyon, the Athenian general Iphikrates decides to harass them on the march back to Lechaeon with his peltasts, leaving the Athenian hoplites under Kallias in reserve. However, a Spartan cavalry unit is nearby and should arrive at some point to assist the Spartan hoplites. (The strength of the Athenian peltasts is unknown, so I've made the two sides of equal VP value.)

Leuktra 371 BC - Attempting to reassert Sparta authority in central Greece, King Kleombrotos invades Boeotia with an 11,000 strong army (of which 2,000 were Spartans and the rest comprised of various Peloponnesian allies) and establishes a camp at Leuktra, near Thebes. The Thebans and other Boeotians under Epaminondas, despite being outnumbered, decided to risk a battle. To compensate for their numerical inferiority, the Thebans decided to attack the Spartan right flank - where the Spartans themselves were located - in a 50 men deep formation headed by the Sacred Band, an elite force of 300 men. Meanwhile the rest of the Theban units were deployed in an echelon formation, held back so that they didn't make contact with the enemy line. The Spartans were crushed by sheer weight of numbers and their uncommitted allies were reluctant to prolong the battle.

Mantinea 362 BC - After the decisive Theban victory at Leuktra, Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnese several times, weakening traditional Spartan influence over central and western Peloponnese by establishing cities at Messene and Megalopolis. Taking advantage of a dispute between pro-Spartan Mantinea and Tegea, Epaminondas first attempted to outmanoeuvre the Spartan army under Agesilaos and take an undefended Sparta then, when this move was frustrated, marched against Mantinea where he encountered the Spartans and their allies, who now included the Athenians. As at Leuktra, the Thebans attacked the enemy right flank in strength while holding back on the other flank and once again secured victory. However, the death of Epaminondas marked the end of the brief Theban hegemony and facilitated the rise of Makedonia as the dominant power.